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ABSTRACT 
 
While History of Technology as a discipline has developed more strongly in the Global 
North, a huge lacuna exists in the Global South, particularly in Africa.  In addition, the 
few texts that have given attention to the South have more often than not continued to 
bracket these localities and the experiences of its peoples as either a historical or 
lacking agency.  The over-emphasis on the perspective of the colonizers rather than the 
colonized that is evident in most of the literature has led to inconclusive typologies 
common to many syntheses of Africa’s past especially its urban experiences.  In many 
instances, the dichotomous and a symmetrical analysis results into the African practices 
of the city being reduced to a colonial perception of disorder.  To envision Africa’s 
cities only in terms of their colonial and postcolonial relationships may preclude a fuller 
understanding of the multifaceted ways in which they have engaged with the larger 
world. Furthermore, most studies on technology and infrastructure to be particular have 
employed dominant paradigms like the theory of Large Technical Systems (LTSs) and 
propagated the imagination of most urban spaces within the lenses of the ‘networked 
city model’.  These theoretical frameworks have produced incomplete narratives that 
see the South as chaotic, disorderly and operating on the brink of collapse.  It is this fact 
that has driven contemporary social science and technology studies to call for a 
departure from the ‘old’ to a new scholarship that acknowledges the localities in the 
South as not only ‘sources for data’ but also as ‘sites for theorization in their own right’. 
What is needed in history of technology is a shift from focusing on ‘origin and 
invention’ to ‘use, meaning and effect’ so as to avoid the reproduction of knowledge 
that continues to ‘privilege’ the North.  Towards the development of Global History of 
Technology, the gap needs to be bridged by giving attention to the historical 
particularities of the Global South rather than the South being approached as 
exceptional. 
 
It is on this backdrop that this study of Nairobi was undertaken. Moving between the 
formal level of engineering and planning and the informal level of daily practice, the 
dissertation investigated how urban water and sanitation technologies were adopted, 
appropriated, and contested by various actors. Archival investigations in Nairobi, 
London and Oxford (UK) and oral accounts of users were employed and analyzed 
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qualitatively.   By departing from the dominant LTS perspective, the study zeroes in on 
the role of users as participants in the making of the histories of the city and as non-
passive recipients of migratory ideas and ideals, especially in the process of procuring 
their daily needs.  Technical infrastructural artifacts are looked at as multilayered and 
possessing a powerful political and economic nature that determines their access and 
‘allocative’ role. Nairobi’s water and sanitation socio-spatial outlay was unbundled to 
reveal a quilt of a heterogeneous techno-scape.  
 
Nairobi, like any city in the world has its urban materialities embodying aspirations of 
various actors but historically, its engineer sociologists continue to define both the 
characteristics of the technical artifact and the social universe in which they are to 
function.  As a colonial city and an urban space, Nairobi was loaded with imprints of 
social differentiation, social control and domination and the post-colony has seen elitist 
ideals augmented in parallel with a rapidly expanding group of urban poor.  However, 
much as infrastructure supply has for several years followed a variegated path, this 
study sought to push the boundaries beyond the conventional asymmetries of race, class 
and ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ as explained through the formal and informal binary that is 
common in Urban Studies.  It is not enough to conclude that the deployment of key 
infrastructures adheres to racialized (later elitist or class) planning.  Rather, the question 
of access is informed by many factors that include the political nature of artifacts 
themselves and people as non-passive recipients; the cost-recovery component of 
‘modern’ infrastructure projects as juxtaposed to the socio-cultural constructs of water 
and sanitation provisioning.  Nairobi in retrospect attains a techno-collage or patchwork 
of modalities of provisioning that affirms the heterogeneous nature of most urban 
spaces.  
 
Furthermore, juxtaposed against the ‘splintering urbanism’ thesis, this work reverses 
the narrative by pointing out that the Global South cities have traditionally been 
fragmented and ‘splintered’ in terms of their socio-technical topologies.  Nairobi for 
instance has from its foundation been marked by a quilt of different socio-technical 
arrangement of water and sanitation provision that combine both top-down approaches 
that are characterized by highly centralized municipal governance and bottom-linked 
modalities.  These include shallow wells, boreholes, rain-water-harvesting, cesspits, and 
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pushcarts amongst others.  There are also ‘mediative’ hybridized arrangements like the 
‘spaghetti’ pipes and standpipes cum water kiosks.  The centrality of some of these 
methods from below, as espoused in this study, has witnessed a process of streamlining. 
This is acknowledged by the utility companies through public-private partnerships that 
combine the large and the small to plug into the technological gaps existing especially 
in the informal settlements that are melting pots of both technological innovation and 
contestation.  Heterogeneity and ‘decentered’ or devolved small scale modalities of 
provision have been and will always remain a permanent marker of most cities as their 
history goes hand in glove with that of the cities themselves.  Nairobi’s checkered 
sociotechnical outlay is as old as the city itself.  
 
Perhaps, as the writing of a Global History of Technology takes center stage, future 
scholarship needs to focus more on the multilayered nature of human and knowledge 
flows that go beyond the North-South binary to encompass South-North, South-North-
South, South-South amongst many other shifts and counter-shifts, as we grapple with 
the challenge of knowledge production on histories of technology that is highly 
representative. 
  
vii  
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Während die Technikgeschichte als wissenschaftliche Disziplin im Globalen Norden 
stark vorangetrieben worden ist, besteht für den Globalen Süden, insbesondere Afrika, 
in dieser Hinsicht eine große Lücke.   Zudem stellen die wenigen Texte zum Thema, die 
dem Süden überhaupt Beachtung schenken, die lokalen Eigenheiten und Erfahrungen 
der Menschen dort entweder als ahistorisch dar oder klammern sie aufgrund 
vermeintlich fehlender Handlungsmacht aus. Durch die Bevorzugung der Perspektive 
der Kolonialisten gegenüber jener der Kolonisierten, die den Großteil der Literatur 
offenkundig prägt, sind in Bezug auf die Vergangenheit Afrikas, insbesondere die 
dortigen städtischen Erfahrungen, meistens unvollständige und einseitige Darstellungen 
entstanden.  In vielen Fällen hat diese dichotome und asymmetrische Analyse von 
urbanen Praktiken in Afrika dazu geführt, dass sie in der reduzierten kolonialen 
Wahrnehmung schlicht als Unordnung erscheinen.  
 
Eine solche Auffassung von afrikanischen Städten, d. h. ausschließlich im Hinblick auf 
ihre kolonialen und postkolonialen Beziehungen, riskiert aber, dass die vielfältigen 
Verknüpfungen mit der restlichen Welt nicht umfassend berücksichtigt und verstanden 
werden.  So werden in den meisten Studien zur Technologie und Infrastruktur 
beispielsweise dominante Paradigmen, wie die Theorie von Large Technical Systems 
(LTS), zugrunde gelegt und urbane Räume werden durch die Linse des “Networked 
City”-Modells betrachtet.  Durch diese theoretischen Rahmungen sind unvollständige 
Narrative entstanden, denen zufolge der Globale Süden chaotisch, regellos und am 
Rande des Kollapses agiert.  Dies wiederum hat dazu geführt, dass die zeitgenössischen 
Sozialwissenschaften und die sog.  Sceince and Technology Studies (STS) von einer 
Abkehr der “alten” zugunsten einer neuen Wissenschaft aufrufen, in der Orte des 
Südens nicht lediglich als “Datenquellen” betrachtet werden, sondern als eigenständige 
Orte zur Theoriebildung. Was die Technikgeschichte also braucht, ist eine 
Verschiebung des Schwerpunkts von Ursprung und Erfindung hin zu Nutzung, 
Bedeutung und Wirkung. Dadurch könnte verhindert werden, dass nur Wissen 
reproduziert wird, das fortlaufend den Norden privilegiert.  Wenn auf eine Globale 
Technikgeschichte hingearbeitet werden soll, muss diese Lücke geschlossen werden, 
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indem den historischen Eigenheiten des globalen Südens ernsthaft Aufmerksamkeit 
geschenkt wird, anstatt ihn immer als exotische Ausnahme zu begreifen. 
 
Die vorliegende Studie über Nairobi wurde vor dem oben skizzierten Hintergrund 
durchgeführt. Die Dissertation untersucht, wie städtische Wasser- und 
Sanitärtechnologien durch verschiedene Akteure übernommen, angepasst und infrage 
gestellt wurden. Dabei berücksichtigt sie sowohl die formalen Ebenen des 
Ingenieurswesens und der Stadtplanung als auch die informale Ebene der alltäglichen 
Praxis. In Nairobi, London und Oxford fanden Archivrecherchen statt und es wurden 
quantitative Befragungen von Nutzern durchgeführt und ausgewertet. Durch die Abkehr 
von der dominanten LTS-Perspektive fokussiert die Studie auf die Rolle der Nutzer als 
nicht-passive Teilnehmer an der Geschichtsschreibung der Stadt, insbesondere bei der 
Erledigung ihrer täglichen Bedürfnisse. Technische Artefakte und Infrastrukturen 
werden in diesem Zusammenhang als vielschichtig und von inhärenter politischer und 
wirtschaftlicher Natur angesehen, da der Zugang zu ihnen sowie ihre allokative Rolle 
festgelegt sind.  Der sozialräumliche Aufbau der Wasser- und Sanitärversorgung in 
Nairobi wird entflochten und hat einen Flickenteppich heterogener Techniklandschaften 
entfaltet. 
 
Wie jede Stadt verfügt Nairobi über eine lebendige urbane Materialität, die von den 
Ambitionen und Hoffnungen verschiedener Akteure bestimmt wird.  Historisch gesehen 
jedoch definierten fortlaufend die Bauingenieure und Planer der Stadt die Merkmale der 
technischen Artefakte und das soziale Universum, in dem sie funktionieren.  Als 
Kolonialstadt und urbaner Raum wurde (und wird) Nairobi durch soziale 
Differenzierung, soziale Kontrolle und Herrschaft geprägt. Außerdem wurden elitäre 
Ideale in der postkolonialen Zeit stark befördert, während parallel eine immer schneller 
wachsende Gruppe an Menschen in städtischer Armut lebt. Ebenso wie ein Großteil der 
Infrastrukturversorgung seit einigen Jahren unterschiedliche Wege geht, versucht diese 
Studie die Grenzen über die konventionellen Asymmetrien zwischen den Rassen, 
Klassen und Kategorien von  ‘legal’ und ‘illegal’ durchzubrechen. Dieses formale und 
informale binäre System wird zur Erklärung der meisten städtischen Räume 
herangezogen. Es reicht jedoch nicht, zu dem Schluss zu kommen, dass der Ausbau der 
grundlegenden Infrastruktur einer rassifizierten (später elitären oder nach Klassen 
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strukturierten) Städteplanung folgt. Die Frage des Zugangs zur Infrastruktur wird von 
vielen Faktoren bestimmt, wozu u. a. auch zählen: die politische Natur der Artefakte 
selbst, die Bewohner als nicht-passive Empfänger und die Kostendeckung “moderner” 
Infrastrukturprojekte, wie sie den soziokulturellen Konstrukten der Wasser- und 
Sanitärversorgung gegenübergestellt wird. Rückblickend wurde in Nairobi eine 
Technik-Collage aus Versorgungsmodi verwirklicht, die die heterogene Natur der 
meisten städtischen Räume untermauert. 
 
Darüber hinaus kehrt diese Arbeit das Narrativ vom “zersplitternden Urbanismus” 
(splintering urbanism) um, indem darauf verwiesen wird, dass Städte des Globalen 
Südens, und vielleicht auch des Nordens, in Bezug auf ihre soziotechnologische 
Topologie traditionell schon immer fragmentiert und “zersplittert” waren. So wird 
Nairobi beispielsweise durch ein Flickwerk verschiedener soziotechnologischer 
Übereinkünfte zur Wasser- und Sanitärversorgung geprägt, wobei Top-down-Ansätze, 
die durch eine höchst zentralisierte kommunale Verwaltung gekennzeichnet sind, und 
Bottom-up-Verfahrensweisen kombiniert werden. Zu Letzteren gehören u. a. Brunnen, 
Bohrlöcher, das Sammeln von Regenwasser, Klärgruben und Schubkarren. Zudem gibt 
es hybridisierte Vorrichtungen wie “Spaghetti”-Rohrleitungen und Steigrohre oder 
Wasserkioske.  Die Bedeutung dieser Bottom-up-Methoden, die in dieser Studie 
verfochten werden, ist inzwischen von Versorgungsunternehmen durch öffentlich-
private Partnerschaften anerkannt und optimiert worden.  So wurden die großen und 
kleinen Lösungen kombiniert, um die technologischen Lücken zu schließen, die 
insbesondere in informellen Siedlungen bestehen, welche zugleich Schmelzpunkte 
technologischer Innovation und ihrer Anfechtung sind. Die Heterogenität und 
Dezentralität dieser kleinformatigen Versorgungsmodalitäten waren schon immer ein 
festes Kennzeichen der meisten Städte im Globalen Süden. Ihre Entwicklung ging 
immer Hand in Hand mit der Entwicklung der Städte selbst.  Die schachbrettartige 
soziotechnologische Gestaltung von Nairobi ist so alt wie die Stadt selbst. 
 
Je stärker sich die Technikgeschichte globalen Themen widmet, umso mehr wird die 
zukünftige Wissenschaft sich vielleicht auf die vielschichtige Natur von 
Menschenströmen und Wissensflüssen konzentrieren müssen.  Denn solange wir mit 
der technikhistorischen Wissensproduktion ringen, zirkuliert dieser Austausch jenseits 
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der binären Grenze von Nord-Süd und wir müssen mindestens die Fließrichtungen Süd-
Nord, Süd-Nord-Süd, Süd-Süd aber noch viele weitere Bewegungen und 
Gegenbewegungen in unsere Studien mit einbeziehe. 
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PROLEGOMENON 
 
 The concept of history plays a fundamental role in the human 
thought. It invokes notions of the human agency, change, the 
role of material circumstances in human affairs, and the 
putative meaning of historical events. It raises the possibility 
of ‘learning from history.’ And it suggests the possibility of 
better understanding ourselves in the present, by 
understanding the forces, choices, and circumstances that 
brought us to our current situation. (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
History, 2007) 
 
While the history of technology as a discipline has developed tremendously in the 
North, it is a relatively new field of interest for the Global South, particularly Africa.  A 
huge gap exists in African historiography in terms of technology studies.  By studying 
the evolution of water and sanitation for Nairobi from 1899 to 2015, I contribute 
towards bridging this gap.  In studying Global South cities, the debate has touched on 
the need to device unique approaches and new theorization away from the conventional 
practice that is perpetuated by the North.1  Even though most research has tended to 
bracket the experiences of ordinary people and characterized cities in the South as 
chaotic, it is my submission that more representative research undertakings do not 
necessarily imply that these cities must be approached differently or in a special way. 
This is in agreement with Garth Myers’ proposition that it is the historicity and 
particularities of these cities2 that should concern contemporary studies rather than the 
attempt to view the Global South as exceptional.  By seeking to complement rather than 
disengage from works that have laid the foundation for technology studies and 
infrastructure development in Africa and Nairobi, such as David Nilsson3 and Ezekiel 
N. Nyanchaga,4 I take a methodological shift to additionally employ oral traditions in 
rendering the African voice to the history of technology (HOT).  This will bring on 
board the everyday experiences of ordinary people as users.  I purpose to extend the 
existing debate by offering a socio-cultural and constructivist interpretation, adopting 
an integrated approach and exploring what this means for the history of technology.  
                                                 
1 See Robinson(2006, 2011; 2013) 
2 Myers (2011),pp. 101-106. 
3 Nilsson (2011; 2016; 2017) 
4Nyanchaga (2016). 
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However, by acknowledging that this thesis arises out of an effort to address a lacuna in 
African historiography, with reference to the history of technology, I revisit the existing 
theoretical and evolutionary development of technology studies.  While this may 
reproduce redundancy for a Global North reader, it is important because it acquaints 
readers in Africa with necessary background information.  This places them on a 
trajectory of not only developing the history of technology as a discipline on the 
continent but also joining in the writing of global histories of technology.  In the same 
respect, so as to provide a prism through which this work should be understood, this 
preliminary section unfurls the historiographical question, which according to this 
study, exists at two levels.  First, is the near absence of the history of technology as a 
discipline in Africa, and the attempt is to locate it within the existing debates on society 
and technology.  Secondly, I attempt to identify the gap in the existing literature by 
focusing on materials that dwell on the theorization of urbanism and the bracketing of 
Global South societies.  By asking the following philosophical and theoretical 
questions, I level the ground and establish a backdrop for knowledge generation 
through a bottoms-up approach. 
 
A)  History 
(i) What is the role of history and the historian’s knowledge interest? 
It is not the historian’s sole aim to pose what, when and how questions by approaching 
history as an event bound in time that has already lapsed.  Instead, history proposes to 
account for the past in a way that reveals the continuities and discontinuities in human 
actions and practices in relation to time and, in so doing, provide an understanding of 
the present that can speculatively point to the future.  As Bill Nasson, Professor of 
History at the University Of Cape Town, South Africa, observes, in a language such as 
German, the terminology of Geschichte, which stands for history, carries the verbal 
connotation of a process that means an amalgam of the past, present and future.5  A 
historian undertakes a journey of connecting the past to the present and the future in a 
manner that makes the study worthy and relevant.   The historian’s focus dwells more 
on (re)action, adaptationand transformation as the core engine of the historical process. 
 
                                                 
5See Nasson (2004), p. 3; see also Mahro(1984);Pomper, Elphick, and Vann,. (eds.) (1998); Stanford,(1994); Tosh (1984). 
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In bringing the potential of human action to the centre of the investigation, the 
dynamics of historical understanding can contribute actively to the shaping of our 
future, always emphasizing that it can be one of many possibilities and alternatives.6 
Sanford states that history need not be confined to kings and battles and great men. 
Perhaps we can treat it practically, using it for our purposes.7  Writing history from 
below would make it a worthy engagement that is representative of the society as a 
diverse entity.  The day-to-day experiences of society, without necessarily focusing on 
the monumental moments, events, or individuals, can develop knowledge that is seen to 
encompass the realities of a society in its past, present and perhaps the future.  The 
writing of this kind of history, therefore, has to start by asking the right questions, re-
questioning the existing knowledge and putting human experiences at the centre.  The 
narrative of progression as an evolutionary outcome has to be juxtaposed against the 
continuities and discontinuities that inform the nature and character of a society. 
 
(ii) What is the meaning of history and technology? 
While Europe dominated and patronized the age of science, it sought to subordinate 
other societies by blatantly choosing to define history and technology in a way that 
hegemonized the rest of the society.  Despite progress being made towards having more 
inclusive explanations of what constitutes history as a discipline and knowledge in 
general, Africa still plays ‘catch up’ compared to many other societies.  There exist 
large gaps in the historiography of Africa with respect to technology studies.  
 
One of these gaps is that the history of technology as a discipline in Africa is either 
non-existent or, where it has sprouted, it has stagnated in its infancy.  The second gap, 
one perhaps of major concern, is that the literature emerging from studies conducted on 
Africa has always approached issues pertaining to the African continent from a vantage 
point of superiority of Western scholarship and Western society at large.  Tragically, 
this kind of scholarship has produced works that are silent about the narratives of local-
level technological triumphs, adaptation to incoming technologies, rejection or 
contestation of imported technologies, as well as thefailure tosee users as tinkerers. 
Africanist historian Clapperton Mavhunga indicts Westernized approaches for this 
                                                 
6Nasson (2004), p. 3. 
7 Sanford (1994), p. 112. 
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tragic state by observing thatwhile STS in traditional practice is good at identifying 
banal forms of science and technology; it is severely limited in Global South societies 
in which the black and white of things that are technological and scientific are not or 
may not be readily recognizable.8 
 
The bracketing of African-lived experiences in the literature emerging from the 
research carried out on the continent occurs either by design or default. History as a 
discipline in Africa is a phenomenon of the latter half of the 20th century.  The slow 
pace in the growth of the history of technology as a domain is established first as 
emanating from a methodological dilemma and, secondly, as a result of the obsession 
by nationalist historiographers to concentrate on socio-political histories and the neo-
colonialist debates that have focused more on the colonial (dis)continuities persistent in 
the post-colonial world. In terms of methods, the belief is that the attempt to study local 
societies within certain predetermined frameworks that are popularized under Western 
scholarship has, many times, produced non-comprehensive results that have led to 
either misconstrued or subjective conclusions reminiscent of the colonial period.  The 
unilateral approach to knowledge in technology studies that see users, especially in the 
Global South, as either passive recipients or as incapable of invention, continues to 
propagate notions of superiority of ‘things’ from outside.  This leads to the production 
of what Adiele Afigbo, in his attack on colonial historiography on Africa, conclusively 
referred to as ‘bastard historiography’.9 
 
As is widely documented, the period leading to the early 20th century witnessed the 
promotion of Eurocentric interpretations of history and the well schemed grand plan of 
dismissing non-European cultures. Cultural nodes like Africa were characterized by 
Hegelian thought as devoid of history.  The notion of the ‘dark continent’ was 
propagated, and Africa today still grapples with the after-effects of such defeatist 
psychological imperialist analogies.  Topographies and topologies of knowledge 
outside Europe and North America were described as backward and primitive to the 
extreme.  
 
                                                 
8Mavhunga(2017), p. xi. 
9Afigbo(1993), p. 46. 
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It is within such lines of thinking and practice that the history of Africa was written as 
‘the history of Europeans in Africa’.  This implied that history began in Africa only 
when the European explorers, traders, interlopers, adventurers and philanderers 
penetrated the region south of the Sahara.  European imperialism and colonialism in 
Africa was not basically territorial occupation and political subjugation.   It went further 
by instituting a system of socio-cultural domination.  Extrapolating from such an 
understanding, what did such marauding Europeanism imply for indigenous 
technologies and the colonized peoples’ everyday interactions with their surroundings? 
 
Entrenchment of colonialism reached far and wide and, as espoused by Headrick, 
technology became the tool of empire.10  As the maxim gun served its purpose of 
plunder and conquest during pacification, the handgun was used for control and 
suppression.  Many other technologies went along way in ensuring social subjugation 
and differentiation.  Colonialism in Africa produced devastating results.  It did not 
matter whether it was under British policies of direct and indirect rule, French 
assimilation or association, Portuguese high handedness or the Belgians’ malignant 
indifference in the Congo. 11  Perhaps one of the greatest effects of the European 
‘colonial enterprise’ in Africa was the huge discrepancy in the socio-economic make-up 
of societies.  Colonial scholarship of Africa as part and parcel of the grand imperialist 
scheme, on the other hand, resultedin huge knowledge gaps characterized by biased, 
fragmented and incomplete accounts about Africa and other ‘non-industrialized’ 
societies.12 
 
The aftermath of the 2nd World War provided an opportunity to re-examine how 
societies related to each other in pursuit of international peace.  If the signing of the 
Atlantic Charter was a denunciation of oppression, subjugationand servitude in the 
world, then the path to the admission of equality of all persons demanded the 
demolition of the oppressive structures and pseudo-ideologies of the superiority of 
certain races. Scholarship and history, in particular, needed to shed the 
misrepresentation of some societies and the silence on their day-to-day lives in most 
                                                 
10 See Headrick (1981). 
11Khapoya (2016); see also Henriksen (1973), p. 406; Mazrui (1969), pp. 661-666; Crowder (1968), p. 2; Settles, (1996), see 
also Boahen, (1985, 1987), Henderson and Whatley (2013), pp. 1-25. 
12 see Arowosegbe (2014), pp. 308-321. 
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literature.  The process of rewriting history had to commence as the decolonization 
process stretched beyond political independence and assertions of nationhood.  
 
It thus followed that pan-Africanists started laying the foundation for revisionist efforts 
in the development of African historiography.  Institutions like the School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS) in London and the two American universities of 
Wisconsin and North Western University took it upon themselves not only to train the 
pioneer Africanist historians but also to introduce material on Africa in their 
programmes.13 As Patrick Manning observes, the fields of European and American 
history underwent booms in the post-war years, fuelled by economic and educative 
growth.  They focused heavily on the development of national political communities 
and on their modernization.  At the fringes of Euro-American national history lay the 
frameworks of imperial and colonial history, western civilization and expanding area 
studies programmes.  From these fringes emerged the academic fields of African and 
world history.14 
 
The question of how best to initiate the ‘African recovery and agency’ had to be 
coupled with a methodological shift. Through inter-disciplinary approaches that 
encompassed anthropology, linguisticsand archaeology, amongst others, the ‘African 
initiative’ got underway.  The decolonization process had to spread beyond political 
independence and institute a process of re-asserting a sense of pride in that which was 
indigenous for societies in Africa.  In doing this, oral traditions gained centrality in the 
‘recovery’ of African history.  This marked a watershed moment in the development of 
African historiography as new literature arrived covering the history of various peoples 
on the continent.  While the political and economic implications that resulted from 
decades of European colonialism in Africa have been highlighted through various 
nationalist histories, a huge lacuna exists in terms of socio-cultural histories.  This is 
more pronounced specifically for environmental history and history of technology. 
 
Concomittantly,  history of technology emerges as a relatively new field in Africa. 
Europe and European scholarship have dedicated a lot of resources towards the 
                                                 
13 Watterson (2008). 
14 Manning (2013), pp.319-330. 
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development of knowledge on the growth, organization and arrangement of cities and 
the centrality of technology in driving change in their societies at all levels.  The current 
situation reveals the existence of a body of literature emerging from Asia and Latin 
America that specifically focuses on technology studies and the history of technology. 
India enjoys the lion’s share on this front, perhaps for reasons that can be historically 
located in its long civilizational history and its pivotal role on the imperial expansionist 
frontier as a coveted British colony.  Furthermore, with India having served as a 
template on colonial administration, especially in the larger British Empire, it perhaps 
presents the most ideal laboratory to explore the nexus between society and technology.  
 
Notwithstanding that, what has been termed as ‘the Global South’ in contemporary 
scholarship continues regrettably to be bracketed in most literature.  The linearity in the 
approach to the subject of travelling ideas, ideals and technologies has minimized the 
scope of knowledge, especially on how the process of invention, innovation and 
appropriation unfurls.  The Global North is not only over-represented but is also 
propagating the status quo.  The inertia in the history of technology in the Global 
Southhas become a major impediment to filling the historiographical and knowledge 
gap that exists in this sphere.  
 
In terms of how technologies are contextually interpreted, scholars like Arnold have 
justifiably questioned the tendency of many historians to treat colonialism as an 
undifferentiated whole, and their disposition to see technology as an instrument of 
empire.15 The end result has been a failure to acknowledge the flows and counter-flows 
of ideas that emerge from a much broader perspective of technology as a cultural space 
in which various forms of interaction take place.  The colonial and postcolonial binary 
that has dominated scholarship has presumably precluded a fuller understanding of the 
multifaceted ways in which the Global South has engaged with the larger world.16  It is 
at the interface between the technology and the user that in the focus needs to be.  To 
make his point, Arnold continues by proposing that the history of technology has 
                                                 
15 Arnold (200), p. 87. 
16 See Simone (2001), p. 19. 
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to,thus, move beyond a focus on investigating origins and inventions (which has led to 
Europe being privileged) to an inquiry that centres on uses, meaningand effects.17 
 
Edgerton, in what he refers to as ‘creole technologies’, prompts us to engage with 
history and not just the question of technology, and that this ought to be done in a 
particular way that offers a new way of post-contextualist history to those already 
available.  The historian’s focus should be on writing a ‘history of content and context 
together’.18 This is with respect to what indigenes, rather than colonizers,make of new 
technologies that are, as yet, little understood.  Perhaps, it is by borrowing from such 
histories that the lenses need to be refocused sharply on the experiences of indigenes in 
their day-to-day interactions with technologies as inventors, users and tinkerers. 
Acknowledging the local processes and platforms of innovation is a step in the right 
direction towards a comprehensive history of technology that explores the socio-
economic and political facets of technologies.  
 
B)  Urban Studies 
(i) Reflections on Urbanization and Urbanism in Africa 
Undertaking a study on infrastructure systems and focusing on the technological 
components of urban service provisioning requires us to historically contextualize 
ourselves as a way of establishing the framework within which such work is to be 
understood.  The attempt to reflect on the question of urbanization in Africa, thus, is a 
simple exercise of exposing the lack of consensus amongst scholars on what merits 
urbanization, and the fluid way in which the question of urbanization has been handled 
throughout time.  It establishes itself as an exercise not only to recover the local agency 
in urban provisioning for water and sanitation for a city like Nairobi, but also as a way 
of addressing the huge historiographical gap that exists in the history of technology in 
Africa and the cultural biases eminent in the theorization of the process of urbanization. 
The question of what definitively explains the process of urbanization, specifically for 
Global South societies, lingers on and the scholarship around it has been criticized for 
being supremacist and non-inclusive.  The following is an attempt at delineating the 
                                                 
17Arnold .op.cit., pp.81-106. 
18 Edgerton (2007), p. 9. 
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issues along this narrow path of locating the ‘local’ in urban studies as we set a 
platform on which the current study has to be interpreted and understood.  
 
(ii) The Binaries of North versus South: Seeking an inclusionary explanation of the 
process of urbanization 
Urbanization is as old as history.  As a process of transformation in society, it is seen to 
epitomize civility, progressand development. From the Neolithicperiod to the 
digitalized world of today, human evolution has been marked by a structure of growth 
that has seen different forms of agglomeration that have, alongside other revolutionary 
developments, resulted in what is characterized as urbanism.  While current scholarship 
and global policy agencies seem to be at a consensus in defining urbanism by its 
demographic purview,19 what should capture our imagination is the question of whether 
it is enough to see urbanity in terms of the number of people conglomerating within a 
certain prescribed geographic location or to approach it as a multi-pronged space 
exhibiting both demographic and geospatial trends.  As an ever-evolving phenomenon, 
what are the other unique facets that distinguish an urban area from any other form of 
settlement?  Do the means of procuring the socio-economic needs of the populace that 
occupy such areas play a part in reinforcing urbanity as a phenomenon and status?  The 
day-to-day practices of a people go a long way to define their form of existence.  Once 
established, do urban areas assume a life of their own and in themselves become forces 
for change and transformation?  
 
As Kingsley Davis argues, urbanization represents a revolutionary change in the whole 
pattern of social life.  Urbanization, itself a product of basic economic and 
technological developments, tends, in turn, once it comes into being, to affect every 
aspect of existence.20  Once established, the city becomes a centre for political power 
and influence throughout the whole society, no matter how agricultural or rural it may 
                                                 
19 McGranahan and Satterthwaite(2014), p.1-28; see also UN-Habitat World Cities Report.2016. 
http://nua.unhabitat.org/uploads/WCRFullReport2016_EN.pdf (accessed 17 October2017); see also World Bank (2013b) ‘ 
Harnessing Urbanization to end Poverty and Boost Prosperity in Africa: An Action Agenda for Transformation; http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/21/000442464_20131021121716/  
Rendered/PDF/815460WP0Afric00Box379851B00PU BLIC0.pdf, (accessed 28 March 2016);  see also You, N. 2007, pp. 214-
220. 
20Davis (1955), p. 2. 
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be.21 The city as a space emerges out of and encompasses demographic shifts, itself 
remaining prone to all kind of interminable change in its materialities.  
 
It follows that cities, with their extreme agglomeration of people and unprecedented 
densities of technology, have been at the core of modern history and modern 
society. 22 However, despite the consensus on what demographically distinguishes 
urbanity and the contemporary trends towards the homogenization of urban spaces 
across the globe, various cities have been informed by unique histories that set them 
apart as they navigate through various epochs, carrying along certain aspects that 
transcend space and time.  On the global map, each city thrives differently, despite a 
demonstration of either conformity to the general trends of migratory ideas and ideals 
or a clash of the new and the old, the indigene and the exotic, the persistent and the 
flexible, the rigid and the fragile representing their social-political fabrics.  It is through 
these lenses that I presume that current scholarship should be founded, away from the 
prisms of progressive versus ‘static’ societies. 
 
In retrospect, while it is not disputable that the emerging cities within the ‘civilizing 
world’ are key indicators of progress in the general way of human life, scholars like V. 
Gordon Childe, by emphasizing writing as paramount to the process of urbanization,23 
emerge as enthusiastic apologists of the European imperial hegemony.  The main 
purpose of their line of argumentation, either out of ignorance or as a deliberate act, was 
to deny those they characterized as ‘pre-historic societies’ their rightful place in history 
and justify the domination of Global South communities through colonialism.  Their 
mantra was that ‘history begins when man takes to writing’ 24  and with that, they 
justified the suppression of oriental and African societies.  Writing provided a soft pair 
of gloves with which the Eurocentric scholars adamantly feigned blindness to 
‘progress’of non-European societies.  In hindsight, writing ought to be seen as pivotal 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Hard and Misa(2008), p. 82. 
23 Childe (1950), pp. 3-17; see also Mabogunje (1969), pp. 121-203. 
24In 1923, the European scholar, A.P. Newton, addressed the Royal African Society on the topic, ‘Africa and Historical 
Research’. He declared:’Africa had no history before the coming of the Europeans. History only begins when men take to 
writing. And since Africa had no knowledge of writing, information of African history could be found only in material 
remains, in language and in primitive culture. These are the concerns of linguists, archaeologists and anthropologists and 
not the concern of historians’. 
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to the development of ‘useful’ sciences that bore sophistication to what characterized 
urban spaces in the North and not as ‘a precursory imprint of urbanity’. 
 
In a demographic sense, many theorists have tended to focus on the rural-urban 
population shift as the foundation of urbanization but, at the same time, identify 
industrialization as the basic driver behind the movement of rural population to urban 
areas for factory jobs.25 The problem with this focus on the rural-urban population shift 
binary is that it fails to broadly delineate all the forces, whether centrifugal or 
centripetal, that drive urbanization.  Is the emergence of cities equivalent to what we 
characterize as urbanization? Perhaps, to broaden the scope of understanding of the 
concept of urbanization, Xizhe Peng, Xiangming Chen, and Yuan Cheng state that the 
human ecology paradigm developed.  If put in perspective, according to Robert Park 
and others, human ecology developed to describe the structure and evolution of the 
American city, primarily Chicago in the 1920s to 1930s.26 It was based on assumptions 
of the interactive role of population dynamics, market competition, material technology 
(for example transport infrastructure) and the built environment in the making and 
remaking of urban life. 27  Advances in technology, the emergence and growth of 
industries that provide wage labour and produce a surplus to spur marketization, 
cultural diffusion and, most of all, information flows became key drivers of 
urbanization as understood from a human ecological and later a modernist point of 
view.  The cities’ dynamism is informed by the pull and push factors operating at hand.  
 
However, the main weakness of these endogenous and human ecology theoretical 
perspectives, amongst many other post 20th century paradigms, is the fact that what 
they espouse provides only explanations on European and North American urbanism. 
Urbanization in the rest of the world is seen as resulting from the spread of European 
imperialist hegemony and American liberal capitalism.  As posited by Fox, through 
trade, colonialism and (in the latter half of the 20th century) international development 
assistance, the key technological and institutional developments that set Europe’s urban 
transition in motion were diffused to other regions, stimulating urbanization in these 
                                                 
25Peng, Chen and Cheng, undated.pp. 1-16. (Accessed at https://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/C04/E6-147-18.pdfon 2 
November 2016). 
26Ibid. 
27 Hawley (1981), Orum and Chen (2003). 
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regions as well.  The onset of the urban transition in any given country or region 
should, therefore, be understood as part of a global historical process linked to 
technological and institutional change and diffusion, not simply as a product of 
endogenous economic and demographic forces.28 
 
Deriving from such schools of thought, pre-colonial settlements in the former colonies 
are seen as lacking a demographic and technological threshold.  But historical evidence 
proves that some of the oldest civilizations in Asia and Africa produced magnificent 
dwellings of an urban kind, as supported by the existence of thriving indigenous 
knowledge extracts, food productionand strong polities.  Although this is not the case 
for all cities, for example, Nairobi–which grew organically, starting in 1899, from a 
European colonial railway outpost–archaeological evidence and oral histories, as major 
methodological approaches towards reconstructing the history of prehistoric societies, 
confirm the presence of urban settlements in sub-Saharan Africa for over 2000 years.29 
However, these settlements remained relatively small, fewand far between in 
comparison to other regions of the world; most proved ephemeral.30 It is this fact that 
sees them removed from the debate on what urbanization implies for modernist 
scholarship. 
 
If European civilization is presumptively the model for understanding urbanization, 
then it follows that no form of pre-colonial agglomeration in Africa would fall within 
the precincts of what is broadly acknowledged as the form and nature of a city.  The 
majority of scholars are sceptical in their view of the pre-colony in Africa and posit that 
though small settlements emerged in Africa, none rose to be a manufacturing centre.31 
The push bydrastic innovations in terms of technologies for mass production and the 
rapid wave of industrialization that happen to have been at the core of European 
urbanism are unequivocally reported to be absent and, hence, render pre-colonial Africa 
non-urban. Snippets of urbanism appear when itis argued by Horace Miner in his edited 
                                                 
28 Fox (2011), p.9. 
29Anderson and Rathbone (2000). 
30Ibid. 
31 Becker, Hamer and Morrison (1994). 
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work, The City in Modern Africa, that urbanization during the pre-colonial era was as a 
result of politics.32 
 
According to Miner’s analysis, economic development, which modernization theorists 
see as a precursor to political development, did not occur before political development. 
It was, rather,economic development that necessitated political organization; thus, there 
is the presence of defence.  Urban areas developed not only because of the 
establishment of administrative centres, but because trading, port activities, religious 
activities, and defence needs also caused towns and cities to grow.  Rural surpluses, as 
well as the growth of exchange economy, resulted from the provision of defence and 
creation of trans-shipment posts.  This led to the establishment and growth of urban 
centres.33 
 
Analysing the existing knowledge, we can state that the greatest challenge to research 
as a whole, and history in particular, is its perpetual treatment of Africa as a whole and 
Africanism as an over-riding cultural orientation.  Most scholarship has endlessly 
conceptualized sub-Saharan Africa as a single mass of existence.  The failure to 
acknowledge the diversity that exists on the continent socio-culturally and ecologically 
is in itself self-defeating.  The misinformation perpetrated towards understanding 
urbanity alongside other aspects results from the generalized approach to studies on the 
sub-Saharan region.  While the idea is not to treat every part of the continent as unique 
and different, it is important for every case to be located contextually and analysed with 
certain specifics that derive from every community charting its own independent path 
based on the prevailing factors.  Insofar as it can be established, West Africa, North 
Africa and some parts of central Africa exhibit evidence of the earliest forms of 
urbanization. 
 
Despite the diversities in terms of appropriation of urban spaces across the African 
continent, it is the advent of European colonialism that emerged as a watershed in the 
history of cities in Africa.  Colonialism through its imperial tentacles stamped itself on 
the African continent by mostly altering the character and form of cities.  As observed 
                                                 
32 Miner (1967). 
33 see Tettey (2005), p. 25. 
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by Freund (2007), this advent and consolidation of European colonialism was marked 
by aspects of resistance to the re-development of old cities.  For instance, the Germans 
ruthlessly hanged Rudolf Manga Bell in Douala, Cameroun, for leading protests.34 
Depending on the manner of conquest and systems of administration adopted, some 
cities were run down completely, some new ones emergedand others survived the 
onslaught, retaining their original selves.  Conquest was marked by continuities as well 
as discontinuities, hence producing the duality that characterises most contemporary 
urban spaces in Africa.35 
 
Such representations of ‘duality’ are not a recent phenomenon in urban scholarship. 
Cities have traditionally been understood as socially dualized through the lenses of 
native versus immigrant settlers, age differentials, ethnicity and education, amongst 
other factors, as polarized extremes.36  Fanon draws the binary of a settler town built of 
stone and steel, and the native or negro village, the ‘medina’, as a town on its knees and 
wallowing in mire.37 Abu-Lughod stated that the major metropolis in almost every 
newly industrializing country was not a single unified city but two different cities 
physically juxtaposed but architecturally and socially distinct.38 Freund indicates that 
the dual city in Africa is a widespread phenomenon, necessitated by various historical 
and political factors in the face of European hegemonization.39 Although Peter Marcuse 
challenges the dual city thesis by arguing that a complex reality exists in the 
contemporary city in terms of multiplicity (‘several different groups and quarters’) 
rather than duality, this thesis brings forth a different kind of duality in terms of the 
technologies of social service provisioning and the inertia of centralized networks vis-à-
vis the active movements from ‘off-grid’ localities, otherwise known as peri-urban and 
informal urban spaces.  Rather than interpreting the urban as a case of two polarized 
extremes, as is the case in Mollenkopf and Castell’s thesis, the large technical and 
centralized systems, or rather the ‘networked city’, must be seen asexisting in 
complementarity with the devolved topologies that operate adjacent to planned zones. 
                                                 
34 Freund (2007). 
35Ibid. 
36See Mollenkopf and Castells (1993), pp. 254-5. 
37 Fanon (1961), pp. 37-39. 
38 Abu-Lughod, (1965), p. 420. 
39 see Freund (2007). 
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However, to some extent, viewing ‘colonial cities’ as ‘dual cities’ is misleading since 
colonial societies cannot be understood merely in terms of a ‘European versus 
Indigenous’ dichotomy.  To take such an outlook omits the agency of indigenous 
societies, their capacity to overcome such divisions, to ignore them or even to imagine 
them differently.40 
 
Eric Wolf, in Europe and the People without History, argues that a creative stretch 
between macro and micro-histories is required to enable those people who claim to own 
history and the ones to whom history has been denied emerge as participants in the 
same historical trajectories. 41  Urbanization that is assumed to represent a form of 
civilization and a categorization of society into progressive and non-progressive groups 
entails thedenying of ‘others’ their history.  It is these forms of bracketing available in 
the multiple histories emerging across the globe that call for a more extensive 
engagement that would correct the weaknesses in approaches to production of historical 
knowledge, especially for the South.  
 
C)  Structure 
This prolegomenon has set out to establish a frame within which the work is to be 
understood.  It has asked philosophical questions on what constitutes history and the 
historian’s role in knowledge production, and it has discussed the relationship between 
technology and urbanization. 
 
Chapter One introduces the statement of the problem, the research questions and the 
objectives of the study, hypotheses, and methodology, as applied in collecting the 
relevant data.  The chapter situates the study in Nairobi by exploring the current status 
of water and sanitation and the precarious nature of its existence in terms of 
infrastructural development. 
 
Chapter Two offers a broad analysis of the existing literature.  Specifically locating and 
delineating the infrastructure and technology debates within the realm of STSs and the 
                                                 
40Fourchard(2011), pp. 223-248. 
41 https://is.muni.cz/el/1490/podzim2013/CZS13/um/lecture1/1_4_Wolf.pdf 
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history of technology.  It further offers a sneak preview into the main questions under 
discussion in the entire thesis as a way of laying a foundation for understanding the key 
points of departure.  
 
Chapter Three narrows down the case for Nairobi, exploring the rise of the city and the 
evolution of its water and sanitation infrastructure system within the period leading to 
the immediate aftermath of World War I (1899 to 1919).  The debate, as discussed, 
unearths the genesis of Nairobi’s water and sanitation problems as located both in 
planning policy or its absence, and the competing administrative centres of power, that 
is, the railway corporation and the colonial office through the Commissioner.  The 
chapter also sets the basis for the discussion of the segregationist approach to the 
deployment of key infrastructural projects, including water and sanitation.  The 
discussion juxtaposes the emerging centralized systems of supply against the 
indigenous and bottom-up means of access.  
 
Chapter Four, which incorporates the 1920 to 1963 period,focuses on the change of 
status of Kenya from a protectorate to a colony, and what this change implied for the 
water and sanitation topologies of the nascent city of Nairobi. The overriding theme is 
the politics of infrastructure and whether segregation is pursued as a deliberate policy or 
results unintentionally from the economics of provision and access.  The key goal is to 
push the discussion beyond the normative and simplistic debates that conceive spatial 
inequalities within a racial binary.  It is not a case of either one or the other but rather a 
broader framework of analysis that sees indigenes as capable of agency in employing 
innovative and creative technologies in meeting their day-to-day needs.  In providing 
these dissections, the distinction, the representationand the performance of 
infrastructure systems vis-à-vis their various imageries are explored.  The post-World 
War II period upto 1963 highlights the question of financing for infrastructure as 
dominated by big international monetary agencies and how the development or a high-
modernist debate shaped the nature of infrastructure provision, in this case, water and 
sanitation for Nairobi.  
 
Chapter Five (1963 to 1978) sets out to unearth and answer the questions relating to 
continuities and discontinuities and their implications, especially for the growing group 
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of urban underclass within the burgeoning informal and peripheral settlements.  Local 
initiatives as espoused through self-help ideals come to light to reveal the potential that 
is within bottom-linked approaches to social service access, yet autocratic and 
municipal centralization impede the ability of the ordinary people to innovate and 
invent their livelihoods. 
 
Chapter Six explores the paradoxical maxim of the period commencing in the 1980s, 
especially with reference to the practice and policy approaches for cities in the Global 
South. It brings to the fore ‘appropriate technology’ ideals by locating the user and the 
shifts, if they exist, in the conception and provision of water and sanitation.  Off-grid, or 
what I refer to as the bottom-up approaches, are explored against a backdrop of 
governance, political pluralism and flexibility. 
 
Chapter Seven offers an aerial outlook of the entire text, with the aim of situating it in 
the contemporary debate, especially around the discourse on the social and political 
nature of technical artefacts.  It reinforces the contextualist approach towards the 
writing of the global history of technology. This chapter offers a sneak preview into the 
need to expand the theoretical and methodological frameworks that look beyond the 
North-South asymmetrical binary of knowledge flow. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
LOCATING THE PROBLEM AND DELINEATING INFRASTRUCTURE DEBATES 
 
1.1  Nairobi’s Geologyand Hydrography 
Volcanic activity has dominated the geological history of the Nairobi area since 
Miocene times and has controlled the geomorphological evolution.42 Apart from a few 
isolated occurences of Precambrian and Quaternary rocks, the area is composed of 
volcanic rocks that originated in the Rift region and flowed eastwards on to a warped 
and partly dissected pre-Miocene erosion surface, cut a cross the older crystalline 
rocks. 43  Four prominent physiographic units are recognised in the Nairobi area 
reflecting the volcanic rock types and the tectonic movements that have affected them. 
They are the; lava plains, the Kikuyu highlands, Rift flank and the Ngong Hills.  The 
main drainage is consequent upon the regional slope of the volcanic rocks towards the 
east, while subsidiary internal drainage into the Rift region is confined to the western 
part.44 
 
The lava plains east of the Ruiru-Nairobi-Ngong area are underlain by a succession of 
lava flows alternating with lakebeds, streams, deposits, tuffs and volcanic ash.  These 
plains, comprising mainly of the Athi Plains and the northern section of the Kapiti 
Plain, extend westwards rising from 4900 feet (1493 m) at the Athi River to 6000 feet 
(1829 m) in the faulted region near Ngong.45  The water draining eastwards from the 
hill area accumulates on the low lying ground between Parklands in the north and 
Nairobi South estate, forming a perched water table above the Nairobi phonolite.  The 
Kerichwa Valley Tuffs lying to the east function like a sponge and the contact between 
them and the underlying impermeable phonolite thus forms a perfect aquifer, so much 
so that a number of channels containing water occur beneath Nairobi.46  The soils are 
                                                 
42Saggerson (1991), p. 5   
43ibid 
44ibid; see also Morgan (1967) for a comprehensive review of the area. 
45Alukwe (2016). See also Saggerson (1991). 
46Alukwe (2016), p. 16 
  
19  
products of weathering of many volcanic rocks.  Weathering has produced red soils that 
reach more than 50 feet (15 m) in thickness.47 
 
Nairobi River is a river flowing through the Kenyan capital Nairobi.  It is the main river 
of the Nairobi river basin, a complex of several parallel streams flowing eastwards.  
The river is joined by several tributaries that include; Ruiru River, Kamiti River, 
Kasarani River (aka Gathara-ini), Ruaraka (aka Rui Ruaka), Karura River, Gitathuru 
River (aka Getathuru), Mathare River, Nairobi River (the main channel), Kirichwa and 
Motoine-Ngong River which flows to the Nairobi Dam, an artificial lake meant to 
provide drinkable water for residents of Nairobi (but currently polluted and not 
usable).48 
 
A feature of the streams and rivers in Nairobi is that they all flow eastwards.  The 
Western half of Nairobi marks the start of the ascent up the Rift Valley escarpment 
while the Eastern half is a flat plain.  The rivers therefore flow by gravity to the East. 
All these rivers and streams join the main river of the Basin – the Nairobi River – near 
Dandora and Ruai which then proceeds to join the Athi River.  Another feature of the 
rivers in Nairobi is that most informal settlements are located along river valleys.  
 
Nairobi draws its water from three main catchment areas.  This comprise the Aberdare 
ranges, Mt. Kenya and the Rift Valley. However, the Ndakaini Dam, which lies about 
50 kilometeres (30 miles) north of the capital,  is Nairobi’s main source of water. 
The Nairobi utility receives 94% of its water from the Tana River basin north of the city 
through three reservoirs: the Sasumua Dam on the Chania River, the Thika Damand the 
Chania-B Dam.  The Thika Dam (Ndakaini) is the largest, supplying 225,000 m3/day. 
Water from the reservoirs is treated in two treatment plants, including the largest one 
in Ngethu.  The remaining 6% comes from local sources: the Kikuyu Springs and the 
Ruiru Dam, both located in the Athi River Basin and whose water is treated in two 
smaller treatment plants on site.49 Ondiri wetland lies about 20 kilometres northwest of 
                                                 
47Saggerson (1991) 
48 retrieved from; https://www.revolvy.com/page/Nairobi-River 
49Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company:Map of Nairobi water sources 
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Nairobi and is Kenya’s deepest freshwater swamp—could help supply more drinking 
water to the city’s growing population if well protected and harnessed.50 
 
Groundwater supplies an additional 85.000 m3 per day or more from an estimated 3000 
boreholes, up from an estimated 2250 boreholes in 2001.  The groundwater table has 
declined; in one well it declined by 40 meters between 1958 and 1996.  The average 
depth of new wells in 2001 was 238 meters.  In that year 97 new wells were drilled 
because of a drought.  Most wells are operated by industrial enterprises, hotels, farms 
for flower production in greenhouses, and private houses in parts of the city that receive 
only intermittent supply (e.g. Langata and Karen).  Groundwater is also used to irrigate 
gardens and to supply tankers that resell the water.  Many private well owners are also 
connected to the mains water supply network and use groundwater as a back-up supply. 
Natural groundwater quality is good.  There are few data on whether the aquifer has 
been polluted or not.51At the height of another drought in 2008/2009, Athi Water 
Services Board drilled over 40 emergency boreholes in various parts of the city and 
connected them to the distribution network.52 
 
1.2 Nairobi’s Water and Sanitation Status 
Today, Africa continues to urbanize rapidly, both as a result of the diminishing rural 
livelihoods and urban bias policies that prompt massive rates of rural-urban migration 
and through internal population growth due to improved reproductive health.  Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam have been reported as the fastest growing cities in Africa, with a 
projection of a 77% and 85% growth rate between 2010 and 2025 respectively.53  The 
challenges that come with these high rates of growth call for extensive approaches on 
the functionality of such cities and their sustenance.  The partly dysfunctional nature of 
those cities, as castigated by most global North scholarship, thus, calls for new 
approaches that would comprehensively represent the realities of the cities in the South. 
This study on Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructure serves as an important step 
                                                 
50 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-water-climatechange/nairobi-looks-for-new-water-to-ease-its-growing-thirst-id 
USKBN1J8269 
51Foster &Tuinhof (2005). 
52https://jambonairobi.co.ke/services/water-in-nairobi/water-supply-to-nairobi/4/ 
53 The African Development Bank reports in Tracking Africa’s Progress in Figures, as accessed from 
http://www.africastrictlybusiness.com/lists/top-20-fastest-growing-african-cities on 04/16/2016 
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towards achieving this goal.  While the major concern is not centredon Nairobi’s 
urbanism per se, the question of technologies of water access and the modalities of 
ridding the city of its wastewater guides the study in its dimensions of capturing the 
people’s day-to-day experiences as Nairobi evolves through various epochs.  
 
1.3  Problematique: The State of Water and Sanitation Infrastructure Supplyand Access for 
Nairobi 
Nairobi’s water has over time been harnessed from a combination of both surface 
resources and ground sources, basically wells and boreholes.  The water infrastructure 
network extends from catchment towers close to 40 miles away through river 
extraction.  These flow into the two-tier system of supply, namely, Kabete and Gigiri.  
The majority of the city’s residents rate improvement in water provision as their top 
development priority.54 Most of the urban poor lack a private water connection.  Even 
in those estates where there is a household connection, competitive pumping by 
neighbours exacerbates frequent prolonged scarcities that leave them without water.55 
The supply network is not only skewed but is also unreliable for most residents.  For the 
underserviced and unconnected, what have been the mechanisms of access and supply? 
What are the indigenous technologies supplementing or filling in for the failures of the 
centralized network system? 
 
According to the International Water Association (IWA), sanitation provision in 
Nairobi is grossly deficient.56 The UN Habitat in 2003 reported that about 10 percent of 
Nairobi’s population was served by sewers while 20 percent relied on septic tanks and 
the remainder used latrines.  The bulk of Nairobi’s population still relies on traditional 
pit latrines. Nairobi has two major sewage treatment plants since the closure of the 
Eastleigh plant; Dandora, with a daily treatment capacity of 80,000m3, and Kariobangi, 
with a daily capacity of 32,000m3.  
 
While Kariobangi is a conventional plant based on biological aerated filters, Dandora is 
a lagoon-based plant57 with stabilization ponds.  However, with only the planned areas 
                                                 
54 Citizen’s Report Card (2007); Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki, (2005). 
55 Citizen’s Report Card (2007). 
56 Accessed from www.iwawaterwiki.org, 
57See ECFA (2008). 
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of the city, which house only close to 40% of the population, connected to these sewer 
lines, the real sanitation challenge is within the informal areas,where the majority of 
Nairobians reside.  Municipal and city authorities in their master plans treat these 
informal areas as blank spaces and blind spots.  Excreta waste from such ‘flexible’ 
(informal) areas render river water in Nairobi unsafe for domestic use due to open 
dumping and defecation.  As a result, the cityfinds itself in a dire situation in terms of 
its water and sanitation systems.  The poor get by on their own means.  With these 
realities that represent inefficiency and inadequacy, what are the upward movements 
from below in terms of adaptation, hybridity, improvisation, tinkering, rejection and 
protestation, both as innovative and appropriative ventures.  To what extent can 
informal areas that operate off the grid through individualized approaches and 
community led micro-networks be characterized as innovation junctions? 
 
The problematization of the water and sanitation situation in Nairobi for the purpose of 
this study does not dwell on the question of the deficiency of the infrastructure systems 
in terms of access.  Instead, it focuses on the evolution of systems of supply and the 
technological questions in terms of implications, application, appropriation, 
contestation, adaptation and innovations from below, which aim to equalize the eminent 
shortages deriving from municipal practices of centralized supply systems.  
 
Taking the analyses that exist, which have been conducted from an LTS (large technical 
systems) perspective, as a departure point, the study narrows down the role of users as 
participants in the making of the histories of the city and as non-passive recipients of 
migratory ideas and ideals, especially in the process of procuring their day-to-day 
critical needs.  The process of appropriating technology is neither passive nor a 
seamless flow from top to bottom.  
 
Technical infrastructural artefacts are looked at as multi-layered and possessing a 
powerful political and economic nature that determines who has access to them. 
Moving between the formal level of engineering and planning and the informal level of 
daily practice, the dissertation investigates how urban water and sanitation technologies 
were adopted, appropriated and contested by various actors.  By questioning existing 
historical trajectories and the general scholarship on urbanity, technology and society in 
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Africa, this study seeks to locate the ordinary peoples’ agency in infrastructural 
developments as localized processes.  I explore the deployment of Nairobi’s water and 
sanitation infrastructure systems and construct narratives that emanate from below to 
embody the daily experiences and practices of off-grid dwellers and operators in a 
socio-spatially fragmented city like Nairobi.  People or users must be seen as co-
producers, or as has been aptly put, as ‘producers’.  All these questions are addressed 
within the post-colonial theoretical framework that is believed to possess greater 
potential for clarity in delineating aspects of continuity and discontinuities, plus the 
counter-reactions that characterize not only the evolution of cities like Nairobi but also 
inform post-independence debates in most of the Global South. 
 
I also re-question how various scholars have approached technology studies.  This I 
achieve by unpacking infrastructural artefacts as socially and culturally constructed, 
interpreted and envisaged. This undertaking not only proposes to fill the 
historiographical gap present in the history of Africa, specifically the history of 
technology, but it also aims at delinking this history from the perpetual top-down 
approaches that tend to bracket the experiences of indigenes. The history of 
urbanization in Africa has been written and approached as the history of European 
activities in Africa many times, and indigenes are treated as the docile recipients of 
European civilization who lack agency.  
 
Of particular interest for this study is that the decolonization process in Africa, despite 
acknowledging the need to revise the colonial historiography, has failed to 
comprehensively address all facets and, instead, has concentrated on nationalist 
histories that sometimes over-glorify the pre-colony era.  Consequently, environmental 
history and the history of technology constitute part of the neglected or forgotten 
histories of Africa.  It is this lacuna that exists in African Studies and, particularly, 
histories of technology that I seek to address by pioneering this work in tandem with the 
foundation being laid by scholars like Nillson (2011; 2016; 2017) and Nyanchaga 
(2016).  Nyanchaga (2016), in particular, offers a detailed account of the development 
of Kenya’s water landscape and specifically addresses policy questions in terms of 
various legislative and reform exercises.  As a civil engineer by orientation and having 
worked closely with international development partners as a consultant, his accounts 
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are historically rich and a good departure point.  Nilsson, in Pipes, Progress, and 
Poverty (2011), applies the dominant LTS theory to provide a general historical account 
of the development of urban water in both Kenya and Uganda.  These accounts, though 
grounded in rich archival research, fall short ofunbundling the socio-cultural and 
political character of infrastructures as technical artefacts.  Following on from David 
Nilsson’s and Ezekiel Nyanchaga’s works, I undertake to rewrite a social and political 
history of Nairobi’s water and sanitation technology. The focus is on the 
conceptualization, financing, operationalizationand implementation of water and 
sanitation infrastructure and the nexus vis-à-vis the interplay by different actors, 
whether at the micro or macro levels.  By focusing on certain dominant aspects within 
the STS debates, this study envisions and approaches the technical artefacts as socially 
and culturally constructed within specific contexts and timeframes, as well as 
examining the bottom-up initiatives such as people agency.  How do locals fit into the 
ensuing matrix, especially where a deficiency and absence of networks are noticeable?  
 
1.3.1 A Diagramatic Preview of Nairobi’s Water Sources 
 Source: http://www.jambonairobi.co.ke/services/water-in-nairobi/water-supply-to-nairobi/3/ 
Figure 1: This diagram maps out Nairobi’s waterscape in terms of sourcing and management. 
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1.4 Research Questions, Objectives and Hypothesis 
In studying the evolution of Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructure system, the 
key question is about the process and manner of accessing water and getting rid of 
waste water as two of the most critical infrastructural services for any urban space 
anywhere in the world.  The idea that infrastructural artefacts of water and sanitation in 
Nairobi, as instituted in the colonial and postcolonial period, need to be contextually 
analysed from belowwas key to determining the main questions for this study.  Asking 
the question of how making provision for water and sanitation has been mapped out in 
Nairobi since its foundation in 1899, with the goal of producing narratives of the daily 
experiences of the users, informed this undertaking not only as away of filling the 
historiographical gap that exists in the history of technology in Africa but also as a 
means of de-bracketing the Global South histories of urbanization.  Specifically, this 
research seeks to historically unravel how various technologies have interplayed to 
reproduce Nairobi’s water and sanitation landscape.  The study also centres on 
answering the question of the nature, meaning and effect of water and sanitation 
technologies for Nairobi in relation to their adoption, contestation and localization.The 
study treated technology as a non-neutral entity that is embedded within society and 
whose process of production, deployment and appropriation palpitates contextually.  
 
The main objective, therefore, is to provide an understanding of the development of 
Nairobi’s water and sanitation scapes, locating the meaning, effect and use involved. 
This is against the backdrop of the inadequacies of the large technical systems (LTS) as 
a popular paradigm inSTS.  Iunmask and explain the nature of technologies, as 
provided through centralized regimes in Nairobi, and, at the same time, capture the non-
conventional approaches emerging out of the adaptability, localization, contestation, 
resistance, and rejection, especially on the fringes of the networked systems.Scholarship 
on the history of technology must give credence to the ‘bottom-linked technologies’ 
that emerge and thrive, especially in deprived areas of the Global South cities.  The user 
or consumer is key to the process of the appropriation of technology, and the potential 
for most cities today lies in the devolved, decentralized, bottom-up or bottom-linked 
technologiesfor service provision.  The purpose of this is to meet the goal of writing 
history that integrates the conventional top-down approach and the user agency from 
below.  This leads to production of a history of technology that is representative of the 
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society, where the interaction of users and artefacts takes place to represent the 
complementary co-existence of the ‘decentred’ and centralized modalities of provision. 
Seeing Nairobi’s landscape especially within the ‘flexible settlements’ as spaces of 
innovation, invention, and reinvention of technologies for water and sanitation, the 
people must be central to the process of migration and transfer of technology.  Post-
colonialism and coproduction provide the theoretical framework and perspective within 
which these objectives are realized.  
 
The major hypotheses informing this study involve the recognition and 
acknowledgement that people as users have the ability to adapt, localizeand reject 
incoming technologies that have come to alter their social-cultural fabric.  Technologies 
as artefacts are non-neutral entities.  They are more often than not laced with embedded 
politics, informed by the scale of economics and the day-to-day politics of control, 
domination and livelihood development.  The day-to-day experiences of ordinary 
people give the correct images of how technologies are constructed and mediated in the 
process of rendering them responsive to the needs and aspirations of their users. 
Another key hypothesis of this study is that there is potential in the ‘bottom-up 
approaches’ to the challenges of service provision and only a bottom-linked study in a 
multi-layered city like Nairobi can bring forth a representative understanding of the 
realities of the Global South and enhance the writing of inclusive histories of 
technology.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology and Materials 
The study employs an interpretative research design as it is aimed at historically 
presenting the formal urban practices of water engineering and sanitary planning, as 
well as the individual and group responses, practices, meanings, effects, opinions, 
attitudes and perceptions in relation to water/sanitation infrastructural development, 
especially within the informal areas of Nairobi.  It targeted the African settlement areas 
of Pangani and Kibera within the colonial context, postcolonial Mathare, and ‘informal 
settlements’ in Eastland areas of Nairobi (refer to the map).  These ‘informal’ areas 
were purposively sampled, though not exclusively, because, based on their fluid nature 
and conventional infrastructure deprivation, they became sites for most of the urban 
grassroot flows in survival and also carry most of the indigenous images on the urban 
  
27  
landscape.  The Nubians in Kibera, as the oldest inhabitants of the city of Nairobi, were 
instrumental in providing key background information to the research.  This was with 
the aim of capturing the day-to-day narratives of access to water and sanitation and 
exploring the contextual ideals of technologies of water and sanitation provision, 
especially through processes of adaptation, improvisation, hybridization, 
contestationand localization.  
 
In-depth interviews, participant observations, informal discussions, photographing and 
subsidiary oral sources were utilised.  In my use of oral traditions, I examined the 
‘verification approach’,as explained by Peter .R. Schmidt.  This is a methodological 
perspective which holds that oral traditions must be affirmed by concrete proof of their 
claims; that is, they must be verified before being accepted as reasonable sources.58 
This process of verification was done through the corroboration of sources to determine 
thereliability of the data given before being adopted for usage in the analysis.  The 
process of triangulation and verification proved highly effective in testing the validity 
of most of the data attained orally. 
 
Oral accounts (considered ideal for subaltern studies and also heavily relied upon in 
collecting historical data) of purposively sampled urban residents of informal areas 
(with special reference made to those who have lived in the city through its various 
epochs-colonial and post-colonial/post SAPs), urban planning practitioners, civil 
society groups, neighbourhood movements, social welfare groups, and development 
partners was also employed to supplement the archival sources.  Archives provided 
both primary and secondary data.  The oral sources were gathered through in-depth 
interviews that were conducted in Kibera for its long history that is as old as Nairobi 
itself, and the belief that having developed as a village model, it offers insights into 
bottom-linked approaches to the provision of critical services.  Interviews were 
conducted in Mathare for the self-help efforts initiated either by land-buying companies 
into the early 1970s or the initiative by the Catholic parish that aimed to improve 
livelihoods; and Kariobangiv was used as a model of on-site and service settlement. 
Photos and voice recording were employed to gather data before being transcribed and 
analysed. 
                                                 
58 Schmidt (2006), p. 27. 
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Archival sources were derived from the British National Archives at Kew, Richmond 
(London); the Kenya National Archive (KNA), Nairobi, the Bodleian Library of Oxford 
University, UK; and the Macmillan Library in Nairobi, which houses documents from 
the Nairobi City Council (NCC) dating back to the establishment of the municipal 
council in the early 1920s.  More than six months of archival research was dedicated to 
the archives and libraries in Nairobi across a span of three intervals of mostly two 
months each.  Four weeks were spent in the archives in London at Kew and a week at 
the Bodleian Library, Oxford.  Most archival materials analysed included colonial 
reports from the early 1920s to 1962, special commissions’ reports, especially on 
sanitation and water supply, colonial official communiqués to the colonies, 
correspondence from colonial officials, letters from individual officials, both 
administrative and engineering staff, diaries, photographs, maps, tender documents for 
the supply of engineering materials, consultancy firms reports, financial application 
documents, and other policy documents appertaining to sanitary and water supply 
issues.  This archival research was used descriptively to establish trends or develop, 
approve or disapprove hypotheses in tandem with the research objectives.  
 
Apart from the material from the archives, the library of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS) in London provided an opportunity to conduct document 
analysis of the valuable data available in the form of reports, policy documents from 
several African countries, works of fiction that point towards urban materialities (e.g. 
Going Down River Road by Major Mwangi), magazines and World Bank and NGO 
documents.  The British Institute in Eastern Africa Library (IBEA) and IFRA library in 
Nairobi provided the necessary literature and, of course, not forgetting the multiple 
secondary literature accessed electronically and physically at TU Darmstadt and the 
Institute of Civil Engineers, London.  The online archiving of newspaper articles by 
IFRA came in handy and complemented the other sources employed. 
 
The last stage involved the corroboration of the archival and oral sources against the 
available secondary literature.  This was then thematically analysed with reference to 
content and against the backdrop of the identified theoretical perspective(s).  This was 
done in tandem with the set objectives to develop a narrative that would represent the 
history and social political constructs of Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructure 
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question.  In developing this work, the focus narrowed to capture ordinary people’s 
daily experiences, and juxtaposed them with the top-down ideals of provisioning and 
planning offering a contextual analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  An Overview of Literature and Infrastructure Debates 
2.1.1  The Sanitary Movement in the 19th Century 
A history of sanitation in its own sense is a story of the world’s struggle for an adequate 
supply of potablewater, and its efforts to dispose of the resultant sewage without 
menace to health or offence to the sense of sight or smell.59  In the realm of the city as 
understood today, it is important to acknowledge that the attempt to rid the city of its 
own filth has been a tempestuous journey, founded in planning, engineering and legal 
tussles.  
 
The processes of advancement within societies go hand in hand with major social 
cultural and economic transformations in the general perceptions and practices of either 
individual or group.  The aftermath of the industrial revolution in Europe and North 
America presented new challenges for city authorities and urban residents.  Among 
these challenges, sanitation was of primary concern.  As society faced pestilences that 
were connected mostly to the congestion witnessed in emerging urban spaces, medics 
and other practitioners sought to connect major illnesses to hygiene and sanitation.  
 
Accordingly, the popularisation of ‘miasmata’ and later the ‘germ theory of disease’ in 
the second half of the 19th century saw hygiene and sanitation gain centrality in the 
struggle against illness and disease.60  Prior to the 19th century, cleanliness was not 
prioritized and streets remained dumping sites for refuse.  What accrued from this were 
high mortality rates as Europeans lived in an unhealthy milieu of filth, poor hygiene and 
non-existent sanitation.  Bubonic plague, typhus, variola (small pox) and tuberculosis 
took a heavy toll on populations, both young and old.61 Medical historian Howard 
Wilcox Haggard captures the sense of ignorance and the laxity towards personal 
hygiene during this period by asserting that refuse from the table was thrown to the 
floor to be eaten by the dog and cat or to rot among the rushes and draw swarms of flies 
                                                 
59 Cosgrove (1909), p.2. 
60Faria (2002), pp. 121-125. 
61Ibid. 
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from the stable.62 By acknowledging that poor sanitary conditions were a recipe for 
killer diseases whose control proved expensive, authorities sawthe need to institute 
major reforms that would guide the disposal of waste and the handling of wastewater. 
Some of these reforms were necessitated by developments in the field of science and 
technology.  
 
The squalid conditions in urban areas of 19th- century Europe which was occasioned by 
massive industrialization, brought about epidemics that forced governments to deal with 
public health, at least from crisis to crisis.  As espoused by Martin V. Melosi, 
experience became the best teacher. 63  On this front, the efforts put in by Edwin 
Chadwick went along way to setting in motion realistic approaches of achieving 
sanitary cities and neighbourhoods from a miasmatic point of view.  Sir Edwin 
Chadwick’s collaboration with Dr. Thomas Southwood Smith and John Stuart Mill led 
to magisterial improvements in public health in the Britain of the early 19th century.  
As an expert in Poor Law reform, Chadwick confronted municipal officials with a 
commitment to tilt the state of affairs to what he believed was a panacea to the 
deplorable conditions in British industrial cities.  
 
According to Mervyn Susser and Zena Stein, Chadwick in his relative youth was 
greatly informed by technical innovations in epidemiology and the statistics of the early 
French hygienists, and not least by their emphasis on the quality of the social and 
physical environment.  He learnt much from Villermé, in particular, and from Parent-
Duchatelet, and corresponded with both (though none of these two French scholars 
believed in miasma theory).64  Chadwick’s analysis,as portrayed in his report in terms 
of approach, was greatly influenced by his ongoing worksin France, where 
hemaintained a close correspondence on grappling with the enormous task of the 
investigations he had undertaken.65  The metanarrative in the referred to approach by 
the French hygienists was the causal assumption that poverty caused disease; disease 
was costly to society and to prevent disease, one must alleviate poverty.66  Above all, 
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Chadwick adopted the utilitarian social engineering approach of his mentor, the 
influential philosopher Jeremy Bentham,67 with whom he had served loyally under, on 
the front of the reform of the Poor Laws. 
 
As Lynn M. Zottobserved, the watershed text that emerged from official explorations 
into the environs of the poor was Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of the 
Labouring Classes of Great Britain (1842), which compiled the findings of Poor Law 
doctors throughout England and Wales.  As part of his Sanitary Report, Chadwick 
called for dramatic social improvements and changes to the nation’s infrastructure, 
including improvements in sewer drainage and the water supply, methods for garbage 
removal, and better ventilation as part of building design. In newspapers and magazines 
across the country, Chadwick’s programme for public health was discussed and 
debated, with many concluding that sanitation reform was the best and only way to 
address the social ills of the lower classes.  Sanitary conditions would not only halt the 
spread of disease, but also obviate the need for large-scale charity measures, as the 
poor, no longer oppressed by dirt and illness, would be better able to fend for 
themselves. In short, public health would not only benefit the poor, it might even reduce 
the number of destitute.68 Chadwick, the man who became the embodiment of the 
sanitary movement and its ardent defender, believed that the nostrum for the menacing 
disease in urban areas lay in eradicating the sources of miasma arising from the 
unhygienic habits and filthy living conditions that were characteristic of the poor.69 
 
In 1848, a new wave of cholera was sweeping westwards across Europe.  By June, an 
epidemic was raging in Moscow and by September it had reached Hamburg and Paris. 
Watching its spread with anxiety, the British government, after several failed attempts, 
passed the Public Health Act on the last day of August 1848, establishing a General 
Board of Health for a provisional five-year period.70 With the Public Health Act of 
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1848, Chadwick’s ideas began to be implemented in Britain.71 The enactment of the 
LW was ‘the beginning of a commitment to proactive, rather than a reactive, public 
health’.72 
 
Despite the recommendations by sanitarians receiving utmost popularity and goodwill 
from local leaders, practitioners and policy makers, the contrary belief that it would be 
ineffective, or that implementation of such drastic programmes would require 
burdensome taxes or it would interfere with personal liberties garnered many 
advocates. 73  They used the press to register their misgivings about Chadwickian 
principles. In 1848, The Economist published an article heavily criticising attempts to 
try public sanitation, as demonstrated in this excerpt; 
 
Suffering and evil are nature’s admonitions; they 
cannot be got rid of; and the impatient attempts of 
benevolence to banish them from the world by 
legislation, before benevolence has learned their 
object and their end, have always been more 
productive of evil than good.74  
 
The opposition and scepticism came from both high profile individuals and groups who 
preferred the status quo in cities like London.  Theysaw the new changes as expensive 
and draconian.  In a letter to the Morning Chronicle, a Londoner, anonymously 
identified as ‘Rate Payer’, provided scathing and sceptical views on the ‘centralising’ 
tendencies of the Public Health Act, noting that; 
 
Even in Constantinople or Grand Cairo where plague 
and cholera are decimating the population, it is 
doubtful whether such a Bill would be desirable.75 
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Despite the opposition, the passion and non-compromising position adopted by 
Chadwick,who was supported by medical researchers, the most prominent of which 
included Florence Nightingale (1820–1910), resulted to reforms being instituted across 
England and Wales. This included progressive pipe-based sanitary systems. 
Nightingale, a social reformer, a statistician, and the founder of modern nursing, 
became a great voice in the belief in miasma theory and an ardent opponentof the 
‘contagionists’.  Edwin Chadwick, in the early years following his 1842 report, 
patronised sanitarianism with the support of loyalists amongst doctors, engineers and 
local government practitioners.  
 
The Royal Commission on Health of Towns (1844–1845), which had tacitly accepted 
Chadwick’s agenda, distanced itself from what was referred to as the ‘messy social and 
moral issues’ of the 1842 report by switching their attention from the condition of the 
labouring population to the health of towns.76 It now appealed to the middle class 
municipal improvers, whose efforts had previously been little concerned with the state 
of the masses but, on the contrary,focused on that of the streets in which they 
themselves lived and worked.77 In this way, according to Hamlin, an easily justifiable 
and relatively uncontentious restriction on the scope of a single inquiry shifted the 
focus of public health to municipal engineering and local government.78 
 
E. P. Hennock observes that whenever a town has succeeded in tapping a larger supply 
of water, its drainage becomes a more acute problem.  Water closets were emptied into 
sewers designed for surface and wastewater.   Older forms of sanitation had belonged 
to a household economy where water was available only with much labour.  
Households, therefore, did not use the quantities of water that they were to do later, and 
human waste was mainly disposed of separately from wastewater.  The demand for a 
larger water supply, when it came, frequently stemmed from local industry and came 
about through the influence of local manufacturers on municipalities.79 The analysis 
drawn from this case is that sanitary arguments served at best to support a case made 
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primarily for economic reasons.80  It is imperative therefore to mention that although 
sanitarians used pestilence as the central cog in their demandforimproved waste 
disposal mechanisms for cities, water supplyand sewerage systems assumed economic 
ends in an expanded purview of the need for radical forms of reducing environmental 
pollution from industrial wastes.  
 
Before the provision of a central water supply and sewerage system, traditional forms 
had undergone certain improvements.  Cesspits, being the most persistent technology 
for sanitation at the time, underwent major makeups by receiving brick-lining, 
reduction in size, minimised stench by the application of various materials to absorb 
moisture and also frequent emptying as responsibility moved from house owners to 
municipal authorities.81 Later on, cesspits started being replaced by tubs and pails, 
which could be removed in a sealed state to a depot to be emptied there and washed 
before being re-used, and by the use of various materials to absorb moisture and reduce 
odour.82 
 
It goes without saying that the use of excreta as fertilizer for agricultural production 
was a common practice.  These old systems of excreta disposal by collection of dry 
matter from cesspits were simple despite the nuisance of odour and the elaborate 
systems favoured by sanitarians promised to channel the collectivised wastewater to 
riparian fields for fertilizer production.  However, this was not to immediately happen 
as towns constructed sewers that poured their contents into local rivers, thereby 
compromising the health of downstream communities.  On a larger scale, it led to 
major health crises as characterised by the ‘great stink of London’, resulting from the 
Thames being chocked with raw sewage.  Increasing use of water closets and the 
implementation of the water carriage system, as Melosi writes, redirected pollution 
problems away from households and into rivers and streams.83 
 
It took more engineering expertise to solve the question of sewage treatment before 
being released into water channels.  Joseph William Bazalgette, who rose to 
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prominence after the passing of the Nuisance Removal Act of 1855 that established the 
Metropolitan Board of Works to develop an adequate sewerage system for London, 
proposed a series of main intercepting sewers, which ran west-east to catch discharges 
before they entered the Thames. 84  Technical know-how combined with legislative 
shrewdness became the two critical forces that drove the sanitary movement in Europe. 
 
Despite expressions of misgivings on the centralised and large-scale sanitary systems 
launched in most towns and cities in England and its dominions, the English sanitary 
movement attained a broader scale of publicity that went beyond Britain.  As the 19th 
century witnessed a lot of efforts being dedicated to developing sanitation and water 
provision systems that assured security from pestilence, the need for scientists, policy 
developers, reformers, local authority agencies and engineers to meet and share, 
disseminateand exchange ideas was great.  The first International Sanitation 
Conference was held in Brussels in 1852, and the 1876 International Congresses on 
Sanitation and Demography initiated a series of meetings.85  It gave British sanitarians 
an opportunity to make their views known, one that they were quick to seize.86 
 
Following the elaborate systems instituted in England that were highly publicised, 
especially with the cholera threat sweeping across Europe, the sanitarians won an 
immense following in most European cities amongst administrators and local 
governments.  In Germany, as Hennock notes, where British engineers had already 
been active constructing gas and water works for private companies, the best-known 
reaction was that of the city of Hamburg.  After a serious fire ravaged the city in 1842, 
the authorities in Hamburg commissioned William Lindley, a British engineer working 
in Germany, to provide a public water supply. Itfollows that rather than disease being 
the causal agent for adopting new systems, the risk of fire was making many cities and 
towns consider constructing public water systems. Under Lindley’s influence, 
therefore, Hamburg seized the opportunity offered by the necessary reconstruction of 
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so much of the city to construct a central sewerage system that was operationalized in 
1853, making it the first city in Germany to do so.87 
 
The city of Frankfurt benefited more from the efforts of Georg Varrentrap, a local 
physician, who had visited England in 1847 and 1852 at the height of the sanitarian 
movement, making him much versed with the debate and considerations. 88  After 
deliberations on the value of adopting such systems as instituted in England, a 
commission of experts charged with the responsibility of making recommendations 
sanctioned the construction of a small water-bore flushed drainage system.  After slight 
delays resulting from the annexation of the city by Prussia, the drainage system was 
operationalized in 1868.  Berlin was more hesitant, having failed to send even one 
sanitary expert to the Brussels Congress, and despite taking several officials on 
familiarisation trips to London, Paris and Hamburg, it was not until 1873 that it 
instituted a piped sanitary system.89Other cities in Germany followed the same pattern, 
with Danzig having completed their sewerage system in 1871, Breslau in 1877 and 
München,and Köln in 1881.90 
 
In the Danish capital of Copenhagen, the sewers were constructed in 1857 and 
improved in 1860 and 1885 so that wastewater and surface runoff were channelled into 
the harbour.  Further health concerns necessitated the reworking of the sewers from 
1893 to 1903.91Over the same period,starting from the 1860s, the same technologies 
and approaches to sanitary challenges in cities diffused tothe US’s major cities, such as 
Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia.92 
 
At the end of the 19th century, the European colonies got sewerage systemsfor the 
same public health reasons, but at later dates than in Europe.93 During the first decade 
of the 20th century, the sewers of Calcutta, the then capital of British India, were 
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constructed.94 The first sewers of Pondicherry, the main city of French India, were 
built in the 1930s, but drains had been constructed in the 18th century and a law on 
waste dumping implemented at the end of the 19th century.95  India would become an 
important reference point, serving as a template for the implementation of major 
infrastructure, including sewerage systems, in the other colonies.  Spatial inequality in 
urban infrastructure development and the strong bias in quality service provision, 
skewed towards certain zones of the city, has seen postcolonial historiographers and 
sociologists locate the inadequacies of the systems in the colonial past of the Global 
South.  As technologies travelled from the metropole to the dominions or colonies in 
this case, their adoption and implementation presented a different imagery from that of 
Europe and North America.  The water and sanitary systems adopted bythe colonial 
milieu in the colonies, like many other infrastructure developments, revealed intended 
or unintended deficiencies, inadequacies and differentiations, as manifested in the 
skewed nature of their deployment.  Despite their purpose of dealing with pestilence in 
the form of plague and cholera outbreaks that ravaged virtually all cities in the colonies 
at the latter half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, sanitizing cities 
meant characterizing indigenous and Asians in the case of the African colonies as 
‘diseased societies’, yet the water and sanitation systems failed to provide a 
universalized model of access.  
 
Erik van der Vleuten explores the aspects of the ‘ideology of circulation’, which 
connects the infrastructural integration of peoples with economic and ideological 
exchanges in the service of joint progress, democracy and peace, and, most 
importantly, the analysis of the implications of infrastructural changes to the economic 
or political agendas of powerful elites (imperialists and colonialists in this case for the 
colonies) for their own benefit.96  However, I would argue that while in Europe LTSs 
may have had the objective of homogenizing the city, solving existing problems in 
transport, water, energy, and sanitation, in the colonies, these models, instead of 
having just a utilitarian value, stand accused of possessing motives of promoting racial 
segregation, atavistically anchored in beliefs of European superiority and reinforcing 
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the notion of Europe’s civilizing mission.  Was racial segregation a conscious goal of 
system builders within the colonial context and what implications did this have on the 
indigenes either trooping into or already settled in the urban locations of the Global 
South?  
 
Carole Rakodi correctly states that colonial powers used and developed the planning 
ideas, standards, and engineering technologies that had been invented to meet the 
requirements in Europe. 97 An analysis of the emergence of LTSs and their 
implementation by system builders in cities in Europe points to incidences of 
unevenness either in connectivity or in the quality of the supply network.  For 
example, London had a dual system of water supply from the Thames, whereby the 
lower supply system connected to low-income areas of the city while the other 
network, which had greater reliability in terms of pressure, linked the high income and 
industrial zones.98 Such spatialization would replicate itself in the colonies, though 
characterized basically by race rather than class.  The popular view has been that the 
engineering practices in the Global South deliberately or consciously intervened to 
reorder the infrastructure geography and the social map of the urban areas to 
perpetuate a system of ‘spatial apartheid’.99  This view needs to be examined further’ 
either as a way of expanding Global South infrastructural and area studies or as a 
means of revising the grey area that exists in the contemporary scholarship. 
 
For writers like Headrick, the advent and consolidation of European empires together 
with the arrival of modern technology in the mid-19th century was a monumental 
moment.  It was at this point that technology provided the ‘tools’, first for the creation 
of overseas empiresand second for their management and exploitation.100 It is against 
this backdrop that large technical systems (LTSs) were rolled out in the colonies.  At 
the same time, as cities grew to assume new roles as colonial government capitals, they 
had to be remodelled to a standard that would provide a ‘home away from home’ for 
the colonial officials and their families.  Under the French assimilation policy in West 
Africa, Dakar in Senegal had to be a ‘small Paris’ if not Paris itself.  Furthermore, 
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colonies constituted new frontiers for the application of new models in technology and 
the introduction of those already in practice in Europe.  
 
Within the realm of urban studies, there has been a longstanding argument that for 
imperial Europe, the colonies were laboratories where new models in technology 
would be tested.  David Arnold gives credence to this assertion by arguing that in 
recent times, colonies and ex-colonies provided overseas laboratories and testing 
grounds, places where dangerous experiments could be conducted or ambitious 
schemes of social and physical engineering enactedwithout the public scrutiny and 
political constraints that might inhibit or even prohibitsuch ventures in Europe itself.101 
Africa, as ofthe late 19th and early 20th centuries hence found itself under new 
engineering and planning practices that would change its urban spaces completely.  
The city in Africa became one such ‘laboratory’ or frontier. 
 
Although that which was popularized in the 19th century by advocates of the sanitary 
movement, with Chadwick as the lead proponent, was seen as a solution to the problem 
of water and sanitation in the cities of the emerging polities in Europe and further 
replicated in America with little tinkering, it ended up serving and protecting the 
interests of the ‘better off’.  Large systems of water and sanitation seem to have evolved 
beyond their vision as mere public amenities into becoming instruments for social 
differentiation, which responded mostly to the needs of the advantaged dwellers within 
city spaces.  Arguably, the new technical achievements in developing early water 
supply proto-systems had some bearing on levels of consumption in the early 19th 
century and the new systems did not provide for equity of service.102 Mikael Hård and 
Ruth Oldenziel observe that a critical analysis of many actions by scientists and 
engineers reveals that they were not aimed at improving the welfare of the proletariat 
but rather at protecting the interests and investments of the middle class. ‘Instead of 
making the proletariat cleaner, running water increased the comfort of the better off 
classes.’103 
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Mathew Gandy is of the view that the first half of the 19th century was marked by a 
deterioration in urban living conditions punctuated by devastating outbreaks of 
infectious diseases.104 The rapid growth of cities quickly overwhelmed the historical 
reliance on wells, water vendors and other sources, and led to the introduction of 
centralized water supply systems in, for example, Paris in 1802, London in 1808 and 
Berlin in 1856.  However, the question of the financing of these projects arose.In the 
British colonies, the Manchester doctrine adopted in Britain curtailed expenditure on 
major engineering solutions.In Paris, new legislation in 1894 made the connection 
between individual dwellings to the main drainage system mandatory.  In the Global 
South, this last phase of modernization of water infrastructure remained only partially 
completed.  Neither comprehensive sewer systems nor water treatment works were 
ever introduced.  The result here was the skewed nature and class-biased provision of 
city services that continues to be perpetuated there.  Mathew Gandy proposes that 
exploring the history of water infrastructure beyond the metropolitan core of Europe 
and North America can uncover fresh insights into the limitations of the 
‘bacteriological city’ as a universal model and also disentangle some of the political 
tensions underlying the introduction of technological networks in the capitalist city.105 
 
It is important to note that most countries hesitated about adopting the systems as they 
were in England in the pioneer years due to the debates on the pollution of rivers and 
the legal tussles based on rights and vested interests.  In some places, the traditional 
improved systems of cesspools were favoured compared to the cost of the new 
systems.  The use of pneumatic pumps for the purpose of emptying cesspits had seen 
them survive for longer in Germany than in England, where ashes had been used to dry 
the excreta.106 Furthermore, when a town embarked on a main drainage system, it 
began something whose cost greatly exceeded what the authorities were accustomed to 
spend. It becomes imperative to highlight that a sanitary infrastructure of a centralized 
water supply and main drainage was the luxury of communities that were rich.107 
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Deriving from the sanitary movement, cities and towns had the benefit of knowing the 
actual connection between sewage and the sources of drinking water, for example, the 
adverse potential impact on their health or welfare.  That knowledge resulted in great 
strides being made in collecting and conveying sewage away from people’s homes, 
and in treating the sewage prior to its discharge either from their source of potable 
water or at a point near their source.108  The impact of the new system of sewers on 
mortality rates remained debatable yet it was recognized as mostly substantial. 
JorgVögele through his work, Urban mortality change in England and Germany 
1870–1913, provides a demographic comparison that shows the remarkable decline in 
death rates in the 1860s in English towns while in Germany, a common pattern of 
decline is only registered from the 1880s.  The steady decline in mortality rates in 
German towns in the last quarter of the 19th century is attributable to the adoption of 
sanitary measures along the English model.109 Hence, while epidemiological dangers 
and aesthetic problems associated with substandard sanitation and drainage were at the 
centre of the adoption of the new systems, fire prevention as shown by the Hamburg 
casealso played a major role in instituting pipe-bound cities.110  The purpose of curbing 
mortality rates and bringing them down through sanitary measures had to be coupled 
by that of securing the economic base of such cities from the devastating risk of fire by 
adopting strategic water supply mechanisms.  
 
Also, it is important to note that the success recorded in improved health for most 
cities by the period marked by the end of World War I cannot solely be attributed to 
the efforts of 19thcentury sanitarianism. Other emerging technologies like the 
introduction of motor vehicles had a ripple effect on sanitation.  This is because the 
vehicles as a mode of transport phased out the use of animals such as horses, oxen, and 
donkeys.  This eliminated or reduced the volume of droppings.111  As a result,the 
number of flies as carriers of pathogens or disease vectors was also reduced, resulting 
in a massive decline in mortality rates.  
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2.1.2 The STS/LTS Debate 
As Renate Mayntz and Thomas P. Hughes noted, social science research has long 
focused on the development, diffusion and, in particular, the consequences of specific 
isolated technologies or technical artefacts.112  The existence of complex and ubiquitous 
technical systems has caught the imagination of many researchers. This has resulted in 
ongoing debates that centre on the socio-technical character of LTSs, and their transfer, 
appropriation, conflict and contestation.  Historians of technology have sought to 
analyse how these systems develop not only as technical artefacts but also in their 
social nature as they acquire functionality among users.  More often than not, these 
technologies in their ‘largesse’ spurn out into networks at a spatial and organizational 
level.  
 
However, it is the risks of failure and disaster, negative externalities, management, 
coordination and control problems associated with the development of LTSs which 
have necessitated historians and social scientists to co-operate in the analysis of their 
development and functioning.113 While the attention given to large technical systems 
and the subsequent interdisciplinary approaches has seen remarkable success being 
made towards the production of knowledge in the realm of science, technology and 
society studies, the LTS/STS debate has for a long time perpetuated the marginalization 
of the ordinary technologies of everyday life, especially for the non-elite class of 
society.  
 
Hughes’ publication, Networks of Power (1983),set into motion unprecedented interest 
in the study of large technical systems as socially constructed ones and how they 
function in modern society.  Hughes became the ‘the father of LTS’ and his 
phenomenal work attracted diverse attention that can be argued to have given science 
and technology studies a new lease of life.  The starting point of Hughes’s historical 
reconstructions, both in the sense of the initial research interest and of the elementary 
building block in what would later become the edifice of LTS, are successful investor-
engineers. 114  Hughes describes the origin of LTS, and their transfer to specific 
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technologists which he identifies as ‘inventor-entrepreneurs’, ‘independent professional 
inventors’ or ‘system builders’.115 While Hughes’ elaborate and didactic presentation of 
the evolutionary progression of technical systems provides a strong basis for 
understanding how technologies develop and work within society, his uni-linear 
assumptions of development require a more insightful interrogation.  It can be said that 
the LTS perspective as espoused by Hughes (1983) presents single narratives where one 
group of actors, the ingenious technologists, is herofiedand the large technological 
systems allocated autonomous and deterministic power to always chart a forward 
looking development by virtue of what he calls ‘momentum’.  This kind of analysis 
closes one eye to the interplay of opposing forces and socio-economic and political 
tensions that inform the character of technological development.  Much as this kind of 
research marked a turning point in augmenting STS focus, it has retrospectively 
contributed to the bracketing of some societies and sometimes the alienation of the 
pivotal role that users play in the development and appropriation of technologies.  
Jorges observes that users of LTS are passive users.  Their discipline and their active 
contribution, and, by the same token, their potential resistance, are rarely made explicit. 
The co-production of system services is not explicated in LTS researchas the users 
remain hidden, most of the time, behind abstract concepts such as demand or risk or 
regulation.116 
 
In line with the ambiguity associated with what constitutes ‘large technology’, 
metaphors like ‘small is beautiful’ capture many people’s belief that happiness is not a 
matter of largeness, especially not with technical systems.117Jorges states that whatever 
we take to be large, that which is vaguely construed out there as large seems to be 
unsatisfactory as a delineation. Any differentiated reconstruction of the views of actors 
concerned with a particular system will show this.118 The level of complexity may vary 
in scale at various levels of analysis or production. While the user may not comprehend 
how large the system could be as he or she interacts with the technological materialities, 
the engineering designers may see it as a complex system at a technical level while 
politicians and government operatives may tend to concentrate on the financial and 
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legal complexities of the system’s adoption and implementation. As for investor-
entrepreneurs, the complexity might arise in the form of the cost of implementation or 
operationalization vis-à-vis investment returns via a system of cost-benefit analysis. 
The bottom-lineis that LTS studies remain inconclusive in capturing the specific 
technological aspects of socio-technical development and usage.  
 
E.  F.  Schumacher, one of the proponents of ‘small is beautiful’ in his publication by 
the same title – which interestingly came out ten years prior to Thomas P. Hughes’ 
magisterial work – asserts that technology recognizes no self-limiting principle in 
terms, for instance, of size, speed or violence.  It therefore does not possess the virtues 
of being self-balancing, self-adjusting and self-cleansing.119However, I would assume 
that this does not imply that technology exhibits neutrality.  
 
Though Schumacher’s analysis is more focused on the economics of everyday life, he 
warns, ‘to go for gigantism is to go for self-destruction’.  His views on technology 
contradict those held by the Hughesian school in many respects.  While contemporary 
scholarship need not romanticize smallness, the need to re-examine technologies as 
tools of everyday life must reign supreme.  This constitutes part of my objective to 
refocus this study of Nairobi’s infrastructure systems of water provision and sanitation 
access through an integrated approach – both bottom-linked or ‘decentred technologies’ 
and centralized large technical systems – so as to give voice to smaller technologies 
emerging and sustaining off-grid localities in the urban-scape, which operate outside 
the luxuries of centralized large technical systems, be they public or private.  
 
With the focus of scholarship around technologies and infrastructures shifting from 
‘images of things’ to Edmund Husserl’s philosophical injunction, ‘to the things 
themselves’,120 the belief is that the unpacking of artefacts provides deeper insights into 
the functionality of technologies.  By focusing on technological systems as artefacts 
that derive from socially contested spaces, and are hence non-neutral, STS helps in 
providing a lens to unpack and unbundle them to manifest their multifaceted and 
multilayered nature.  If Hughes’ LTS bestowed unto historical studies of technology 
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the‘systems’ perspective, linking the apparatus to engineering systems and, in turn, 
linking these to manifold organizational, economic and political actors and structure, 
then social constructionist theorists of technology broadened the scope of analysis by 
understanding technological things as embedded within society and loaded with 
meaning. Technologies might not only be ‘means to ends’, they could also be ‘ends of 
means’.  They shape society as well as being shaped by society.  They are mediated and 
negotiated upon as not only technical artefacts but also as socially engineered.  
 
Things encapsulate multiple notions of various actors and, hence, situating them in their 
right contexts capturesthe intricacies that surround their development and usage, forms 
of representation and embedded characteristics of a political nature.  This helps us 
avoid the Hughesian heroism of ‘engineer-entrepreneurs or system builders’ and the 
black boxing of artefacts as self-driving, self-regulating and forward-moving.  As 
Eduardo Aibar and Wiebe E Bijker’s work on the Cerdà plan for the extension of 
Barcelona reveals, closure around a final design resulted not from a simple power 
equation of who had the loudest voice, but from a set of situationally specific 
compromises resulting from a set of micro-struggles over the width of streets, the 
depths of buildings, and the provision of, and public access to, social facilities and 
parks.121 By treating the city as an ‘enormous artefact’ in which the social and technical 
are heterogeneously engineered by a range of competing actors and institutions, Aibar 
and Bijker were able to escape notions of ‘technological impact’ that tend to frame 
discussions on urban technology.122 Furthermore, their research shows how competing 
and contrasting visions of engineers, architects and local communities encompassed 
overlapping discourses of hygiene, mobility, economic growth, social distinction, land 
ownershipand occupation rights.123 
 
Brain sees the STS perspective as helping illuminate how producers of cities, for 
example, architects, ‘make sense with things’ as ‘practical operators’ rather than simply 
reflecting the logic of abstract economic system.124 This becomes a reality by shifting 
from the generalities of technology as a subject of reference and the human interaction 
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with things to the contextual and ‘post-contextual’ analysis of technology that is in 
undated with socio-cultural constructs.  Urban materialities embody aspirations of 
various actors in a network but, as Brain states, its engineer sociologists define both the 
characteristics of the artefact and the social universe in which it is to function.  STS 
hence unravels ‘what social relations, institutional practices, strategies of action, and 
possibilities for transformation are built into cultural artifacts’.125Coutard and Guy point 
out how the STS perspective, broadly construed, emphasizes the ambivalence inherent 
in all technologies and the significant potential of the contestation of, and resistance to, 
technology – supported forms of discrimination, the deeply contingent nature of the 
process of ‘socialization’ or the appropriation of new technologies and their uses –
affect the social ‘effects’ of new technologies.126 
 
While STS studies have been important in offering a wide platform on which we 
analyse technological artefacts or ‘things’ in general, the over-reliance on the ‘ideal 
planning’principles of the city either completely excludes the non-formal or small-scale 
mechanism of survival and organization within the city.  Furthermore, despite centring 
the sociology of technologies, the STS perspective still bestows the utmost power to the 
engineering sociologists, hence promoting ‘the autonomy of things’ that is at the core of 
Hughes’ argument.  Despite addressing the ambivalent nature of the city and its 
tentacles represented in the form of its technological body, STS remains a top-down 
approach that has not focused on producing inclusive narratives of technology and 
technological processes.  Retrospectively, while proponents of actor network theory 
(ANT) such as Latour acknowledge the role of actants,127 the South has continued to be 
bracketed within the same theorization due to the privileged position of the North as the 
centre of scientific knowledge.  
 
2.1.3  TechnologyTransfer and Colonization in Africa 
David Arnold observed that works on the history of technology have been weak 
analyticallycompared to other subfields of history, specifically economic history, 
agrarian historyand environmental history or the history of medicine. Part of the reason 
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is that these subfields have managed to bring their own methodologies and agendas to 
the discussion of technology.  They have also continued to receive better funding, thus, 
enabling them to undertake huge projects in terms of research and the production of 
knowledge.128 As for the inertia in developing a history of technology in the South, 
Arnold indicts the traditional approaches to research.  First and foremost, by equating 
technology with industrial technology as it has evolved in Europe and North America, 
the establishment of modern technology in Africa and Asia has been seen as primarily a 
legacy of colonial intervention, a boon bestowed by technologically advanced 
civilizations on societies considered ‘backward’ and even ‘primitive’. By promoting 
such prejudices, indigenous technologies have ended up being excluded and devoid of 
their agency.  The other approach has been to see technologies as having diffused from 
Europe to Africa, Asia or the Americas without significant local input.  The indigenes 
are painted as passive recipients.  As the ‘travelling technologies’ were characterized as 
progressive, modernand largely benevolent, their failure could only be as a result of 
local populations’ stubbornness or misguided rejection, their failure to acknowledge the 
usefulness of the new technologies or local physical conditions that militated against 
their effective use.  
 
Part of the reason for the promotion of such bias in the history of technology in relation 
to non-elite societies or the colonized is not only a problem of the colonies but the age-
old practice of recording the history of ‘great wars’, ‘great men’, ‘life changing or 
breakthrough inventions’, and ‘great machines’ amongst many other grandiose ideas, 
events or projects.  Oldenziel and Hård in Consumers, Tinkerers and Rebels amplify 
how technological innovations rarely produced the uniform experiences of Europe and 
that the main point is to acknowledge that in the process of appropriating technology, 
networking, tinkering and tweaking were necessary activities. The story of 
‘technologies-in-use and the people who used them’129offers a level ground on which to 
render an insight thatprovides a vivid understanding of technology, society and the 
lived experiences of day-to-day livelihoods. Instead of having a uni-linear narrative of 
invention, innovation and technology transfer that result from the asymmetrical analysis 
of technological artefacts, the counter-narratives of adaptation, conflict, contestation, 
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improvisation and basically tinkering by consumers and users as active recipients put 
scholarship into the realm of a history of technology that is more rounded than is 
currently constituted.  
 
To refocus attention on the relationship between the metropole and the colonies, Daniel 
Headrick promotes the central thesis of technology as ‘tools of empire’.130 European 
imperialism was partly a result of technological advancement asit made it possible to 
conquer, subjugate and establish hegemonic control over the new territories.  Once 
established, the massive rail roads instituted in the colonies basically enhanced the 
movement of soldiers, European administrators and economic exploitation that leeched 
the colonies for Europe’s economic development, under-developing the colonies in the 
process.  The maxim gun was a symbol of European might that subverted indigenous 
communities sometimes into willing subjects.  Advances in medicine, such as the 
production of quinine, did not just ensure the conquest of the tropical territories by 
controlling malaria.  Narratives of how jigger parasites and other biological weapons 
were released by European colonialists to weaken resistance by local communities and 
increase misery have also emerged to put into perspective the role that technology 
played in the building of European overseas empires.  After conquest, western 
technology served the purpose of promoting domination over indigenous societies, 
derogatively referred to as ‘natives’ and mediate the process of cultural imperialism 
described as the ‘humanistic civilizing mission of the colonized’.  European notions of 
superiority were promoted at the expense of all local initiatives at a technological level 
in what Betwell Ogot sees as blatant refusal to acknowledge the role played by 
indigenous societies in shaping not only their own history but also global 
history.131Ogot emerged as one of the leading nationalist historians in Africa in the 
1940s, who pioneered what is widely known as the ‘history of peoples of Africa’.  He 
did this through a methodological revolution by employing and asserting the place of 
oral traditions in capturing the African agency, especially during the pre-colonial and 
colonial period. 
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Michael Adassums up the perception of the European imperialists by stating: 
‘… so much was new and strange in the overseas lands 
they visited in the early stages of expansion that 
Europeans often simply overlooked tools and methods 
of cultivation (read indigenous technologies). Cities 
and housing, public works and armies, and the way the 
inhabitants dressed and the products they offered in 
trade had greater impact on European attitudes than 
their distinctive techniques of construction, the killing 
power of the weapons with which they fought their 
wars, and the quality of the looms on which they wove 
their textiles.’132 
 
However, much as the experiences of the indigenes were pushed to the periphery in the 
face of European imperialism, what is missing in Adas’ and Headrick’s analogies of 
technological imperialism is the question of how some local communities were able to 
tinker with some of the incoming technologies to their advantage, for example, as gun 
repairers and scrap metal dealers, doing artisan work that exhibited high skill levels. For 
instance, the Nandi warriors in Kenya put up one of the fiercest resistances to colonial 
establishment in Africa not only by using their indigenous weaponry but also by 
vandalizing and stealing railway and telegraph materials to make strong spears, arrows 
and bows, which they used against the invading British military.133 Hence, it is not 
always that new technologies were received in colonies with bewilderment and meek 
acceptance.  
 
To broaden the scope of understanding aspects of technology transfer and interaction, it 
is also important to aver that Europe has long looked overseas for opportunities for 
technological experimentation and development that were not feasible in Europe 
itself.134 Colonies, and their successor states in Africa, Asia and Americas provided 
career openings for engineers, agronomists, doctors and technicians for well qualified 
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women and men, opportunities that were often lacking or very restricted in Europe. 
Colonies were ideal as overseas laboratories and testing grounds due to the absence of 
public scrutiny and political constraints or basically weaker laws governing such risky 
undertakings.  Perhaps confronted by the new industrial technologies of the high 
imperial era where ‘machines became the universal measure of men’, the question that 
lingers is how far these ‘big’ – one might say‘heroic’ – technologies, so emblematic to 
the imperial eye and so often commanding state resources and prestige, actually 
mattered to the local populations.135 
 
Arnold continues to lament the growing distrust of sweeping generalities across time 
and place of earlier, seemingly simplistic typologies, with their unsubtle (or worse 
unfounded) distinctions between ‘colonial’ and ‘indigenous’, their tendency to treat 
colonialism as an undifferentiated whole, and their disposition to see technology as an 
instrument of power relations rather than as a cultural space in which various forms of 
interaction and exchange, of mimesis and reversal become historically possible. 136 
Arnold’s submission that is useful for our analysis is his emphasis on the centrality of 
users/recipients of technology from Europe in the study of the history of technology in 
the Global South.  However, despite the proposed need for zooming in on the meaning, 
useand effect of technologies as they travel and are appropriated within new frontiers, 
the study of technology in the Global South must be able to locate the role of indigenes 
as innovators, inventors and independent users who possess the ability to adapt, 
rejectand contest.  Not only are they (users) shaped by incoming technologies, they are 
also able to reshape the recipient technologies orsometimes reject them per se, leading 
to ‘a persistence of the old’ no matter how out of favour, going by the grand narratives 
of progression, it might be.  
 
Looking at processes of transfer, adaptation and appropriation as translations allow us 
to follow travelling elements on their journeys between different sites- both in a fine-
grained minute fashion or by tracing larger, more encompassing trajectories.137 The 
study of technology in Africa, like any other social space, must be de-territorialized and 
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re-territorialized so as to address aspects that give credence to the adaptation, 
appropriation, mixing, rejection or resistance at local level. 138 In colonial parlance, 
technology transfer was proposed by the implementers to be adopted as a socio-political 
or economic instrument for change. For instance, in the latter half of the 19th century, 
Istanbul witnessed massive changes to its urban infrastructure systems, specifically 
water supply.  The Ottoman reformers believed that modern urban technologies– such 
as central water supply, sewers, and street cars– would raise the general level of culture, 
which was defined and redefined as a continual and contested process.139 
 
However, the effortby city planners to attain homogeneity through technological 
reforms misses the point in that individual citizen and officials have modified and 
sometimes even rejected the changes.140 Technology in transfer remains susceptible to 
indigenous adaptations and contestations.  As it enters new geographical frontiers, it is 
reconfigured to achieve user-specific ends.  Elisio Macamo and Dieter Neubert propose 
that we study African local appropriation through the pull factor of attractive ‘products 
of modernity’ that cause social change locally. 141 Concepts such as ‘glocalisation’, 
‘hybridisation’ and ‘creolization’ as approaches addressing the mixing of various 
culturally embedded practicesoffer an explanation on the process of appropriation of 
incoming technology. 142 Butcategorizing them as ‘attractive’ products of 
modernitylegitimizes the view that these migrating technologies come as superior to 
and for the good of the local. What is modern or modernity? In exploring 
Eisenstadt’sconcept of ‘multiple modernities’,143how does it play into the technology 
transfer discourse? 
 
All in all, David Edgerton defines ‘creole technology’ as that which finds a distinctive 
set of uses outside the time and place where it was first used on a significant scale. 
Therefore, I argue that technology undergoes a process of enculturalization, where it is 
prone to alteration, modification or complete adoption for a totally different use that fits 
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well with the local needs of the users. Users are a source of both active and 
unintentional innovation.  They matter not only because they use technologies in 
unforeseen innovative ways but also because they themselves develop new and 
innovative technologies, services, approaches and so on. 144  Basically, ideas do not 
remain unchangedas they flow but are subject to translation.145 As diffused ideas are 
translated throughout theircirculation, and as they evolve differently in different 
settings, they may not only lead to homogenization but also to variationand 
stratification.  The concept of ‘editing’ has served to describe and explainhow such 
translation proceeds – thus further focusing on the dynamics of circulating ideas.146 The 
history of technology, while exploring the question of colonialism in Africa in line with 
technologies that came along and continue to be imported, needs to see them not as 
prototypes but as templates that are subject to processes of localization.  
 
As they mediate through space and re-establish themselves within society, do 
technologies operate as neutral entities? Contextualised and post-context historical 
analysis locates technology as a cultural construct that is embedded with different forms 
of character within the socioeconomic and political milieu in which it operates and 
thrives.  Technologies can be translated politically and their functionality within society 
depends on certain political structures or by extension, they may reframe and 
restructure the balance of power in locales where they apply.  There is a need, as 
espoused by Langdon Winner, to recognize how social and economic forces shape 
technologies. 147  What matters is not the technology itself but the socio-economic 
system in which it is embedded.  
 
Moreover, if our moral and political language for evaluating technology includes only 
categories having to do with tools and uses, if it does not include alteration to meaning 
of designs and arrangements of our artefacts, then we will be blinded to much that is 
intellectually and practically crucial.  The endeavour is not to look for conscious 
conspiracies or malicious intentions.148 The undertaking to understand the environment 
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within which the water and sanitation infrastructure system for Nairobi has 
systematically developed in its various epochs is to provide more insights that go 
beyond the blanket notions of the pull and push between the colonizer and colonized, 
the governors and the governed, and the rich and the poor.   Hård notes that technology 
is applied to groups to preserve or alter social relations, and foster technological 
change.  He states that arising out of conflict, technological change is never a socially 
neutral process.149 In this view, the application of technology is not, in the first place, 
defined as a means of using natural resources or as a tool for alleviation of physical 
strain.  Rather, it is seen as a tool of establishing and influencing social relations.150 
 
Despite the consensus around the history of technology in general and how it needs to 
be approached from a multifaceted perspective, in Africa,it remains relatively an 
upcoming discipline that is struggling to gain roots. Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, 
a Zimbabwean environmental historian, lends his voice to the technological debate for 
the former colonized societies by advocating for what he calls ‘technologies of 
everyday life’.  Mavhunga uses the analogy of ‘the horse and rider relationship’ 151 in 
explaining the technological nexus between North and South.  The rider enjoys the ride 
as the horse shoulders the burden and does as directed.  This nexus further forecloses a 
view to ordinary people as creative beings in their own right.  Mavhunga’s work, by 
using the example of hunting and the human interaction with the forest as mediated 
through the world of spirits, brings to the fore the question of STSs capturing people’s 
imagination and seeing science and technology as an aspect of everyday practice.  
 
2.1.4 Duality, Infrastructure Systems, and Urbanity in Africa 
The process of urbanizationthe world overis basically marked bytechnological 
advancements.  Those technologies emerge to characterize the body that is the city as 
they bore artefacts that become the nature, nurtureand body politic for the city.  Once 
fully developed, the technical systems become naturalized as part of the whole, many 
times going unnoticed unless they fail. They are the connective tissues and circulatory 
systems of ‘modernity’, and hence infrastructures.152  They become the unavoidable 
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‘extensions’ of the whole. Those infrastructures are mostly invisible. But by 
constituting what would be termed as the appendages on which the city revolves, they 
become the core of that city.  They distinguish the urban from the rural’ city, from 
upcountry or reserve (in colonial Africa).  As an organic entity and supported by 
technical systems that are organs153 in themselves, the city evolves over time, acquiring 
new form, shape and functionalities. The path of evolution, however, is context 
specific, determined by geographical factors, political considerations, scientific 
innovations, and environmental trends, amongst other factors.  
 
Bill Freund asserts that while particular towns and cities that fit particular historical 
purposes and political or economic ends may come and go, the urban tradition is one of 
accretion and agglomeration, not one of entirely distinct stages.  Cities inevitably carry 
baggage from their individual and collective pasts that have to be understood.154 Part of 
the baggage that urban Africa carries is the imprint of decades of European imperialism 
and colonialism.  However, Fourchard warns that an overemphasis on the perspective 
of the colonizers rather than the colonized has led to inconclusive typologies common 
to many syntheses of Africa’s urban past, which ‘tend to divide between the essentially 
African and the essential colonial city’.155  Moreover, seeing Africa’s cities only in 
terms of their colonial and post-colonial relationships may preclude a fuller 
understanding of the multifaceted ways in which they have engaged with the larger 
world.156 
 
Despite the risk involved in taking these binaries towards understanding urbanization in 
Africa from the age of colonialism, the city in Africa has continued to present a picture 
of ‘two worlds’ not only spatially but also socially.  What is revealed is the case of 
continuities and discontinuities during colonialism and into the post-colony.  The 
European colonial occupation of Africa marked the destruction of old cities and their 
replacement with a benign neglect of the old and the establishment of adjacent new 
frontiers, ahybridization, whereby the old mixed with the new and in certain cases, new 
areas were established that grew into important cities.  The persistence of the ‘old’ was 
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partly as a result of resistance from the indigenes, who fought for preservation or, 
where aspects of indirect rule were instituted, the non-interference policy witnessed 
aspects of the old thrive to inform the character of certain cities, for instance, in 
northern Nigeria.  
 
In terms of appropriation of space, the colonial era has been marked by exclusion 
exhibited through racial segregation in terms of access to space and subsequent 
infrastructure systems.  However, as envisioned by this study, this narrative needs to be 
interrogated further beyond its normative depictions.  What is depicted is a vivid picture 
of ‘dual cities’ in Africa, although these aspects of duality in terms of access to urban 
infrastructure are not unique to Africa, as revealed by the history of industrial 
Europe.157 All in all, cities in the South remain divided, where the former ‘European 
town’ is currently occupied by the petty bourgeoisie, which took over the reins of 
power from the colonialists.  It is characterized as modern, spacious, low density, well 
maintained through town planning and culturally different from the surrounding 
environment.  The second, which houses the mass of the city that is basically poor, is 
usually separated from the first by parks, railway lines, open spaces, andis invariably 
more densely settled with traditional housing and is overcrowded and lacking in 
services and infrastructure provision.158 
 
Contemporary cities in the former colonies are trapped in their past.  They exhibit thick 
layers of colonial imprints despite the indigenes’ resilience and resistancebeing visible 
sometimes.  The important point that King makes is the observation that past studies 
have taken a Western frame of reference; hence, they end up under-representing or 
misrepresenting the realities of the Global South.  The agency of the accounts from 
locals is very critical of contemporary scholarship for this will shed more light on the 
character of the city and develop inclusive works of knowledge.  
 
William Cunningham Bissellobserves that colonialism was marked by contradiction, 
confusion and even chaos.159  Within these environments of suspicion and prestige, it is 
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imperative for technologies of provision in the form of infrastructures to be unbundled 
and unpackaged to reveal their embedded nuances of conquest, resistance, 
submissionand rejection.  As laboratories or experimental terrains for the metropole to 
try out technologies of the modern, as Wright160 and Rabinow161 put it, how do these 
inform the social and political techno-spaces in the Global South, especially for 
emergent cities like Nairobi?  
 
Exploring the question of what he refers to as ‘exceptionalism’ in an article titled, ‘Why 
African cities matter’, Myers delves deeper into the methodological debate that tends to 
sectionalize cities of the world through bifurcation.  As a result, the Global South cities 
have been marginalized.  The pompous characterization of some cities into ‘global 
cities’ against ‘slum cities’ amongst other juxtapositions creates a smoke screen that 
masks the potential of Global South urban locales.  Myer’s proposes that the focus 
should be more on the historicity and particularities of cities rather than on 
exceptionalism.162 While cities in the world today are major points in a meshed-up web 
of the global economy, each one of them has its unique history and a different social 
fabric that sets it apart to a degree that demands its own particular approach in a way 
that unbundles it successfully, leading to inclusive narratives of technological 
invention, innovation and appropriation, especially in urban provisioning.  Furthermore, 
rather than seeing cities for how they fail in terms of infrastructure and economy, we 
need to approach them for the multiple relations and practices that constitute how they 
work.163 
 
With the view that infrastructures as technological artefacts are non-neutral, Antinna 
von Schnitzler explores the question of techno-politics surrounding water and energy 
infrastructures in South Africa. 164  She reinforces the idea that artefactsundergo a 
process of interpretation or perhaps translation that enhances contestation or rejections, 
emanating from the prevailing political push and shove.  The controversy that 
surrounded the introduction of Pre-paid Meters (PPMs) in South Africa’s low-end areas 
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brings forth the high politics of technologies or infrastructures and how different social 
classes conceive and visualize new technologies that are applied from above.  While 
PPMs can be rationalized as a viable innovation aimed at controlling consumption and 
regularizing supply of services within the dictates of the laws of demand and supply, 
the South African protests, as vividly elaborated by von Schnitzler, calls for the need to 
reimagine and re-think the user. 
 
Egyedi, Mehos and Vree refer to systems that are derived away from the central 
networks as ‘inverse infrastructures’.165 For them, cities, not only in the South but also 
in the North, are witnessing the emergence of unprecedented infrastructures that are not 
owned by government or large businesses away from the centralized or controlled top-
down by government or industry as telecommunication, energy networks and railways; 
rather, they are owned and developed by individual citizens or small businesses.  Yet 
they manage to mushroom into local, regionaland even global infrastructures.  For 
purposes of our study, Egyedi, Mehosand Vree’s idea of ‘inverse infrastructure’ 
informs what we refer to as bottom-linked systems or ‘small infrastructures’.   Against 
that back drop and acknowledging that Nairobi’s cityscape is littered with several off-
grid spatial zones, I undertook to address it for the inadequacies located within the 
central systems of water and sanitation, and move a notch higher to locate the 
decentralized or non-conventional processes of accessing these critical services, that is, 
the small technologies of provisioning the services.  
 
Jochen Monstadt acknowledges that infrastructures mediate resource flows and vitally 
shape environmental practices and socio-technical innovation in cities.  He further 
asserts that adequate conceptual approaches, which reflect the complex 
interdependencies between cities, networked infrastructuresand urban ecologies, and 
which broaden our understanding of ways we can develop, govern and renew our 
infrastructures in cities in a sustainable way, are needed.  The inter-relationship 
between infrastructure and ecology vividly comes out.166 For him, cities are pivotal 
sites in which resource flows ‘metabolized’ by infrastructures are geographically 
concentrated, and the everyday exchanges between networked infrastructures and 
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natural environments occur.  However, although not within the scope of this study, the 
relationship between urban and its peripheral ecology is more of a parasitic nature than 
symbiotic. 
 
Drawing attention to the infrastructures that characterize the day-to-day experiences of 
the city and its residents, it has been argued that socio-technical innovations in water 
supply, sanitation, energy supplyand transport, amongst other services, are at the core 
of evolving urbanization processes and have permitted the extreme acceleration of the 
urban metabolism. 167  The equilibrium between nature and societies sustainability 
results from how we develop, governand renew our urban infrastructures.  Moreover, 
the quality of networked infrastructures and the degree of social and geographical 
access to them has a huge impact on distributional justice and social wellbeing in cities, 
as explained by the proponents of the ‘splintering urbanism’ school of thought.168 
 
Although overly high modernist in approach, Neuman and Smith assert that great cities 
are born and give rise to great infrastructures.169 The development of infrastructure 
transforms urban spaces and gives a city an image and infrastructure thatin itself 
possesses transformative power.  It revolutionizes the city.  Perhaps a city is ranked on 
its level of infrastructural development and a functional infrastructure network sustains 
the city.  Infrastructures lessen equity disparities, providing sustainable solutions and 
hence lowering non-renewable resource depletion and environmental impacts at all 
scales. 
 
The ‘modernization’ of water and sanitation provision system in urban environments, 
including Nairobi, was basically to deal with the question of miasmas.  As such, one 
would have expected an attempt at instituting a web of supply infrastructures on a 
universal basis for the nascent city.  However, only ‘Europeanized zones’ were serviced 
by the networked system.  While racial segregation policy, believed to have been 
pursued by the colonizers, promises to provide answers to the inadequacies in 
infrastructure development in cities in the Global South, for example, Nairobi, 
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exploring the question of whetherthe outcomes of the systems were premeditated is 
more promising.  Is inequality a structural component embedded in the artefacts that 
make up LTS? 
 
In a study on ‘water vending’ in Tanzania, Marianne Kjellén paints the differential 
picture of most cities in the Global South as she states that in most developing 
countries, a piped water supply in the cities is the norm for the richer households, while 
poorer households struggle with a number of alternative means for accessing water.170 
With the majority of the urban poor in these cities sitting on what are characterized as 
‘illegal’ spaces (slums, informal and squatter areas), city authorities decline to provide 
and plan for service provision (water included) grounded in the argument that 
incorporating these informal areas in the city planning structures in themselves would 
be institutionalizing illegality.171 Hence, despite these areas absorbing more than half of 
a city’s residents, they continue to operate like blank spaces on city authority master 
plans and policy papers.  Diminishing state resources coupled with inadequate urban 
management capacity and the insufficiency of conventional approaches have rendered it 
impossible to provide basic infrastructure in urban areas in developing countries such as 
in the city of Dares Salaam.172 Faced with these realities, how do the urban residents 
reproduce themselves from below for sustenance?  
 
Perhaps the biggest tragedy for the cities in the Global South is that some of the non-
conventional approaches, on which,according to a conservative figure, close to 70% of 
the people in these cities rely to provide themselves with services, are easily labelled 
illegal and as a result it reverses the efforts towards the development of stable cities. 
Scholars, like administrators, remain culpable for promoting the so-called dominant 
ideals and planning models through their discourses and publications. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE ‘GREAT STINK’ OF NAIROBI: SANITATION, WATER AND THE POLITICS OF SITE 
LOCATION, 1899 TO 1919 
3.1  Introduction 
It is not easy to delineate the development of water and sanitation provision systems for 
Nairobi in isolation from the other cities across the continent of Africa, especially those 
in former British colonies. The histories of water and sanitation infrastructure 
development for Accra, Lagosand Kampala resonate almost script for script with that of 
Nairobi.  This was even more the case during the pioneer years of the British colonial 
establishment.  Despite the geo-political differences across Africa, at the beginning of 
the 20th century, the same questions arose regarding the spatial suitability and 
appropriateness of the water and sanitation technologies to be adopted for the future of 
the rising administrative and commercial capitals.  The filth in Lagos, compounded by 
the poor drainage system, and the plague outbreaks of the 1900s in Accra led to broad 
discussions on the need to rethink the water and sanitation question.173 Nairobi, which 
was an infant rail outpost, and the politically redefined Kampala were similarly not 
spared from the vital question of ‘modernised’ access to water and sanitation.  
However, with the differences in geographical bearings, each of these cities has had its 
unique development path in water and sanitation.  The specific challenges of each city 
in relation to ecological and economic factorsand the coloniser’s motives cannot be 
downplayed.  To that end, this study purposes to broaden the scope of understanding 
the technological developments in the inception and attempted augmentation of the 
water supply and sanitation system for Nairobi during the first two decades of the 20th 
century.  
 
First and foremost, this section expounds on the centrality of the role of railway 
authorities in the emergence of Nairobi as a city and in the pioneering waterworks of its 
officials.  Secondly, the successive recurrence of plague outbreaks and the broad 
discussion on relocation of the Nairobi site are put into context to explain the 
underlying politics engineered by various parties with competing interests.  Thirdly, the 
re-emergence of plague outbreaks, which led to the establishment of another sanitary 
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commission in 1913 and the laying of the first major drainage/sanitary system for 
Nairobi, is discussed with the aim of clearing the greatest ‘public health scare’, 
reminiscent of ‘the great stink of London’ in the mid-19th century, that is, the Indian 
bazaar.  Lastly, a conclusion is drawn derived from the foregoing discussions.  This 
aims at painting a vivid picture of how Nairobi as a colonial capital ‘proper’ thrived as 
far as augmenting its water supply and challenging the sanitary menace were 
concerned. 
 
Image 1:Map of Kenya 
 
Source: http://www.worldhistory.biz/sundries/29395-kenya-nineteenth-century-precolonial.html  
 
3.2  The Birth of Nairobi City 
At the advent of European colonisation in Africa, Nairobi was an expansive area that 
served as grazing land.  The pastoral Maasai ethnic group grazed it intensively with 
their stock of cattle.  The long droughts coupled with famine in the last quarter of the 
19th century had seen the Maasai venture into the plains in search of water and pastures 
for their diminishing stocks.  Certainly, the Nairobi River provided a viable attraction to 
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the area, which the Maasai referred to as Ewaso Nyrobi, meaning ‘a place of cool 
waters’.  For the Kikuyu, the cool climate and fertile lands to the Northwere an 
assurance of food production in the wake of major droughts and famine.  Temple claims 
that both these indigenous peoples were trying to establish hegemony over the area 
during the last half of the 19th century prior to the advent of the railway.174  While 
Nairobi was not a major outpost for the popular long-distance caravan trade that thrived 
across the entire East African region from the coast as far as Central Africa, its unique 
topographical features were instrumental in influencing its growth as a rail outpost.  
This is clearly summarised by one of the administrators, Sir Guildford Molesworth:  
 
Nyrobi has, with great judgment, been selected as 
the site for the principal workshops. It is about 
5,500 feet above the level of the sea, which ensures 
a comparatively salubrious climate; there is ample 
space, of level ground for all sorts of requirements, 
and excellent sites, for the quarters of officers and 
subordinates. On higher ground above the station 
site, there is a fairly good supply of water but 
reservoirs and tanks will have to be constructed.175 
 
According to White, Silberman and Anderson, it was not long after the coming of the 
railway in 1899 that two facts became clear.  First, it was going to be impossible for the 
railway authorities themselves to cope unaided with the social consequences of the 
development they had initiated at Nairobi.  And secondly, as the government took over 
these responsibilities, it was necessary to ‘associate at least the expatriate social control 
and social provision which were needed.’176 How the railway authorities decided to 
establish a major outpost at the site that became Nairobi, despite the glaring challenges 
of drainage, remains unfathomable.  It was clear that the black cotton soils in most of 
the area were poor at draining run-off water.  Perhaps the expansive Rift Valley terrain 
that stretched away a few miles from Nairobi prompted the railway engineers to 
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consider strategic reasons for the Nairobi site in terms of co-ordinating their activities 
and materials.  Nairobi was centrally positioned between the Kilindini railway 
headquarters in Mombasa and the dense Kenyan interior.  In the years that followed, the 
decision to turn a blind eye to Nairobi’s problems as a site would haunt the city in a 
major way in terms of health. 
 
Image 2: The railroad stretch from Mombasa to Kisumu 
 
Source: Jedwab et al (2016). 
The construction of the Uganda Railway (later known as the Kenya-Uganda Railway) was aimed specifically to open up Uganda, 
which the British had secured for its importance as the source of the River Nile on Lake Victoria. This has made many historians o 
believe that Kenya’s colonisation was by default rather than design. All in all, it was the construction of this railway line that had a 
domino effect on the East African Protectorate (Kenya Colony), socio-economically and politically. The railway engineers were the 
first to conceive Nairobi’s planned infrastructures, especially water, as they needed it, both for locomotives (steam engines) and for 
their domestic purposes. In 1907, Nairobi officially became the capital of the East African Protectorate due its strategic importance 
in being located in between the Kilindini Harbour and Port Florence (Kisumu). 
 
 
To be able to institute a semblance of governance alongside the railway administration, 
a decision was made by the colonial government to shift its administrative post from 
Machakos.  The Sub-Commissioner of Ukamba, John Ainsworth (1864-1946), assumed 
authority over Nairobi.  Nairobi, thus, witnessed two centres of power and influence. 
This form of ‘duality’ has been blamed for the ad hoc nature with which Nairobi 
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developed.  During the construction of the railway line, as noted by F. H. Goldsmith, 
the railway administration was entirely separate from the government of the 
Protectorate, an imperium in imperio, having its own police andmagistrate and 
controlling all land for one mile either side of the line.177 
 
Image 3: An outlay of Nairobi at its inception showing various facilities 
 
 
Source: http://healthycities.berkeley.edu/history.html 
 
When Ainsworth arrived, representing a parallel authority to that of the railway, he was 
not greeted with much enthusiasm by the authorities.  On arrival, he immediately 
engaged the then Chief Engineer, George Whitehouse to inquire about what land was 
available and separate from railway holdings.  Whitehouse indicated that all of the land 
on the north bank of the Nairobi River, as well as portions on the south bank and the 
higher grounds, towards where the European hospital would later be built, were 
available for the government to take.  A few months after Ainsworth’s arrival, the 
government’s presence at Nairobi was beginning to take shape in the form of completed 
offices.  These included the sub-commissioner’s office, the magistrate’s court, the 
Accounts Office, Registration, and the Lands Office, the Assistant Collector’s Office, a 
police post and lines, and a temporary jail.178 However, despite all these works by the 
colonial authority, the railway presence remained remarkable.  
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An easily noticeable feature of early Nairobi was the disparity in the physical 
appearance of government installations as contrasted with those of the Uganda railway 
administration.179 The disparity in terms of quality of housing and amenities for the 
nascent city between railway and government establishments resulted from the fact that 
as a company, the railway corporation wielded much stronger economic power than the 
protectorate government,which also suffered from being understaffed.  
 
Goldsmith, writing John Ainsworth’s memoirs, details the new developments in terms 
of infrastructure that altered the landscape of Nairobi prior to the coming of the railway 
line.  By the end of 1899, the railway administration had laid out a roadway, which was 
named Victoria Street, leading from the west side of the station to the Nairobi River, 
where a bridge was built.180 Land acquisition in Nairobi and its environs was through 
auction, and a plot in Nairobi was acquired at an average price of between Rs. 500 and 
Rs. 200.181 Nairobi was fast changing shape from the tented settlement at the end of the 
19th century to a booming commercial and administrative centre.  On the plot nearest 
the railway station, a general store and hotel that later came to be known as ‘Wood’ was 
erected.  Messrs. A. M. Jevanjee and Co. built a soda water factory and living quarters 
for a manager.  Messrs Boustead and Co., Ridley and Co., George Stewart and Co., Mr. 
Huebner (a German trader associated with Hansing and Co.) and one or two others put 
up stores and living quarters. 182 On one plot, a post office was erected near the station. 
Another road running parallel with Victoria Street was marked out from the station 
entrance.  This road came to be known as Government Road (currently Moi Avenue).  
It took a turn to the right about 400 yards from the station and ran into the continuation 
of Victoria Street near the bridge.  From the turn up to near the bridge, a space was left 
for an Indian bazaar,183 with the number of Indian traders averaging about 150 by 
1899. 184  Ainsworth, as the overall administrator of Ukamba Province and the 
representative of the British Crown, undertook to make the road that ran along 
Government Road to the point where the Nairobi River was crossed by ‘Ainsworth 
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Bridge’ (named after him and later washed away by a major downpour that necessitated 
it being rebuilt).  This road, later to be known as Ngara Road, was carried along the top 
of the north bank of the river to connect with what is now known as Kiambu Road.  At 
a short distance from the top of ‘Ainsworth Hill’, where Ainsworth put up his bungalow 
(currently known as Museum Hill), a branch road was made into what in now Parklands 
and from there to Sclater Road.185 However, these road works were not easy going.  On 
Ainsworth’s own admission, the black cotton soil on the Nairobi plain was devoid of 
any possibility of drainage except at huge cost out of all proportion to the importance of 
the place.186 The National Bank of India, which had been established in Mombasa for 
some years, opened a branch in Nairobi in 1900 and the Sub-Commissioner arranged 
for a small wood and iron building as temporary accommodation for them.187 
 
Image 4: Old Nairobi streets 
 
Source: http://www.sikh-heritage.co.uk/heritage/sikhhert%20EAfrica/nostalgic%20EA/nairobi-streets.jpg 
This map shows the main streets typical of a colonial city as shown by the imprints on the street names. After independence in 1963, 
most of the street names changed, taking on an indigenous orientation and heritage. 
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These pioneer works paint a picture of Nairobi as it took shape, developing from 
scratch along imported ideals that were spearheaded by the Uganda Railway through its 
engineers and employees, mostly from India (referred to as coolies or landhies) and, on 
the other hand, a parallel authority representing the Crown, headed by Sub-
Commissioner Ainsworth.  One outstanding feature is how haphazard the city was 
developing based on the emerging needs of the European, Indian and ‘native’ 
populations coalescing around the opportunities and demands available.  Nairobi as a 
new township was developing in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion, with no 
overall plan for construction.188 ‘Our trouble,’ Ainsworth wrote after his retirement, 
‘was due to the fact that we had no definite scheme or layout approved; consequently, 
things just moved on and were liable to alteration to suit some particular fad and 
fancy’.189 
 
The railway authorities adopted their own plans and exerted greater autonomy on how 
they managed the land that had been earmarked as being within their control.  This 
duality of authority seems to have been the greatest factor that determined how the new 
township shaped up, especially in the period to 1920, when the Crown assumed much 
control in the former East Africa Protectorate.   As earlier noted, the railway officials 
had reluctantly embraced the arrival of the colonial administration in Nairobi.  The 
government’s weak financial position vis-à-vis the Uganda Railway compromised the 
governance aspects in terms of town planning, especially at the decision-making level. 
Without strong laws and policies to assert control over the emerging capital, the sub-
commissioner of Ukambani played second fiddle to the railway administration in 
Nairobi.  Infrastructure development and adjudication experienced a state of inertia and 
uncoordinated practices that saw the city continue to expand without the requisite 
planning.  
 
The establishment of Nairobi as the headquarters of the Ukamba Province and the 
recognition of its emerging role in the administration of the protectorate saw the 
establishment of the Township Committee, which was founded along the municipal 
principles of governance found in Britain.  It was constituted in April 1900, and headed 
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by Col.  John Ainsworth, assisted by five other officials chosen by him.   From their 
first meeting of December 1900, the committee realized that they had no powers to 
implement their resolutions.  They had no power to impose by-laws and rates.  Public 
health, coming on the wake of the smallpox outbreak in Ukamba that had seen 
Ainsworth, for lack of personnel, personally administer vaccination amongst the 
population in Nairobi, was the committee’s key mandate, yet it had no power to impose 
any by-laws towards this end.  Consequently, it was found necessary, especially with 
the arrival in 1901 of Sir Charles Eliot as the commissioner for Nairobi, to repeal the 
‘Nairobi Municipal Regulations 1900’ so as to vest more power in the committee. 
 
The new regulations of 1901 gave the commissioner power to annually nominate during 
the month of April one protectorate official, two railway officials, whose names would 
be furnished to him by the chief engineer for that purpose, and three of the leading 
merchants or other residents in the township of Nairobi (not being railway or 
protectorate officials) to act with him as a committee for the purposes of the 
regulations.190 In clear terms, the mandate of the Sub-Commissioner and his committee 
was to institute or charge rates after assessing all lands and buildings in an area 
comprised of an areawithin a radius of 1½ miles from the then office of the Sub-
Commissioner in Ukamba at Nairobi.  Their services were defined strictly as policing, 
cleansing and lighting the township of Nairobi, and in defraying the necessary expenses 
of the committee.191 
 
The repeal of the 1900 municipal regulations was important in that it managed to 
centralize authority in the Sub-Commissioner’s office and, to a greater degree, 
diminished the institutional duality of power that had derailed the process of managing 
the infant city.  However, with the Railway Corporation managing the water 
infrastructure in the city, coupled with a strong financial base and autonomy, it 
continued to wield immense power.  To underscore the centrality of the Uganda 
Railway in the making of Nairobi, Robert Foran quipped: ‘while Col.  Ainsworth was 
the “‘foster-parent” of Nairobi, the Uganda Railway was widely accepted as the “real 
father”’.  Nevertheless, the ad hoc nature by which Nairobi existed was a major 
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impediment to infrastructure planning, especially one based on land concessions.192 
 
Armed with the powers resulting from the new Nairobi Municipal Regulations, 1901, 
which were published under Gazette notice Number 20, the committee issued a two-
month ultimatum for improvement of buildings.  This was specifically aimed at raising 
the sanitary standards in the township and public health in general.However, before the 
notice expired, a disaster in the form of bubonic plague193 (to be dealt with at length in 
a later part of this section) hit the township. Also in 1902, a fire broke out, starting in 
Wood’s Hotel in Victoria Street, and all the buildings except two were razed to the 
ground, including the post office, apart from its contents, which were salvaged.194 
 
3.3  The Kenya Uganda Railways and Harbours Corporation: (Mis)Planning a Colonial City a
 nd a Water Supply 
 
According to Hugh Hume Dixon, who was a partner at Howard Humphreys and Sons 
(Consulting Engineers, London), the selection of Nairobi as a railway depot was based 
chiefly on the presence of the Nairobi River, and the earliest water supply was drawn 
from that source.195 In the early days, a medical officer reported that during the rainy 
seasons, this water was ‘simply the colour of pea soup and undrinkable at the 
standpipes’. 196  In the eyes of the incoming European railway staff and colonial 
administrators, an engineering solution had to be found to make the Nairobi water 
‘drinkable’.  Though sanitation to a great extent continued to be provided on location 
through pit-latrines and the bucket system, the task of watering the nascent city of 
Nairobi fell squarely on the railway engineers. 
 
Though the siting of Nairobi as a railway depot had everything to do with the expansive 
flat plain, as earlier observed by Hugh Hume Dixon, water supply was central to its 
growth.  The railway corporation assumed the primary role of establishing the 
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pioneering works.197 The railway needed water not only for its staffs but also for the 
locomotives, all of which were steam powered.  The earliest water supply for the 
railway encampment was taken from a small concrete dam within the Chiromo Estate 
and was piped by gravitational pull towards the railway land in 1899. 198  Water 
engineers saw the gravitation scheme at the time, beginning in 1840 in Britain with 
successful projectshad transformed Manchester, Bradford and Glasgow, amongst 
others, as constituting the sole approach to the question of a healthy, sanitary city.199 
 
In the eyes of the proponents of the gravitational scheme, it was the best technology for 
keeping cities flush with water for drinking and bearing away human and industrial 
waste, and because it was presumed to be the best method for introducing water to all 
homes in all corners of the city, they expected it to revolutionize the sanitary status of 
cities.200 The advocates of the gravitational school of water supply by extension did not 
limit its application in Britain alone. Instead, as John Broich clearly states, they 
exported their specialty to cities like Bombay, Hong Kong, Colombo and Singapore.201 
However, their implantation without tinkering or respect for the local realities in the 
process of transfer has been faulted for their failure or for the devastating social effects 
they had across the former colonies. 
 
Away from the ‘correctness of technology’ as applied between the metropole and the 
colonies, the use of Indian coolies as technicians in pioneering Nairobi’s ‘modern’ 
infrastructure technology is worth noting. Not only were most British engineers 
working in the colonies bringing on board vast experience from India, but also India 
was being relied upon as a model of how best to approach the new colonial frontiers on 
the African continent.  Indian cities like Mumbai became prototypes if not templates for 
major construction works in African colonies.202 In the same respect, Broich points out 
that social and environmental conditions in the metropole were not similar to those in 
the colonies, but the engineers who undertook the gravitation scheme showed a failure 
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to appreciate these differences.  They approached the task of lifting the gravitation 
scheme from the landscape of Britain and superimposing it on the empire with great 
confidence and largely unmodified designs and procedures.203 How did this unfurl in 
Nairobi to present different topologies of water and sanitation access? 
 
As Nairobi gradually grew from an estimate size of 3.84 sq. km and an average 
population of 8,000 in 1900, the small dam at Chiromo was proving insufficient. 
Furthermore, it was witnessing heavy pollution as it relied on the river as its source.  As 
a result, the assistant engineer for the railway, William Ross McGregor, commenced a 
major water supply plant at Kikuyu Springs.  Assisted by staff who were mostly of 
Indian descent, he set up a treatment plant on the site at Kikuyu and laid a pipe network 
to the city that was complete with reservoir tanks and pumps.  This was completed in 
1906204 and became, and has remained to date,the main source of water for the nascent 
city of Nairobi.  The Chiromo dam was subsequently abandoned.  
 
3.4  Bubonic Plague and the Politics of Relocation: 1902 to 1907 
It goes without saying that the centremost consideration in the choice of Nairobi as a 
site for the railway depot was plain ground.  But this consideration came to haunt the 
place only after three years, as it was occasioned by plague outbreaks.  In terms of 
suitability, both at a sanitary level and for a sufficient water supply, many experts, 
especially administrators and health officials,had a poor regard for the site.  However, it 
is interesting to note that the engineers from the Railway Corporation kept faith in the 
site for reasons best known to them.  Perhaps, they understood that the problems facing 
the infant city possessed engineering solutions rather than being of a geographic 
concern.  Mid-19th century sanitarians had a strong belief in the elimination of miasmas 
in the urban spaces through moving waters, either as clean water for domestic and 
industrial use or as wastewater. 205 
 
While Nairobi had some semblance of a water supply provided for through the railway 
works, it was the overwhelming population and poor housing facilities non-serviced 
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with sanitary systems and reminiscent of the of pre 1850s Manchester and London that 
seemed to be the tipping point as far as its development was concerned.  By 1900, the 
population of Nairobi was approaching 8,000206men and women, who were trudging 
into the township for varied reasons.  Conditions, especially in the Indian bazaar, 
wherethe majority of the people lived, were miserable and filthy in the extreme, 
presenting a real threat to the dwellers. This was according to the Sanitary 
Superintendent who was in charge of public health-related matters.  
 
Apart from the fire disaster of 1902 that burnt down most of the buildings that 
originally represented the first signs of Nairobi as an emerging commercial and 
administrative centre, there was a major outbreak of bubonic plague in March of the 
same year.  The plague was first reported in the Indian bazaar, which was a sanitary 
menace.  Ainsworth had personally expressed his misgivings on the choice of site for 
the bazaar from a public health point of view.  ‘I have all along disapproved of the 
present site selected for Nairobi,’ he wrote in his memoirs in 1902, ‘unfortunately at the 
time of its selection, the Railway interests were predominant and what the Railway 
wanted was a large flat space and this they found here…’ 207  This was a strong 
indictment that resulted in the Indian bazaar being evacuated and pulled down.  An 
alternative location was established on what is currently known as the  River Road.  
 
The outbreak of bubonic plague forced the medical authorities and the Sub-
Commissioner to ponder over the question of the future of Nairobi based on its location 
at the time.  After the successful quelling of the plague, the Commissioner, Sir Charles 
Eliot, proposed dealing with the situation by moving the town from the plain to the 
hills.  Thus, as Robert Maxon notes, in May 1902, a board was convened to consider 
changing the site of Nairobi.208 The board was chaired by the sub-commissioner and 
was comprised of officials from the government, the railway, the military and medical 
officers. 
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 Images 7:List of people diagnosed and treated for plague in 1902 
(i) Cases at the Railway Quarters 
So
urce: British National Archives, Kew: Ref. No.: MPG 1/1000/2(edited and improved by this author) 
 
(ii) Cases at the Railway Premises 
So
urce: British National Archives, Kew: Ref. No.: MPG 1/1000/2(edited and improved by this author) 
The lists in these two photos taken from the Medical Superintendent’s records show the name of the person, their rank, the date 
when attended to, and theplace of residence. As it can be deduced from the names, most of the victims were Indian (coolies) railway 
workers. Three deaths were recorded at the railway quarters as shown. This perhaps contributed to the grand narrative of 
  
75  
associating disease (plague and cholera) with Asians and the adoption of the ideology of ‘diseased peoples’ in justifying racial 
segregation as a pattern of settlement. 
 
As an institution, the railway had consolidated itself and, as earlier noted, they had 
more funds than the government.  Being at a vantage point, they declined moving their 
residences from the plain to the hills.  Consequently, the board recommended that a 
new bazaar be built on the site where police lines had initially been located as these had 
been moved to a new location.  The railway bungalows were to remain where they were 
but to be subject to stringent sanitary inspections. 209  The bazaar operated as the 
commercial site for the city in what would come to be defined today as the Central 
Business District (CBD).  However, congestion and the continued existence of the site 
without basic sanitary amenities, despite having numerous eateries and lodging 
facilities, made it an easy target for demolition on public health grounds. 
 
While most recommendations of the board did not see the light of the day, a sanitary 
inspector was employed and a system of night soil removal adopted.  The primacy of a 
good water supply system in ensuring proper sanitation was acknowledged and new 
efforts were put into augmenting a functioning safe water supply system for Nairobi. 
The characterization of surface water sources as inferior to ground water harnessing210 
guided the engineering practices of the time in the emerging colonial townships like 
Nairobi.  It thus marked the inception of ‘networked’ systems of water supply and 
sanitation.  Networked systems through centralized operations gained prominence. 
However, despite the efforts towards better water supply mechanisms, the threat of 
plague and other diseases associated with sanitation loomed large. 
 
In 1904 another plague ravaged the township, and the medical officer of health, Dr. W. 
H. Macdonald, supported by four colleagues and, in agreement with him, the 
Commissioner, clamoured for the town’s removal.  A dispatch was sent to London in 
1906 to this effect.  Major (later Col.Sir) J. W. Pringle, Inspector of Railways attached 
to the Board of Trade, commissioned to make a final inspection of the Uganda Railway, 
said of Nairobi; 
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…as a station site, the level ground commends itself to a 
railway engineer.  As a site for future capital of East 
Africa, and for permanent buildings for Europeans, the 
sanitary engineer and medical expert condemn it. Under 
the circumstances, I cannot but urge on His Majesty’s 
government the desirability of further considering the 
question before construction of numerous buildings of a 
permanent type pledges them hopelessly to the adoption 
of a bad site.211 
 
To reinforce the question of relocation, Nairobi’s soil was characterized as not 
satisfactory.  Impervious rocks were at places within a few inches of the surface of the 
ground.  This made drainage a costly and difficult affair. It thus enhanced proneness to 
the dangerous disease outbreaks.  However, the red soils, beginning on the foothills, 
was cited to be draining well and decomposing night soil rapidly, thus serving as a good 
foundation for construction.  The suggestions for removal of the small town and re-
establishment, some miles further upland, failed to gain more support.  
 
Between 1902 and 1906, the question of removal of the site had attracted a huge debate, 
including the voices of two British parliamentarians, Herbert Samuel and John Burns, 
who were in support of change of site.212There was a huge tug between those in favour 
of and those against the relocation.  Based on evidence from William Ross McGregor 
(who was the director of Public Works Department (PWD) from 5th April 1905, after a 
successful stint as a Uganda Railway engineer),213 the question of relocation was mired 
in the politics of land speculation and control by the emerging class of settlers. 
McGregor singled out Ewart Grogan (who later emerged as one of the most powerful 
settlers who shaped the face of Nairobi in terms of land management, and many times 
seen as a trouble maker) as having been behind the clamour. To him, Grogan had 
                                                 
211 White, Silberman and Anderson (1948), p.12. 
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213 The Public Works Department had been founded in 1903 to coordinate the construction and functioning of major 
infrastructures key of which was water, roads and sanitation. Mr. R.M. Batey served as the first director of PWD assisted by 
three officials under the title of superintendents of public works. Mr. McGregor’s appointment in 1905 also witnessed an 
expansion in the department’s membership to 13 officers, mostly of European descent. see Nyanchaga (2016), p.34 
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annexed great chunks of land in the highlands surrounding the Nairobi township and as 
a land speculator; he wanted to cash in by selling it to the colonial authorities as they 
sought to relocate the site on sanitary grounds.214 However, this needs to be understood 
against the backdrop of the out-right disagreement between railway administrators (read 
engineers) and colonial administrative officers, most of whom had only military 
experience, on how best to provide solutions for the sanitary challenges that faced the 
emerging township.  
 
Several laws were passed through specific ordinances that zoomed in on sanitation. 
These were published through various notices in the East Africa and Uganda 
protectorates’ official gazettes. Between 1905 and 1906, the medical officer of health, 
through bylaws enacted by the Township Committee, 215  gained enormous powers 
towards legislating on the sanitary issues of the time.  Heavy fines were to be imposed 
on anyone found in breach of the passed legislation.  The medical officer of health 
acquired sweeping powers to administer over matters of public health.  The bylaws, 
apart from exposing the sorry state of sanitation in the Nairobi Township during the 
first decade of its existence, point towards the multiple technologies employed towards 
the amelioration of the threat to public health.  
 
The bucket system of sewerage disposal was the most popular.  This entailed the age-
old system of using open buckets filled with ash and soil, and they would be emptied at 
night at an already identified location.  A designated person, or whomsoever assumed 
authority at a household level, would do the emptying of the night soil.  However, its 
inefficiencies are what popularized the need to adopt water-borne systems, especially 
on various public facilities and offices.  Cesspools, pit-latrines, earth closetsand urinals 
were also in usage, and the sanitary inspector also acquired power through the referred 
to by-laws to sanction their construction as per the set standards.  Despite these 
seemingly radical by-laws and regulations, the situation remained precarious, 
warranting the unending debate on relocation as pushed by various parties in the face of 
                                                 
214 William Ross McGregor, letters to his mother, dated 13 May/26 June/3 August 1906, Ref No. MSS.Afr.s.2305, Papers of 
William Ross McGregor and Isabella Ross, accessed at Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
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the reluctance of the railway officials, who were basically in charge of water 
infrastructure.  
 
With everything coming to push and shove, a commission was appointed in the last half 
of 1906 to investigate the divisive issue of site relocation.  A reputable sanitary officer, 
Sir George Bransby Williams, was appointed to lead the team of investigators.  George 
Bransby Williams had a background in civil engineering, specializing in water, 
drainage and sanitation designs, and had worked on various projects in Britain, such as 
the Birmingham aqueduct.  He was also concerned with railway civil engineering, thus 
gaining vast experience in South Wales and South Africa.216 Despite the pessimism 
surrounding the Nairobi site, Bransby Williams indicated that Nairobi’s water resources 
were better situated than anywhere else in the colony, with the availability of ‘a million 
gallons a day’ and the problem was that the resource had not been properly tapped.217 
He put an end to the debate on relocation and shifted focus onto the strategic provision 
of water, drainage and sanitation infrastructure.  Together with a team of other experts 
from Britain and South Africa, Williams released his report in 1907, recommending a 
sum of £23,600, which was considered rather a large sum for a little town with an 
annual income of £ 9,100,218 to lay out a water drainage and sewerage system. 
 
Apart from strongly vouching for improved water supply, part of the sweeping 
recommendations by the Williams’ Commission was the installation of a 9-inch 
flushing main pipe aimed at nipping in the budthe sanitary situation on whose account 
the commission had been formed.  He further designed and carried out the main 
drainage and water supply for Nairobi through the three-year financial plan outlined in 
the commission’s report. 219  Despite the Williams’ Commission report being the 
highlight of the year 1907, the change of the colonial administrative headquarters from 
Mombasa to Nairobi presented a new vision for the location.  Government institutions 
were more consolidated, turning the location into a beehive of ‘modernist’ activities.  A 
centrifugal development pattern of key infrastructure, including water and sanitation, 
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became necessary.  Key buildings and facilities were the first to receive water and 
sewerage services in what became the central business district.  Despite the knowledge 
of how important the systems were in terms of determining the future of Nairobi, 
universalization in provision was not a consideration.  Even though race was not a 
primary consideration in provision of services at that particular time, 
compartmentalized settlement patterns informed the supply network. This skewed 
nature that bred inequality from the onset would haunt the Nairobi township, pulling it 
into another public health abyss in the immediate years that followed.  
 
3.5  Planning for Water and the Obduracy of the Sanitary Menace: Williams’ and Simpson’s 
Reports 
On the heels of Nairobi getting a clean bill of health from the Williams’ Commission, it 
was clear that water paucity was not a challenge that would be easily wished away.  To 
curb wastage and maintain water supplies, the Kenya Uganda Railways and Harbours 
Corporation (KUR&HC) introduced water meters in 1908.220 This was the first time 
such technology was applied in the country, but instead of being used as a means of 
providing data on consumption and enhancing revenue collection, it was applied as a 
means of controlling usage of the scarce commodity by only allowing permitted 
quantities.  Cases of technologies being used to institute behavioural change in the use 
of water were not new, as had earlier been demonstrated in Global North cities.  
 
The inadequacy in supply saw the Muthaiga Water Company emerge in 1911.   It was a 
private company, the first of its kind in colonial Kenya, charged with the responsibility 
of supplying around 500 households with water.221 It had its own private connection 
network away from the municipal supplies that were managed by the railway 
corporation.  Similarly, multiple non-networked supplies were instituted across Nairobi. 
Institutions like the Prince of Wales School (currently Nairobi School), constructed for 
the children of European railway officers, had sunk boreholes and reservoirs to provide 
water supplies to the adjacent areas. 222  However, these were seen as temporary 
measures, aimed at augmenting the system. 
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221Colony and Protectorate of Kenya (1913−1923). Muthaiga Water Supply. (KNA, Ref: AG/43/103, Nairobi, Kenya). 
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The use of boreholes and shallow wells developed alongside the networked system of 
supply that connected basically to the railway premises and what were seen asimportant 
government premises, including the Commissioner’s residence. The railway 
corporation supplied water only to its officials and other subsequent staff, mostly 
Asians located within the area that was of their jurisdiction.  The emerging indigenous 
population was expected to be housed at the residences of their white colonial masters 
and, despite the emerging African settlements like Majengo – housing basically Swahili 
travellers from the coast of Kenya – no effort was made to provide water and sanitary 
services.  Rainharvesting and river supply remained the key sources.  As for sanitation, 
pit-latrines and opendefecation was still in favour, with large parts of Nairobi still 
thickly forested, offering privacy for such means, however unpopular.  As indicated 
through oral interviews, particularly in Kibera amongst the Nubians, shallow wells and 
tributaries that feed into Nairobi River remained key to meeting the water needs of the 
burgeoning indigenous populations. This can be adduced based on the pattern of 
settlement within the valleys and along such feeder  rivers.  
 
As Nairobi quickly developed into an important colonial capital and an administrative 
centre for the East African Protectorate (later the Kenya Colony), the provision of water 
for both domestic use and railway functions became a key concern.  In the same 
respect, issues of public health took precedence along the belief existing since the mid-
19th century that those issues went hand in glove with a system of flowing or running 
water, basically through piped systems.  This is in tandem with D.G.M. Roberts’ 
observationthat a major consequence of the introduction of piped water in urban areas 
was the need for a sanitary drainage system. 223 For him, with minimal water 
consumption, insanitary conditions were frequently tolerated, along with other 
environmental deficiencies, but the piped water could rapidly become a nuisance and 
health risk.  The only satisfactory solution thus was the provision of comprehensive 
systems of sewerage and sewage disposal.224 While Nairobi’s sanitary challenges of the 
early 1900s can be argued to have not been directly derived from its adoption of a piped 
water supply system, it is imperative to observe that problems mostly emanated from its 
inadequate supply.  While many governments approach issues of water and sanitation 
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separately, as proven by the persistent plague outbreaks in Nairobi, the two are closely 
related.  A breakdown in the water supply presents a health hazard.  The continued 
expansion of the Indian bazaar in the centre of Nairobi without the proper supplies of 
water and the means of getting rid of waste water meant looming outbreaks of 
waterborne diseases. 
 
3.5.1  The Indian Bazaar in 1910: An ‘eyesore’ on the Nairobi landscape 
Image 8: An aerial view of the Bazaar 
 
Source: http://www.sikhheritage.co.uk/heritage/sikhhert%20EAfrica/nostalgic%20EAfrica%20nAIROBI.htm  
 
The Indian Bazaar, established after the initial one was destroyed following the 1902 
plague outbreak, occupied a core area that stretched along both sides of Government 
Road (today’s Moi Avenue) all the way to the railway.  As the town grew, the bazaar 
expanded towards the bed of the Nairobi River at the southeast end near Race Course 
Bridge.  The area from River Road towards Nairobi River was known as River Road 
area.  That lying between Government Road and River Road was the bazaar.  The 
bazaar had blossomed into a multi-ethnic commercial hub and residential zone.   But 
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the ad hoc nature of Nairobi’s development without proper plans did not provide any 
incentive for service provision to this zone.225 
 
Early in 1911, another bout of bubonic plague was reported, starting in the 
overpopulated and congested Indian bazaar.  A public meeting was held and strong 
resolutions were passed calling for the immediate removal of the Indian bazaar.  The 
highest colonial officer in the colony, Sir Percy Girouard, passed these resolutions to 
the Colonial Secretary in London.226 This was not the first time the issue of removal of 
the Indian bazaar was featuring.  It had been a subject of discussion for a long time, as 
evidenced through the letters and papers of the then director of PWD, William Ross 
McGregor.  The major obstacle to effecting stringent measures was the government’s 
lack of funds to relocate and compensate all the business owners in the bazaar, a few of 
which were Europeans.  
 
Notwithstanding that, the new outbreak witnessed more concerted efforts in relation to 
pulling down the bazaar on the pretext of sanitation.  The bazaar lacked the basic 
amenities to handle wastewater from the eateries and the residential houses leased out 
by the owners to the emerging urban underclass.  It did not have proper drains and it 
had not been serviced by the piped water schemes, the latest of which had just been 
completed in the same year of the outbreak.  
 
In May 1913, there was an administrative change in the sanitary department that saw a 
sanitary inspector’s office established.  This coincided with the appointment of 
Professor W. J. Simpson by the Colonial Office to look into the sanitary matters 
bedevilling Nairobi.227 Simpson was an experienced health officer, who had worked in 
many colonies, including India.  Specifically, he had been the head of the sanitary 
commission in Accra in 1909 and also Lagos.  The Colonial office, hence, saw his 
reputation as vital in unravelling the persistent problem of plague that was threatening 
one of the rapidly emerging nodes for their East African interests.  Going by what 
Simpson had recommended for Accra on the Gold Coast (Ghana), it came as no 
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surprise when he recommended racial segregation as one of the health policies for 
Nairobi.  He had strongly argued against the indigenous water access methods that had 
thrived in Accra, racially terming them as primitive and placed the responsibility of 
providing WSS infrastructure for ‘natives’ on the white man, categorically stating that 
this was his burden.228 It is such sentiments that reinforced the overemphasis on large 
centralized systems of infrastructure in nascent cities such as Nairobi.  
 
Anchored in the principles of separated settlements and the belief in centralized systems 
as a panacea for the public health challenges in urban areas, Simpson’s Nairobi sanitary 
Report of 1913 legitimised the call for the removal of the Indian bazaar.   Simpson’s 
proposal for segregationist town planning was not a new phenomenon.  It was a 
dominant paradigm practised across many territories in Africa, with Simpson himself at 
the centre.  As Beeckmans states, at the beginning of the 20th century, a sanitary 
discourse was used as a pretext and for the legitimation of racial segregation in South 
Africa.229 Swanson calls this phenomenon ‘Sanitation Syndrome’.230Although in Dakar, 
Dar es Salaam and Kinshasa, ‘Sanitation Syndrome’ did not result in the creation of 
separate settlements for Africans miles from the city, as was the case in South Africa, it 
can be argued that it was, inter alia, under the influence of travelling British and South 
African doctors and sanitary officers that public hygiene and sanitation became a major 
concern for colonial administrations in these three cities, albeit with some decades of 
delay.  Indeed, archival records show that local governments in Dakar, Dar es Salaam 
and Kinshasa applied to British and SouthAfrican sanitary officers, such as Prof. 
William J.R. Simpson, one of the founders of the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, for help and instructions with the planning of the sanitary belt.231 
 
Moreover, Simpson’s recommendation that a system of compulsory connection of 
houses with sewers be put in place alienated the urban underclass that could not afford 
such measures.  As for the settlers, their privileged position both through enjoying 
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majority representation on the township council and their financial clout meant they 
received incentives to improve their dwellings through the laying of water supply and 
sewer connections, especially those people within the proximity of the mains supply 
lines.  Moreover, the white populations through the variegated and compartmentalized 
settlement pattern occupied raised areas of Nairobi that had a decent slope for the 
natural drainage of water, hence,facing a minimum sanitary threat.  Boreholes and 
septic tanks also remained ideal for some who occupied expansive areas like Karen that 
to date remains exclusively occupied by whites and upper-class post-independence 
African elites.  Under the cloud of stern recommendations, the Indian bazaar was pulled 
down and a land re-allocation scheme in a new area that became Eastleigh was adopted. 
Eastleigh was earmarked as an ‘Indian only’ low density settlement, but nothing was 
done in terms of providing it with water and sanitary infrastructure systems, let alone 
roads and lighting.  The casual way with which the protectorate government approached 
planning in Nairobi can be blamed for the challenges that bedevil the city to date.  
 
Despite the disruptive nature of the First World War, the dire situation for sanitation in 
Nairobi meant that heavy projects had to be undertaken.  The Williams’ and Simpson’s 
reports have openly been acknowledged as having constituted the first attempt at 
planning Nairobi and, indeed, they cemented the practice of approaching urban 
challenges by prescribing large technical systems of infrastructure.  The first sewerage 
system that was adopted was a combined system handling both wastewater and surface 
rainwaters.  As per the annual reports of the PWD for the financial year 1913/1914, 
their expenditure upon a recurrent works was £13,554, and new works, £34,090.The 
principal item among the new works was a more extensive instalment of the Nairobi 
Drainage System than had been put in any one previous year.  A sum of £12,590 was 
spent on this work.  The main sewer was completed from the intercepting chamber on 
Racecourse Road to the manhole at the junction of Sixth Avenue and Government 
Road.  
 
Analysing these detailed accounts as they appear in the 1913/1914 PWD report shows 
that the heavy expenditure incurred by the Colonial Office indicated a determination to 
take precautionary measures in ensuring that the city that Nairobi was envisaged to 
become was attained.  The removal of the Indian bazaar had ‘cleansed’ the city space 
and allowed room for proper planning.  It goes without saying that the Williams’ 
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reports of 1907 followed by the Nairobi Sanitary Report of 1913were the only plans for 
Nairobi as it limped along to become a major colonial outpost and city.  Experts have 
widely agreed that Nairobi’s problems had stemmed from a system of land acquisition 
marred by confusion, speculation and rent-seeking, over which the authorities had no 
control, which made it almost impossible to plan.  Its development was haphazard, with 
no system of regulation in place.  Hence, the adoption of the two reports laid the 
foundation for planning, especially for infrastructure. 
 
3.6  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has described how Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructure systems 
developed from scratch under the jurisdiction of the Uganda Railway during the 1899 to 
1920 period.  I have demonstrated that, by Nairobi developing within the precincts of 
railway services and having been pioneered as a railway depot, there was a lack of 
authority to lay comprehensive plans that would nurture its growth as a city.  The dual 
system of authority witnessed with its establishment as an administrative headquarter 
for Ukamba Province provided a real challenge in terms of the inception of key 
infrastructural projects.  The government’s lack of resources saw the railway authorities 
augment their position as water engineers, both at a technical and supply level, a 
position they held for close to two decades.  Though Nairobi seemingly developed in an 
environment of neutrality, the key question to ask is how the consolidation of the water 
supply and sanitation worked and gradually reproduced an exclusive network.  It results 
in the need to interrogate the question of the non-intended consequences of 
technologies as they are appropriated within society.  Of importance to note is the non-
integrated approach to the provision of water and sanitation despite there being a 
common understanding amongst engineering practitioners that the introduction of a 
piped water supply to the city must be followed by a system of getting rid of the 
wastewater.  While the railway authorities led by assistant engineer William Ross 
McGregor instituted a water supply system from Kikuyu, a distance of about ten miles 
and within the popular tradition in Britain of the gravitation scheme, sewerage 
provision was in response to bubonic plague outbreaks that exposed the weaknesses in 
the planning of the new city.  This was reactionary and insufficient perhaps because of 
being veiled in racial terms, judging by the recommendations by W. J. Simpson in his 
sanitary report of 1913.  The combined sewerage design adopted for the pioneer works 
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would itself prove inadequate and limited.  Furthermore, it failed to extend beyond the 
key government vantage points, further fragmenting its supply.  In 1920, the East 
Africa Protectorate changed its status to the Colony of Kenya, hence, necessitating a 
major shift in the purpose and manner of water and sanitation infrastructure 
development in the rapidly growing Nairobi.  What did this change entail and how did 
it inform future developments in water and sanitation provision for Nairobi?  The next 
chapter grapples with this question, with the goal of pushing the normative debates on 
skewed infrastructure access beyond the binary framework of racial segregation in 
colonial Nairobi. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MUNICIPALIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND THE COLONIAL POLITICS OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION: 1920 TO 1963 
 
Our period of occupation did the country little 
permanent good, for all the selfless work of many 
devoted Englishmen and so many good intentions. 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the way we left, 
whatever was to come after us, the time for us to be 
there was over. And if we were to go, it was better 
not to linger on. (Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, last High 
Commissioner of the Federation of South Arabia)232 
 
4.1  Introduction 
At the end of the First World War in 1919, amidst the loss suffered by the Axis powers, 
the politics of colonialism were revisited and altered tremendously, with the Allies 
consolidating themselves in the occupied territories.  The pre-war period had been 
occasioned by plunder, pacification, occupationand the consolidation of colonial rule.233 
On the other hand, the process of the actual establishment of an imperial and colonial 
state was slow and tumultuous.  Resistance from below, harsh climate and terrain, non-
existent communication infrastructure matching that of Europe, together with 
inadequate personnel, explained the slow start.234 The pioneer years had been dedicated 
to transforming the conquered territories into viable colonial enterprises.  This entailed 
instituting major infrastructure projects that would not only make governing the vast 
territories easy but also attract European administrators, investorsand missionaries.  
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, development of water and sanitation systems for 
Nairobi was conceived on the premise of a city facing a crisis of water supply and 
public health disasters.  Concomitantly, it becomes necessary to re-examine the status 
of the territories along planning models, governanceand economic viability within the 
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broader prism of an imperialist endeavour.  The triumph by the Allies renewed their 
vigour in their spheres of interest, where they embarked on a process of 
institutionalizing colonialism through domination, subjugationand socio-political and 
economic change.  As the political engagement shifted from ‘protectorates’ to 
‘colonies’ through various legislation, the dynamics of social relations and political 
administration underwent major shake-ups, reinforcing atavistic notions of European 
superiority.  The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 had seen the European powers set into 
motion the occupation of their ‘spheres of influence’ as a way of, amongst many other 
purposes, averting a clash of economic interests that could have easily set them at war 
with each other. For the period leading into WWI, these territories that had been clearly 
marked as British, German, French, Portuguese, and Belgian overseas (African) 
territories remained as ‘protected states’, andhence ‘Protectorates’.235 However, with 
the end of the war, as noted, the Allied powers moved in to consolidate their influence 
by passing several pieces of legislationthat saw the declaration of the protectorates as 
colonies by which the indigenes officially and politically attained subject status.236 In 
the newly crowned colonies, several ordinances (legislations) were passed on virtually 
every aspect of life to provide a legal framework that defined socio-political relations 
and governance in general.  
 
Nairobi gained more credence and witnessed a concerted effort to anchor it as the East 
African ‘jewel’ of the vast British Empire.  Infrastructural projects kicked off to serve 
the rising number of Europeans flocking into Kenya for various reasons.  However, 
before analysing how these infrastructural projects, specifically the water and sanitation 
systems, were unfurled, it is important to revisit the question of infrastructures as things 
and how society interacts with them within a defined geo-political milieu.  
 
Technologies of all kinds are produced and utilized by human kind for specific ends. 
This process is non-linear and it is never ‘a dead end’ affair. 237  The process of 
appropriation becomes a forerunner to either the shaping of the technology by the user 
or the re-construction of the user by the thing.  Langdon Winner warns that those who 
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have not recognized the ways in which technologies are shaped by social and economic 
forces have not gotten far.238As he states, what matters is not technology itself but the 
social or economic system in which it is embedded.  Interpretatively, this implies that 
the socio-political and economic milieu in which a technology operates reconstructs it 
either as a tool or artefact that carries meaning and reflections that are intrinsic to its 
form. To make this visiblerequires a context-specific analysis, yet at the same time, the 
inescapable manifestations that are universal to its operationalization come to the fore.  
Conventionally, historians and social scientists have tended to understand city 
governance and development under colonialism through the binary framework of racial 
segregation.  However, the question of racial segregation needs to be stretched further 
beyond the Eurocentric and Schumpeterian interpretation of imperialism as a throwback 
to a primitive form of human behaviour. 239  Through atavistic justifications of the 
supremacy of the white race and categorization of indigenes as backward, barbaricand 
incapable of progress, the occupation and perpetuation of discrimination in the colonial 
state received legitimacy.240 This was especially so from the white minority groups, 
mostly settlers and industrialists, who dominated the legislatures emerging in the 
colonies.  Did these notions of domination, discrimination and social differentiation 
become embedded in infrastructural artefacts that developed as systems of provisioning 
for the emerging cities like Nairobi?  
 
While it is not my purpose to reproduce Winner’s theory of technological politics, it is 
his suggestion that we have to pay attention to the characteristics of technical objects 
and the meaning of those characteristics that I find enriching.  If we are to understand 
the deficiencies that have characterized the adoption of large technical systems of water 
provision that defy the ultimate goal of either homogeneous urban-scape or 
universalized access reminiscent of the ‘networked city ideal’241 in cities like Nairobi, 
then adopting a nonconventional approach to interpretation is key to expounding on the 
already existing knowledge.  The asymmetrical racial binary popularized in almost all 
understandings of colonial history tends to camouflage the character of ‘migrating’ 
technologies and creates a smokescreen for the push and pull of large technical 
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infrastructure investments, irrespective of where they are instituted.  Delving deeper 
into the issue of the meaning and recognition of the lack of neutrality in the shapes of 
technologydoes not require that we look for conscious conspiracies or malicious 
intentions.242 Whether intended or not, the adoption and institutionalization of technical 
artefacts carries with it consequences for people as users.  From Robert Moses’ New 
York parkways and Baron Haussmann’s Parisian thoroughfares to the 1960s and 1970s 
grotesque concrete buildings of brutalist form on American campuses, infrastructures 
have been seen as either intentionally or unintentionally tailormade to control, dominate 
or subjugate certain groups within society.243 
 
However, this is not to say that infrastructures as artefacts are configured as divisive, 
discriminativeand oppressive. While they are envisioned as progressive and 
correctional to the dire socio-economic distress, for instance Edwin Chadwick’s 19th 
century case of the poor working populations of England and Wales, it is at the level of 
implementation through deployment and usage that variations in access manifest 
themselves.  Perhaps for Chadwick’s Europe, the centralization and municipalization 
resulting from the technical being coupled with legal policy was the most effective way 
of achieving leverage in universalizing urban water and sanitation services to eradicate 
miasmas.  In other cases, devolution or decentralization has been proposed as the most 
prudent way of addressing the weaknesses of the highly centralized and structuralist 
systems of urban infrastructure management.   But all in all, the multi-layered nature 
and character of technical systems as entities need to be peeled off systematically for a 
broadened scope of analysis.   From the Langdon Winner debate, the question of how 
certain forms of technology thrive within certain forms of governance emerges.  
 
Historians of technology of the Hughesian school tend to assume that large technical 
systems follow a uni-linear path of development in the process of their deployment. 
They go through predetermined stages by which they gain ‘momentum’ to become self-
perpetuating and the mitigation of what Hughes calls ‘reverse salients’ epitomizes their 
functionality. 244  The notion of the ‘networked infrastructure ideal’ emerges on the 
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presumption that by adopting large technical systems of provision, the cityscape is 
spatially equalized through a web of ubiquitous networks.  But studies from the Global 
South reveal a vivid picture of fragmentation, decentralization and inequality in the 
systems of infrastructure access. Critical to how the map of access to urban 
infrastructure services are redrawn is the economic considerations that determine who 
gets what, how, how much of it, and sometimes when, as is the case with rationing 
practices common in the South. 
 
In City Water, City Life, Carl Smith discusses what he characterizes as ‘water and the 
infrastructure of ideas in urbanizing Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago’ and uses the 
metaphor of water to expound on the social visualizations and public debates around the 
emerging technologies of water supply and water use.245 Smith presents the bathing 
culture, which he observes to have been alarmingly un-American, through a water 
image that does not shy from the tension in the adoption of both public water pumps 
and bathing establishments or the quality of supply to the wealthy Bostonians.  To 
advocates of universal access, providing water to all urban dwellers in cities becomes a 
moral question.246 
 
In the analysis of the adoption of large technical systems of supply in Istanbul, Noyan 
Dinçkal amplifies the question on inequality embedded in the system of access in the 
form of the technical modes of supply and the physical landscape of access.247 By using 
the analysis of what he calls ‘reluctant modernization’, Dinçkal examines the evolution 
of water from a ‘free good’ to a ‘market or priced commodity’.248 He sees this process 
of modernizing (read westernization) the Ottoman capital and the introduction of new 
urban technologies as a complex case of competing notions of the new (centralization, 
hence, commodification or marketization) versus the old (fountains as free water 
supply).  While the bourgeois parts of the city receive a piped supply to households, the 
majority poor of the city enjoy communal access through public fountains, perhaps as a 
moral aspect to conform to religious uses of water.  The dual system that emerges 
reinforces the aspects of the old versus the new that characterizes most cities in the 
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world.  Retrospectively, the technologies of supply become not only symbols of 
‘modernity’ to represent progress but they also metamorphose into social status 
symbols that distinctly reinforce zoning of the city scape into privileged and 
underprivileged areas.  Universality, though seen as encompassed within the network 
system ideal, becomes a misnomer.  If the adoption of LTSs in the Global North on a 
closer look shows aspects of inequality, tension and conflict, though at varied scales in 
a case by case basis, is it right to argue that the same scenario in the colonies derives 
from conscious decisions by policy makers and system builders to attain an ‘apartheid’ 
system of supply?  
 
Duality in the urban sphere located within the matrix of infrastructural development is 
not a colonial or postcolonial phenomenon.  Incidences of unevenness have perpetually 
manifested themselves as replicas of the implementation and deployment of LTSs. For 
instance, despite water resources being privately managed, London enjoyed an upper 
and lower supply system that linked to the underclass working population and the 
upmarket and industrial zones of the city respectively.249The dichotomization of the 
city, hence, spans far backwards beyond the institution of European imperial 
hegemonies.  Arguing that colonialism proposed and succeeded at the re-ordering of 
urban spaces in the colonies in a segregationist manner reminiscent of a form of ‘spatial 
apartheid’, 250  tends to exonerate the infrastructures as artefacts that possess innate 
abilities to re-shape space and society, especially at the interface between their 
deployment and usage.  If we are to adopt the common narratives emerging out of 
recent scholarship that colonial powers used and developed planning ideas, 
standardsand engineering technologies that had been invented to meet the requirements 
in Europe – hence the devastating imprint they have had on the colonies,251– is it, 
therefore, informative to analyse them through a racialized lens?  Was inequality in 
deployment and usage exclusively a conscious colonial phenomenon?  
 
In heeding Liora Bigon’s caution, the colonial urban sphere should be seen as a 
constantly challenged and contested sphere rather than being perceived as a terrain for 
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exercising uni-directional power by those with formal political control over those 
colonized.252 By exploring the contestations in the appropriation of both the space and 
technologies of infrastructure provision, it becomes possible to peel away the multiple 
layers that constitute urban spaces in a manner that is extensively informative.  Rather 
than seeing inequality as deriving from an official racial policy of bifurcated planning, 
we have to concern ourselves with the potential that derives from the daily practices of 
the people as they strive to meet their water and sanitary needs.  The cityscape is shaped 
by the lived experiences of its residents, both socio-politically and economically.  
 
4.2  The Making of a Colonial Capital: Municipalization and the Dynamics of 
Water/Sanitation Infrastructure Development 
 
As a contested space,colonial Nairobi provides a platform on which the unbundling of 
infrastructure systems and an understanding of how various technologies define not 
only people but also space become possible.  The spatial binary of planned versus 
unplanned spaces is further reinforced by the nature of provisioning for basic services 
and the various technologies in play.   The period commencing in 1920 witnessed major 
developments politically and economically.  While Robert Maxon cites this period as 
having constituted an era of ‘revolutionary advance’ in Kenya, 253  it witnessed the 
extensive consolidation of colonial control that had racial ramifications.  The script had 
been written to establish Kenya as an ideal settler economy. In terms of infrastructural 
development, the change of status from protectorate to colony harnessed more power in 
the office of the colonial governor, hence, diminishing the parallelauthority that 
institutions like the railway had exercised and maximized for their benefit.  Kenya 
acquiring a new status as a colonynot only meant more political control by the 
metropole, it also implied shifts in the management of utilities and municipal 
governance in general. 
 
Perhaps this was expected, with Britain having undergone similar shifts in management 
that had incorporated what was known as the ‘civic gospel’ and later became‘municipal 
socialism’.  In the late 19th century, between 1873 and 1876, Joseph Chamberlain – a 
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local industrialist turned ‘Radical Liberal politician’ and mayor of Birmingham –
energized both his career and the cause of municipal reform in Britain as he led 
Birmingham’s municipal takeover of its gas and water works, reinforced sanitary 
improvements, took steps to improve workingclass housing, and even pressed for a 
thoroughfare through Birmingham’s congested heart. 254 This mirrored what was 
happening in most British cities, and by the end of the 19th century, Chamberlain’s 
‘civic gospel’ had emerged as a critical model for European and American reformers, 
who argued that this concept of ‘municipal socialism’ represented a shift to the 
democratic provision of public goods and services; in principle, through ‘mayoral 
activism’, it translated into ‘more work for the mayor’.  A highly centralized and 
monolithic organization was arguedto be the most ideal one for rectifying urban service 
provisioning challenges.  
 
However, Chamberlain’s positivism with the ‘civic gospel’ model and ‘municipal 
socialism’ as represented by Birminghamwas criticized as a dangerous departure from 
the 19th century principles of laissez-faire and minimal government and highlighted the 
inefficiencies and abuses whichit was believed wouldensue.255 Chamberlain’s assertion 
that the ‘civic gospel’ model was an assurance for more democratic and inclusive 
access to urban social services was contradictory.  Rather than promote equality 
through universal access, the infrastructure ‘networks’ resulted in inequalities in the 
supply outlay.  In tandem with municipalisation, it followed that the greatest success 
was registered in the bolstering of municipal revenues instead of expanded access and 
usage amongst the citizenry.  It took the combined influence of the sanitary movement 
and housing reform by 1900 to fast-track the introduction of water closets (WCs) and 
modern gas-fired kitchens for the majority of the urban underclass.256For the European 
colonies, the period following the end of WW1 witnessed the entrenchment of 
centralized governance, which included the establishment of the municipal 
monopolization of social service provision. With concerted efforts towards the 
municipalisation of utilities adopted for Nairobi in the early 1920s, how did this impact 
on a city that was witnessing high social tension both as a contested space –legally 
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Africans were unwanted in urban areas (Nairobi) unless temporarily employed either by 
European settlers or the government, yet the city provided an easy escape from the 
forced labour on settler farms in the interior of the country – and a multi-racial 
settlement faced with a shortage in key infrastructure, basically water?  Was unequal 
access to water and sanitation infrastructure an intended consequence of the adoption of 
monolithic technical systems of supply or did it result unintentionally from the 
embeddedness of the techno-politics of infrastructure that manifest in the deployment of 
artefacts along socio-economic lines? 
 
As expected, with the arrival of municipalization in the ‘colonial capitals’, it did not 
take long before there was disquiet, especially in cities like Nairobi, which was 
experiencing the inception of social stratification policies, premised on the Simpson 
proposals of 1913, as earlier highlighted.  As the settler society sought to entrench its 
privileged status, the Asians were left competing for equal treatment in accessing key 
resources on the basis of their centrality in the nascent economy.  Inter-racial tensions 
in Nairobi heightened between the various races sometimes played out in street 
demonstrations, as highlighted below. 
 
In terms of the racial divide, Nairobi constituted a European community, people of 
Asian descent and African communities.  As for the Africans, their makeup comprised 
the indigenes, otherwise popularly referred to as natives and non-native communities 
which included Nubians. Somalis had also found a home in Nairobi as livestock dealers 
who supplied beef and other products.  The proximity of Nairobi to the Kikuyu 
countryside made it possible for Kikuyu traders to trudge into the city and back with 
their merchandise.  Members from across other Kenyan communities came into the city 
to offer cheap labour, especially in the homes of the Europeans as cooks or 
‘shambaboys’.257 
 
The colonial state had encouraged Indian immigration for technical support in railway 
construction and at the same time for the critical role Indian merchants played as 
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tradesmen and money lenders.258 The colonial state had expected the Indians to move 
with the railway into the interior and, thus, despite the challenges posed for Nairobi, the 
problems were expected to disappear with time.  However, the Indian merchants took 
advantage of the emerging city and, led by personalities like A.M.Jeevanjee, they 
fought hard for representation and equal treatment in the colony of Kenya.  Despite this 
effort, the colonial government, through the Secretary of State for Colonies, rejected the 
Indian quest for representation.259 Racial and social divisions continued to take shape, 
with rising agitation from indigenes (as is highlighted below with the street protests of 
1921), who were steadily making inroads into the fast growingcity.  
 
4.2.1  The Asymmetry of Planning and Infrastructure Access: Race or ‘Technomics’ of 
Infrastructure Deployment? 
Nairobi became very much politically charged as a space in the early 1920s asa result of 
various legislation adopted by the colonial state to consolidate their power. By 
replicating Lord Lugard’s 1919 vagrancy laws as applied in Nigeria, the colonial state 
sought to control the influx of local communities into the city as a way of consolidating 
labour in the exclusive ‘white highlands’. This introduction of the Kipande (pass) law 
and a system of taxation angered the Africans in the city and they organized protests in 
1921 alongside the Gandhian principal of peaceful demonstrations under the leadership 
of Harry Thuku.260  Such demonstrations were not construed within the purview of 
gaining political rights. Instead, they were basically an agitation for improved social 
services provision and an end to the harassment of the indigenes within Nairobi.261 If 
equality was on the minds of the indigenes migrating into Nairobi, what did it imply as 
understood within the prism of better services in early 1920s Nairobi? Did better 
services for the locals compared to the Asians and the emerging settler community 
include abandoning indigenous social organizations, some of which procured resources 
like water? How did power relations shape the debate not only on social relations but 
also on interaction with various technologies on a daily basis as a lived experience? 
How did spatial zoning (see image 9 below) impact the deployment of key 
infrastructural outlays? 
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Image 9: Zoned plan ofNairobi, 1920 
 
Source: British National Archive, Kew, London. Ref. No:MPG 1/1114 
This map shows the compartmentalized planning for Nairobi and the adoption of zoned land management.The spatial 
appropriation that demarcated Nairobi into exclusively European, Asian and the African area was popularized bySimpson’s 
Sanitary Report,1913. The zoning came to inform the quality of housing, which, in turn, shaped the infractural access outlay. 
However, although the zoned landscape was racially defined on paper to encompass Simpson’s outlook of what he saw as a 
panacea to the persistent plague threat, this thesis establishes that when it comes to the deployment of infrastructure networks, race 
might not have been of primary concern, and that differentiation arises as both the intended or unintended consequence of the 
process of technology appropriation. 
 
. 
Harry Thuku was arrested and his arrest prompted demonstrations that turned 
confrontational in the face of the brutality of the police force.  In the same respect, it is 
imperative to state that the colonialists envisioned Nairobi as a city that was 
exclusionary to the so-called ‘native’ societies and under a controlled labour supply; it 
remained a place of temporality.  But to some Africans originating in the agriculturally 
intensive settler zones, Nairobi provided an escape from the demands of forced labour 
by the brutal colonial establishment.  It is against this contrasting backdrop that 
Ianalyse the question of water and sanitation infrastructure development in Nairobi, and 
how the interplay between several actors, whether passive or active, reproduces not 
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only the water and sanitation scape but the totality of the city in terms of its bottom-up 
innovative potential.  The multi-directional approach envisioned by this work becomes 
a possibility by the acknowledgment of the social diversity that is informed by the 
politics of control and domination, resistance and agitation, on the one hand, and state 
planning, on the other hand. By tampering with universal principles of city 
agglomeration and engineering practices, the water and sanitary landscape wasvery 
much informed by the realities of socio-economic and political contestation.  
 
Even though segregationist planning was a popular dimension to colonial cities and 
wasentrenched through a set of ordinances, the Nairobi case paints a picture of a failed 
attempt that saw cosmopolitanism reigning supreme.  Murunga, by focusing on the case 
of the Somali and Asiatics in Nairobi, vividly demonstrates that segregation was a 
failed project.262 The physical development in Nairobi lagged behind the determination 
of rights and responsibilities in urban land ownership and use and this opened up 
avenues for inter-racial interactions that did not permit racial insularity. 263  Elliot 
Fitzgibbon, the municipal and town planning engineer for Nairobi, stated that common 
practice demanded that ‘town planning must be based on a detailed contour survey for 
the whole area involved’, but no such survey was ever taken for Nairobi.264 With no 
definite town layout, infrastructure provision was reactive and outside of what could be 
termed as a visionary plan for the growing city.  
 
The emergence of Nairobi had seen various communities assume certain relevance and 
establish themselves as an important cog in the growth and sustenance of the city. 
While white supremacist ideals reigned, most of European business community in 
Nairobi recognized the central roleplayed by Asiatics as shrewd business people, 
artisans, moneylenders, medicsand property owners.  The Somali community was key 
to the supply of meat in the city and had also helped in the Kings African Rifles, 
offering security and helping with military activities.  The Nubian veterans established 
in Kibra continued to enjoy some sense of preferential treatment for their military roles 
during occupation.  As for the other indigenous societies, it was apparent that the 
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survival of the Europeans in Nairobi relied on their ability to master European cuisine, 
and with limited technical resources, to be able to meet the dietary needs of the settlers. 
With such an inter-racial symbiosis, pursuing a segregationist agenda especially where 
development relied on haphazard decision-making and meticulous planning was non-
existent remained a pipe dream.  
 
The passing of legislations bordering on racial segregation was easy, but it was at 
implementation that the complexity of the situation, especially the fragile land 
adjudication process, rendered it futile.  A case in hand is the attempt to evict the 
Somalis from part of Ngara and Parklands and the demolition of the bazaar by 
characterizing Asiatics as ‘perpetually insanitary.’  Specifically, the alleged incidence 
of smallpox in 1916 and 1917 had prompted the Principal Sanitary Officer (PSO) to 
advocate for the relocation of the Somali and their livestock to Mbagathi, which was 
presumed to have more grazing land.  The real push for this attempted relocation was 
from the ‘Chamber of Commerce’, which felt that the close to two hundred Somali 
houses in an area reserved for exclusive occupation by high class Europeans was a 
threat.  
 
While the administration hesitated in effecting this decision, citing the ‘special 
privileges’ enjoyed by the Somalis, the fact that they were wealthy and could afford to 
buy land and build their own houses connected to the key infrastructures of water and 
sanitation to meet the municipal prescribed standards made the decision untenable.  The 
Somali elders, through their advocates, put up an argument that they had lawfully paid 
for the area they occupied in Ngara Plains.  They noted that they had faithfully paid the 
Land Office for the area, and were better provided for with water and lighting in several 
of their houses.265 The point is that this particular group of people enjoyed a tenure 
status they had lawfully paid for in terms of land rates and also were being supplied 
with water and lighting as a basic requirement that gave them ‘legitimacy’ in 
accordance with the city by-laws and building codes.  This and many other scattered 
examples, such as Eastleigh, illuminate the fact that infrastructure provision and access 
in Nairobi were not exclusively preceded by race consideration but also anchored more 
on the financial clout of either the target group or individuals.  
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By peeling away the networked large systems of water provision, contextually within 
the precincts of the colonial and postcolonial city, it becomes clear that although 
legislation on paper may read exclusion, infrastructure deployment followed a path that 
was more economically deterministic than racially engineered.  This underscores one of 
the central arguments of this study.  The asymmetry in urban infrastructure access 
extended beyond the ‘apartheid spatialization’ characteristic of the colonial urban state 
and, in subsequence, class differentiation in the postcolony. As high capital 
investments, do monolithic large technical systems gravitate towards universalization? 
Is inequality in the provision an embedded complex character of technological artefacts 
that manifests itself through the deployment process?   Reflecting on how most projects 
were (are) undertaken for urban social service provision, amongst which is water and 
sanitation for early 20th century Nairobi, I note that the modality of provision for the 
colonial city operated on the basis of the consumer incurring the cost of connection and 
concomitantly being able to pay the rates as dictated by the billing system, for example, 
on a monthly or quarterly basis.  This point informed all deliberations at the township 
and later the municipal committee level,and alsothe funding agencies at the Colonial 
Office in London, as demonstrated in the various minutes accessed from the archives 
both in Nairobi and London.   A project’s full adoption was endorsed on a cost-
recovery basis and self-sustainability through paid-up rates.  For instance, when the 
Nairobi municipality applied for a loan of £125,000to expand its waterworks (through 
various arrangements whose option included a loan from Balfour, Beatty and Company, 
or a proposed Land Bank which would take the loan and re-loan to the municipality), 
there was hesitation within the Colonial Office for the application of this loan, the 
reason being that the economic situation of Kenya did not justify it.  There were also 
misgivings on the ultimate success of the Land Bank.266Deprived areas that could not 
enjoy a connection based on land tenure and which housed the urban underclass were 
either left to rely on the Nairobi river water while being intermittently supplied through 
a standpipe or a water bowser at a standardized cost.  
 
As Nolte (2016) observes, infrastructure is an important governance tool that 
materializes planning as a process of inclusion and exclusion, territorialization, and de-
territorialization. That is, infrastructure is decisive in a city and adds to the specific 
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urban context in every city. 267  While infrastructure as materialized governance 
manifests itself and creates difference by how it connects and disconnects people, 
giving some legitimacy and rendering some illegitimate, as per the colonial municipal 
and local government ordinances, these manifestations underscore the non-neutrality of 
infrastructure systems and technical artefacts in general, without characterizing them as 
determinate.  Nairobi was an emerging city that was conceived to serve the politically 
powerful and entitled group of white settlers.  Therefore, its water and sanitation scape 
into the 1920s, in terms of technologies of provision and access, prevailed with aspects 
of racial exclusivity.  However, this exclusion was engineered by the very nature of its 
deployment, thereby making it a question of class.  In retrospect, this denotes race, as 
few or no indigenes enjoyed property rights to equally compete with the moneyed 
classes of Asians and Europeans.  
 
Nonetheless, starting from the early 1920s, Nairobi was developed to serve the white 
European society by providing them with exclusive services to replicate the lifestyles 
back in the metropole’s capitals. By virtue of their centrality in the thriving 
economies,the Asians in Nairobi enjoyed second-tier social status in most major urban 
centres as these capitals, especially Nairobi, remained as controlled areas for indigenous 
communities. Indigenes derogatively identified as ‘natives’ meant communities 
originating locally in Kenya further from the Somalis, Swahilis, Nubiansand Arabs, 
who were allowed to settle in areas such as Majengo, Pangani, and Kibra, even though 
they would later be targeted for demolition as the city expanded.  Exclusion would 
entail legislation or coercion, either directly or indirectly, through harassment.  Various 
pieces of legislation, such as those that controlled African movement and employment, 
housing or building codes, land ownership and purchase, and urban infrastructural 
standards, were purposely crafted to make it difficult for Africans to move into, live and 
work in urban areas like Nairobi.268 As for Nairobi, if the idea of the city and its 
planning did not envision the presence of natives and their permanency, is it a tenable 
state that the race perspective of infrastructure access exclusively explains the 
inequality and spatial differentiation witnessed in its infrastructural development?  
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Despite social segregation being a major aspect of urban planning practices in most 
cities during colonialism, the access to water and sanitation services, just like many 
other major infrastructure systems, manifested itself in a variegated outlay that 
connected certain nodes while excluding others, as arising from the economic 
considerations.  The payability and affordability juxtaposed with the viability of the 
respective technologies determined who got what, howand how much of it they 
received at any particular time.  And for a city that had been acknowledged in the 
Williams report of 1907 and Simpson’s report of 1913 as having perennial water crises 
that was compounded by the growing populations, the most pertinent issue was not only 
the modalities of provision but also the question of cost of expansion vis-à-vis financial 
soundness.  By 1919, as indicated in the colonial report (1919/1920), no waterborne 
sewage disposal schemes were in operation in any of the towns in Kenya as a general 
measure, though in Nairobi there was a growing tendency for private individuals to use 
a septic tank system.  What this means is that sewage handling in Nairobi operated 
more on a ‘do it yourself’ basis, hence, a non-networked or fragmented outlay.  
Disposal basically involved dumping of the night soil at designated areas, and 
trenching, incineration, cesspool collection or distribution on the ground, especially 
from congested areas like the Indian Bazaar, making it a target for demolition as had 
been proposed in the two sanitary reports (1907 and 1913).  Further developments in 
Nairobi, for example, at a factory and godown areas, meant that a waterborne system of 
disposal and treatment with an element of irrigation was necessary. 269  By Nairobi 
lacking a well-coordinated development plan during its first decade, a lot of initiatives 
remained individualized, fragmented and bottom-up.  The network of small rivers that 
had motivated the railway corporation to set up base at the location meant that these 
rivers remained primary sources of water, especially for the emerging class of 
‘interlopers’ from the interior.  This is because the Kikuyu Springs mainline supported 
by private boreholes continued to cater for the increasing number of white settlers and 
Asian traders.  At this point, paucity in the water and sanitation supply system for 
Nairobi was a manifestation of a city that had been subject to haphazard land 
adjudication and uncoordinated infrastructure development.  The differentiated and 
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asymmetrically bifurcated modalities of access spanned the deep-seated racial divisions 
and tension that characterized most urban areas in the colonies.  
 
Apart from the railway base and a few colonial administrative amenities, British tourists 
and settlers initially explored Nairobi as a first-stop and a leisure point for biggame 
hunting expeditions. This had seen the earliest physical development target 
establishment of a thriving hotel industry.  The compart mentalized development of 
infrastructure to target government facilities, the business districtand the social 
facilities, such as hotels, theatres and cinema halls, meant that the areas outside these 
marked zones either had to independently connect to the main lines, especially for 
water, since little progress had been made in large systems of sewage flow or they had 
to rely on ‘own initiatives’.  These case scenarios continue to defy the long held race 
binary in the period leading to the 1920s in most colonies in sub-Saharan Africa.  It is 
the immediate post-First World War age that brought to the fore the racial ramifications 
in planning and urban management.   In line with this, both politics and socio-cultural 
constructs interactedto make technology and infrastructure systems visible.  By 
entrenching European control and domination over Kenya, and Nairobi in particular, 
the political dictates of the enactment of a colony from protectorate in 1920 manifested 
itself differently at various levels in makingthe city an urban space.  However, the 
political question of who gets what and how would be interwoven with the overriding 
principle of means and modes of funding for technologies in infrastructural 
developments.  
 
4.3  Protectorate to Colony: Race, Power, and the Infrastructure Divide of Water and 
Sanitation, 1919 to 1939 
By an order in Council dated 11th  June 1920, the East Africa protectorate was annexed 
to the British Dominions under the name of the Colony of Kenya.270 The difference this 
made was that while under the protectorate status, the territory had existed with some 
form of autonomy despite being under British occupation as their ‘sphere of influence’, 
acquiring colonial status meant that the territory was now under the direct rule, 
controland domination of Britain under the Colonial Secretary in London, who was 
represented in the colony by a governor. The indigenes were mere subjects of the 
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Crown, as explained in the Order in Council (Law) that established the colony.  The 
governor answered directly to the colonial secretary, and the Colonial Office in London 
approved major legislation and budgetary estimates, allocationsand project 
implementation.  However, the Legislative Council (Legco) that was dominated by 
white settlers, a few Asians and one representative of the Arab community made laws 
for the colony locally plus deliberated on several issues affecting the colony directly. 
Africans had no representation and their issues were purported to be handled by a white 
missionary who himself was a foreigner, presenting a huge paradox in governance.   At 
a political level, the establishment of the colony of Kenya brought racial hostilities to 
the fore due to the dispossession of Africans of their land and with Asians whose 
number had substantively increased, disputing the restriction of their membership in the 
Legco to only two non-elective positions.271  It is within this politically heightened 
environment in Nairobi of 1920 onwards that major infrastructure developments 
reminiscent of a colonial capital continued to take shape.  The process of annexation 
continued and the power struggle between the settlers and Asians alongside agitation by 
indigenes for improved living standards and fair treatment in Nairobi formed part of the 
major discussions.  
 
The colonial consolidation of power for Nairobi came with the adoption of the 
Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1922 that saw the city acquire the status of a 
municipality governed by the Municipal Council. 272 In creating a municipality, the 
Colonial Annual Report of 1920/21 identified increased water and treatment as the 
greatest challenge to Nairobi.273  It was clear that the water situation needed to be 
addressed immediately.  As earlier noted, it is imperative to emphasize that Nairobi in 
terms of race envisioned the non-existence of long-term indigenous inhabitants as a 
mechanism of keeping cheap labour on the settler farms for maximum agricultural 
production.  It had been proposed that the few Africans in the city would reside on their 
employers’ plots, where they served as gardeners, cooks, and ‘house boys’.  This is 
important to mention as Nairobi has to be seen as a capital in a colony where race 
tensions and dynamics stand a greater chance of being well articulated by 
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acknowledging that the settler economy that was the backbone of the country – where 
lots of prospects had been placed on mineral wealth and yet little existed – thrived on 
making the city ‘exclusive’of locals as their labour on farms was of paramount 
importance.  When we talk of ‘spatialized’ planning, especially in the pre Second 
World War age, we must take cognizance of the realities that informed space, 
urbanityand the presence of indigenes in urban spaces.  Racial segregation in the urban 
spatial planning of cities in Africa during colonialism cannot be understated, as 
evidenced by works from urbanist historians and commentators like Njoh (2007) and 
Freund (2001; 2007) to show how cities took shape to connote the racial binaries of 
dual cities274 or sometimes triad and quad cities, where Asians, Arabs, and the so-called 
‘natives’ existed.  
 
Rather than conforming to the conventional network city model that presumes the inter-
link and inter-connection of all nodes that converge as the respective urbanscape, the 
economic side of infrastructure provision reproduces differentiation, whether as an 
intended or unintended consequence of deployment of certain technologies.  Only those 
who can afford to meet the cost of individual connection and its sustenance through 
monthly or quarterly billing systems as facilitated by adoption of water meters, based 
on consumption or negotiated flat-rates, get to enjoy the services. This defies the 
universalization principle, as the under-class or ‘politically in-correct’ of the city are 
left to survive on ‘do it yourself’ approaches or other non-streamlined methods that fall 
within the purview of either indigenous or localized modes of provision and access.  All 
in all, the early 1920s marked both political and administrative departures in the new 
colony, and Nairobi became a focal point for consolidation and dissemination of mostly 
travelling ideals in technologies of infrastructure development, most of which were 
centralized large technical systems of water and sanitation provision for the new 
municipality.275 
 
How did the municipalization and centralization process in Nairobi unfold to shape the 
water and sanitation scape in the interwar period?  If the purpose of the British 
government in changing the status of the former East Africa Protectorate into the Kenya 
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Colony in 1920 was to consolidate state power, then Nairobi as a capital became a hub 
for colonial ideals, part of which is the ‘modernist ideal’ of a ‘network city’.  The 
‘networked city’ ideal’s facets mesh into interrelated nodes that are manifested 
throughthe technological design and topology of cities integrated, ordered and confined 
by universal infrastructure networks that organize the exchange of goods, ideas, waste, 
powerand people within and between urban territories, and which define the 
boundaries of an urban territory; (2) the notion that urban monopolists provide for a 
ubiquitous and standardized infrastructure services (or for ‘public utilities’); (3) the 
notion of passive customers that are not actively engaged in the production of 
infrastructure services; (4) the assumption that the provision of infrastructure services is 
closely attached to, or highly regulated by, the state; and (5) the concept of urban 
planning effectively regulating land use and guaranteeing the universal provision of 
critical services276 As positivist and ambitiously assuring this ideal looks, its translation, 
especially as dictated by supremacist racial politics in urban spatial planning in the 
colonies, presented a variegated infrastructure landscape as opposed to its goal of 
universalization and the assumption of users being passive recipients was its greatest 
undoing.  All in all, the implantation of centralization in development and management 
of the water and sanitation infrastructure for Nairobi amongst others presumably gained 
momentum with the 1920 declaration of colonial status.  
 
In a meeting on 17 October 1921, a draft water supply agreement was adopted subject 
to alteration.  It proposed to address the question of water payments.  The proposal was 
that payments be made quarterly rather than monthly.  It further outlawed free repairs 
on standpipes, perhaps with the aim of streamlining water provision on a much more 
responsible basis, informed by returns on investment which can only be achieved 
through a highly centralized system, atleast going by the aims of those who believed in 
the ‘civic gospel’ ideal. As it became clear that the rapid move towards 
municipalization intended to streamline revenue collection, the efficiency and efficacy 
of water meters installed emerged.  Government institutions such as the Kabete 
Research Laboratory reported the underservice of the system and proposals for the 
increased diameter ofthe mains pipes were discussed. On the floor of the same meeting, 
a letter from one resident, a Mr. L. Gilbert, brought into question the quality of the 
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water being supplied by one of the mains, pointing out that if was dirty, a price 
reduction on it should be effected.277 All these brought into the limelight the complex 
problem of water paucity and its obduracy for Nairobi, irrespective of the creed or 
colour of the user. 
 
To further pursue the agenda of centralized supply system, in 1922, the municipal 
corporation bought the Kikuyu Springs from the Uganda Railway at a cost of £20,000 
and, subsequently, acquired the Muthaiga Water Company that had been formed in 
1911 as the first private water undertaker in Nairobi.278 While the takeover instituted 
monopolization, which was believed to bring about efficiency in the supply system, this 
move could be interpreted as one of wanting to augment the revenue base for the young 
colony and at the same time harness political power that could be wielded through 
influence of private entities or corporates controlling key resources like water.  
 
However, apart from the state’s political and economic assertiveness being achieved 
through this shift towards municipal centralized systems of infrastructure outlay, the 
‘networked city ideal’, which has been defined as an ensemble of interrelated 
components, as known and practiced in Europe and North America failed to 
materialize.  This was either not proposed, as demonstrated through segregational 
socio-spatial planning, or it failed as a result of the embedded nature of technologies 
that reproduce and shape urban topologies to sometimes exhibit unintended results. 
Proponents of the ‘network city’ model, as it sought to be replicated in the Global South 
by colonial states, argued that it was the most efficient means of supplying urban 
services and that the panacea to the problems created by the networks resided within the 
networks themselves, for example, in their expansion or universalization, more 
centralized management and increased technical sophistication.279 This was within the 
suspicious atmosphere of racial tension, especially between the emergent powerful 
settler community and the Asian society, which felt greatly disadvantaged by the new 
developments that curtailed their control over land.  
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But perhaps the interesting question to ask would be that of how the move towards 
centralization reproduced the city of Nairobi socio-spatially.  Popularization of this 
model had implications for the users and even for the authorities in terms of the cost of 
managing and procuring services for a population that was perpetually expanding. 
Contained outbreaks of plague also meant less deaths registered, hence increasingthe 
internal growth.  How did this, therefore, inform the access to services?  Did it 
preconceive a racial provision or did the strain put on the water and sanitation system 
imply the criticality of the said infrastructural systems? 
 
Water paucity persisted and, while the government pursued options of increasing the 
capacity of the Kikuyu Springs, many institutions in the city sunk boreholes as backups 
to the unreliable erratic supply to areas like Parklands (dominated by Asiatic 
communities).  In the face of water shortages, private boreholes and shallow wells 
doubled up to meet the demand for water in Nairobi.  Several Europeans on expansive 
plots drilled their own boreholes.  The Muthaiga community, which was predominantly 
white, had been amongst the most proactive (founding their own private water company 
before it was taken over by the municipal authorities) and the Muthaiga tank remained a 
viable source of supply off the main grid.  The municipal would refer clients to apply 
for supply from this tank.  It was the scenario that saw the Agricultural Society’s 
application for more uptake from the Muthaiga tank approved on condition that they 
installed storage tanks that would be filled at night so as not to disturb the town supply. 
With such fragmentation or disaggregation, the early 1920s tendency clearly defies the 
‘network city’ ideal and makes us ask whether the Global South cities have or could 
ever be drawn into the ideological debate around networks and universalized 
infrastructure systems.  
 
The modality of provision was dual in the sense that the colonial government did the 
mains supply and left it to the prospective consumers to do subsequent outlays.  By the 
Colonial State doing mains supply systems that only connected to public amenities and 
government facilities, and requiring that the cost of individual connections be incurred 
solely by interested private citizens, the deduction made was that the infrastructure 
system followed a pattern of deployment that was shaped by economic class rather than 
race.  Spatial appropriation also shaped the pattern of modalities of provision to be 
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adopted.  For instance, Karen, which developed as a posh and exclusively white 
residential area, relied on boreholes with overhead storage tanks and septic tanks for 
liquid waste management alongside municipal provision for those who lay within 
reasonable proximity of the mains supply.280Karen Estate was an expansive and serene 
area, which employed ranching land-use practices.  Its exclusively white settlers kept 
horses for racing, and the most viable means of social service provision were either 
individualized or made communal through landowners associations (Karen Estate 
Company).281However, this is not to dispute the segregated spatial planning approach 
that gave an advantage to majority members of the minority white race in Nairobi. The 
race dynamics were merely augmented by the fact that the colonial economy was in the 
hands of the minority Europeans and Asians.  It can be argued that consumption figures 
show the racially categorized needs of supply in terms of capacity, with the minority of 
European society enjoying a greater supply than the majority Africans, to be driven by 
multiple factors rather than segregationist policies.  It is imperative to note that the 
concern over shortages was not a racial problem.  No records of mobilization along 
racial linesfor demand for supply exist so far and with critical institutions like the 
Agricultural Society that was dominated by the most powerful settlers in the colony 
facing the same challenge, the municipal councils response remained hinged on the 
interested parties incurring the cost of connection, piping and storage facilities. 
 
One regrettable factor is that despite the lack of funds by the Nairobi City Council 
(NCC), water provision seemed to enjoy more primacy compared to sanitation (a 
tradition that continues up to this day as it will be shown in this work).  The colonial 
report in 1919 noted that there was no scheme for waterborne disposal in operation in 
any of the towns in Kenya as a general measure; although in Nairobi, there was a 
growing tendency for private individuals to use septic tank systems.  It was further 
identified in the report that a movement was underway to dispose of the sewage from 
the new factory and godown areas in Nairobi by means of a waterborne system and 
septic tank disposal and subsequent irrigation.  In 1923, sanitation was conceived as a 
housing problem and the solution centred more on providing descent housing.  In 1922, 
the government had put up a few huts for ‘natives’, believing that these would serve as 
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a model for other towns.  Unfortunately, in 1923, the public money available was 
insufficient for the institution of any ambitious sanitary improvements, but progress on 
modest lines had been made, more especially in the provision of improved quarters for 
natives in towns.  Housing policy for the city, as explained through the municipal 
building codes, directly impacted on water supply and sanitation management by 
explicitly setting certain minimum standards.  
 
The housing scheme for the Africans in Nairobi, which had been under consideration 
by the Nairobi Municipality for some time, was not brought into effect during 1924.  
An advance of £16,000 to the municipality had, however, been sanctioned for this 
purpose and before the end of 1925, a considerable amount of good and healthy 
accommodation was expected to be available.  Activity continued throughout the year 
in the general improvement of sanitation in the larger townships by the staff available 
for this purpose, and in Nairobi, a small public health museum was opened to the public 
in which were displayed type plans for African housing models of septic tanks, and 
other subjects of public health and sanitary interest, which, it was hoped, would prove 
to be of benefit to estates on which large numbers of ‘natives’ had been employed and 
housed.  To conceive the sanitary interventionist measures from a building perspective 
would serve to propagate the preference for closed circuits or waterborne means of 
getting rid of wastewater and faecal matter.282 
 
Sanitary matters received more lip service than any concerted efforts to have 
functioning and reliable systems of sewerage management which covered and cut 
across the city.  Dr. Gilks, the medical officer,  recommended the early appointment of 
a sanitary engineer in Kenya in his 1925 medical report.283 The committee endorsed this 
recommendation and also those made emphasizing the necessity for ensuring that all 
building or engineering plans which had any bearing on health were to be approved by 
the competent medical authorities prior to execution.  Dr. Gilks expressed the opinion 
that the bad housing conditions  in many parts of Kenya, Nairobi included, had in the 
past been the cause of much ill health amongst both the European and the native 
populations. 
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In 1926, by-laws were passed aiming, inter alia, at ridding the town of undesirable 
natives, while, at the same time, affording all proper protection to those who had come 
into the municipal area for employment or other lawful purpose.  Numerous cases of 
plague occurred throughout the year in Nairobi; they were almost entirely confined to 
those parts of the town in which housing conditions were notoriously unsatisfactory.284 
In 1927, the Local Government Commission produced its report on the water situation 
in Nairobi.  Acknowledging that the Nairobi Corporation was already in provision of a 
water supply for a considerable portion of the sub-urban area outside municipal limits, 
the report pointed out ‘the necessity for a single system of water supply for the entire 
urban and sub-urban.’ 285  In November 1928, the Nairobi City Council Works 
Committee highlighted the plight of the residents of one of the purported sub-urban 
areas of Nairobi, Eastleigh.  With the recommendations of the Simpson’s report of 
1913, as noted earlier, the Indian bazaar had been demolished and Eastleigh created to 
accommodate those who had been evicted from their premises so as to diffuse the 
tension that had always characterized the removal of the bazaar.  Eastleighsprouted up 
as a low-density area and continued to rapidly grow as a middle-income residential 
settlement.  Earlier on in 1920, it had been estimated that Eastleigh had a population of 
55 Europeans, 550 Indians, 120 Goans and 400 Somalis.286 Its multiracial character set 
it apart, though by law it had been earmarked as an ‘Indian only’ settlement. 
 
However, as calamitously as it could be, Eastleigh remained disconnected from the 
town area without any basic infrastructures.  Residents continued to draw water from 
shallow wells that dried during dry seasons and faced constant pollution.287 If the idea 
was to remove the Somali from Ngaraso as to conform to the segregationist ideas 
outlined in the Sanitary Commission Report of 1913, the Somalis circumvented it by 
making their private arrangements to buy residences in Nairobi East Township. 
Eastleigh was proclaimed a township by gazette notice of 13 April 1921, which was an 
amalgamation of the former Egerton Estate, the Nairobi East Township and the area 
                                                 
284 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1926 Report, accessed at SOAS. 
285 KNA, Ref. No. k.352.91 REP. 
286Ibid. 
287 KNA.,REF. No. k352.91 REP. 
  
112  
known as Egerton, Eastleigh, and Eastleigh Extensions.288 This amalgamation meant 
that what had been earmarked as a segregational residential area exclusively for better 
class Indian artisans, tradersand workers was now a cosmopolitan or, at best, a multi-
racial area.  
 
The Eastleigh Association made requisition for a water trough for their oxen but the 
corporation demanded surety of payment and security to ensure no wastage of any kind. 
House owners grappled with the challenge of providing metered water to their tenants 
but the corporation put the onus of supply to them, offering only to sell meters for the 
landlords to institute their own internal connections, which would be at their own 
liability.289 This, therefore, continues to reinforce the perspective that the rolling out of 
the water infrastructure strictly depended on economic factors. The municipal 
authorities’ concern primarily relied on harnessing returns on one of the major 
investments for water provision.  Municipalization, as demonstrated during the initial 
years of its application in cities in Europe towards the end of the 19th century, 
succeeded in bolstering revenues rather than promoting universal access to social 
services.290 For the colonies, ‘decentred’ or indigenous modalities persisted along the 
developing ‘networked ideal’. 
 
Sinking boreholes and shallow wells for those who could not afford or lived far from 
the network wasa common phenomenon.  Such bottom-up approaches reinforce the 
‘complementarity ideal’ attested to by the self-provisioning models adopted, including 
the posh areas like Karen. Thus the variegation in Nairobi’s water and sanitation 
infrastructure did not solely result from neglect of the ‘unplanned’ and poor areas of the 
city that were settled on by the majority of Africans but also fromlanduse practices. 
 
In terms of development of infrastructure for water and sanitation for the fast-growing 
Nairobi, the hitch in funding was a major obstacle and perhaps it reinforces the 
argument that deployment of infrastructure has its pivotal component in its financing. 
Archival evidence points towards the Colonial Office in London being reluctant to 
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undertake any financial commitment for the municipal authority in Nairobi. For 
example, several proposals for augmenting Nairobi’s water and sanitation supply were 
turned down due to the precarious financial position of the Nairobi Municipal (later 
City) Council. Where loans were granted, the colonial government had to be an 
enjoined party.291 The lack of financial autonomy for Nairobi, therefore, inhibited its 
ability to expand its networks in the true sense of ‘universal service provision’. 
 
The water crisis in Nairobi operated like leprosy, never going away and soaking up all 
efforts only to reappear as the city burgeoned with an increased population and growing 
economic and political status.  In 1930, there was a sense of urgency in seeking expert 
opinion on thewater supply for Nairobi. Specifically, the Nairobi office requested the 
electric engineer, who was then working on a hydro-electric power project referred to 
as ‘Seven Forks’, to advise on the supply of water for Nairobi. It proved improbable but 
reappeared with the order for Zanzibar.  The Nairobi office noted that it was clearly 
desirable on grounds of economy and efficiency that the same expert should advise on 
the Zanzibar and Nairobi problems.  It was envisioned by the city officials that the 
proposed Nairobi water and sewerage scheme would become self-supporting by 1941 if 
construction was completed in 1934.  An average annual loss of approximately £4,500 
was anticipated for seven years, the bulk of which would be met from reserve funds. Its 
viability would, if necessary, consider the increase in the prevailing tariffs at the time. 
The net annual profit of the scheme ultimately could not be stated.  Sadly, it was 
highlighted that the sewerage scheme would probably never be self-supporting.  The 
direct revenue from sewerage connections was, however, anticipated to cover 
approximately half the gross annual expenditures.  Despite these estimates, funding for 
the scheme was not forthcoming.292 
 
The acute crisis of water in Nairobi meant exploration for distant sources, as was the 
practice in most cities globally.  Along such lines, the proposal to takewater from Ruiru 
River, 30 miles from the city centre, was tabled.293 Stiff opposition emerged from the 
riparian agriculturalists.  The water ordinance of 1929, being the law that governed 
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water resources and their usage, was found to be wanting.294 First and foremost, it did 
not address subterranean water. Secondly, it entailed elaborate hydrographic 
measurements and a large personnel team was needed for the same.  Thirdly, there was 
no provision for the payment of fees for the extraordinary use of water. Fourthly, it was 
noted that the ordinance gave much power of a quasi-judicial nature to a semi-
bureaucratic body.  Lastly, it exempted the government water board and their officers 
from any liability for any actions.  To answer to these flaws, an amendment was made 
to empower the water board to act independently in ensuring the conservation of water 
resources and good management for whichever purposes, including the building of 
dams.  The streamlining of the law allowed for the amicable handling of the opposition 
to the Ruiru project by riparians. 
 
As the Kikuyu supply choked under the pressure, the Ruiru River works commenced in 
1935 and were completed and commissioned in 1938.  Much as it boosted the supply 
system, the requirement that individual applicants incur the cost of piping and 
equipment from the main lines to their premises meant that only the rich and powerful 
would enjoy the service.  The interplay between class and race massively shaped how 
the network for water and sanitation access unfurled through the deployment of the 
artefacts that constituted the key infrastructure systems.  The differentiated provision of 
water and sanitation services in Nairobi had much to do with the lifestyle and 
socioeconomic status of the various groups that occupied the city.  A poor European in 
Nairobi faced the same challenges as an Asian or African.  
 
Conventionally, the Chadwickian systems of sanitizing and developing healthy cities 
carried with it a financial burden and the infrastructure finance system supported by 
loans, prompting the authorities to develop a cost-recovery component to access and 
provision.  The funding and ability of the public to pay for such services would shape 
how the artefacts would be deployed to improve access.  The end goal was not 
universalization, as envisioned by such systems in the Global North, but the thriving of 
the city based on multiple modalities of supply and access, though sometimes socio-
spatially situated to the advantage of some compared to others.  As such, it is not a 
question of either centralized or decentralized, monolithic or variegated, networked or 
                                                 
294 Water Ordinance No. 35 of 1929, Ref. NO. CO 533/396/13, British National Archives, Kew. 
  
115  
fragmented, connected or disconnected systems of supply.  Rather, the large technical 
and networked systems come with deficiencies resulting either from the process of 
deployment that is dictated by politics and economics of provision and the user or 
human agency from below.  This is explained by the persistency of the indigene/old or 
counter movements to the adoption and adaptation to the new that manifests itself as a 
complementary outlay in the stabilization of urban services, despite the crisis for some 
societies.  The infrastructure landscape presents a quilt of provisioning ideals rather 
than a large technical monolith from top to down. 
 
4.4  The (mis)Fortunes of the 2nd World War: Expansionist Approaches to Water and 
Sanitation Infrastructure Provision 
As the Second World War erupted in 1939, cities in the European colonies like Nairobi 
were presented with new challenges.  Nairobi had assumed an imperial importance in 
the Second World War as the headquarters of the East African Command and the base 
of East African troops for the Abyssinian campaign, the Middle East and the Asiatic 
theatres of war.  Nairobi was launched as a ‘big city’,which was reflected in its social 
service expenditure, the increase in rates and the expansion in staff.  The demographic 
impact seemed to be overwhelming for the city.  Serving as a military regional 
headquarter had enormous implications for the water and sanitation situation.  Most of 
military activities were water-intensive and the thousands of soldiers trooping into the 
country necessitated the establishment of several military barracks strategically located 
across the city.  The soldiers in the multiple military camps across the city meant 
increased demand for water, both for their personal use and for their equipment.295 The 
Nairobi City Council accused the military personnel of stealing water from the public 
hydrants,although it was difficult for them to effect any disciplinary action based on the 
autonomy with which the military operated.  In line with this new tension, the 
municipal chief engineer estimated that consumption of municipal water by the military 
was about 350,000 g/d.296 The provision of additional water into the municipals mains 
to meet this demand from the existing sources presented insuperable difficulties owing 
to the lack of necessary materials like greater capacity pipes.  This was as a result of the 
global war that made it difficult to secure funds and get fast shipment of the materials. 
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Boreholes became the only viable option of augmenting the supplies to the barracks for 
their day-to-day domestic and sanitary demands.  However, borehole drilling equipment 
was equally required.  The military,not being in a position that would allow them 
directly procure this equipment, requested that the Water Department through the local 
firms to facilitate it.  
 
The increased requirements of military forces led to the creation of the East African 
War Supplies Board, under the chairmanship of Sir Philip Mitchell.297 This was divided 
into two: materials and foodstuffs. On the military side, the Army Supplies Commission 
was set up.  Progress on the various schemes for the investigation and development of 
water supplies was seriously affected by the shortage of technical staff.  Despite this 
impediment, progress was made on several fronts. 
 
Borehole drilling was not only a preserve of the military institutions but also private 
enterprises and public institutions like schools.  The borehole pumping plant at the 
Prince of Wales School (currently Nairobi School) had the capacity to revamp the 
mains supply system as it was harnessed beyond the school’s daily consumption levels. 
However, the municipal engineer in a letter dated 11th  February 1941 noted with much 
regret that the plant had broken down on several occasions.  He wrote to the military 
commander for Nairobi area to offer expert assistance as its sustained functioning 
meant a reduced strain on the supply for civilian and military populations in the city298. 
The most pertinent observation to make here is that the mushrooming of boreholes as 
key modes of supply was possible due to the presence of trained personnel amongst the 
military ranks and, at the same time, the ease with which military orders were handled 
during the war period. 
 
In a meeting on 8th  June 1942, it was further observed by the municipal authorities that 
during the dry season, the supply from Ruiru could only be used to half its capacity 
until a time when a dam could be put on the river.  With a view to overcoming the 
difficulties anticipated during the dry season, the military authorities were advised to 
equip their borehole at Kabete so as to obtain a maximum discharge, of which it would 
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be possible to distribute to all their encampments.  The borehole’s capacity was 
approximated to be about 70,000 g/d, with a consumption of only 10,000 g/d at the 
Kabete camp.  It meant that the borehole had the potential to supply the other military 
bases across the city to enable them to be cutoff from the town’s supply.  Plans were 
made to drill a second borehole at the Kabete site, with the aim of moving all troops 
encamped in Nairobi to Kabete.   As for the areas in and around the Nairobi City Park, 
a borehole was to be drilled in the park to augment the supply.  Through the Gailey and 
Roberts Company in England, the council placed the order for equipment for the above-
envisioned projects as special military orders for them to be expedited.  There was real 
urgency to nip the imminent water crisis in the bud before it escalated to unmanageable 
levels or into a sanitary disaster.  Unlike in Uganda, where the war period (1939-1945) 
witnessed no investment in water and sanitation infrastructure for Kampala, Nairobi’s 
needs sky rocketed in the war period, demanding more investment and alternative 
approaches.299 
 
However, it is also important to note that as much as the government and municipal 
authorities saw the harnessing of ground water through the sinking of boreholes as a 
panacea to the acute shortage, the laws appertaining to this activity were tightened.  The 
Works Committee of the City Council resolved that further by-laws be made under 
Section 69 (26) g of the Local Government (Municipalities) Ordinance,300 amending the 
regulations for the supply and distribution of water, and an application was made for 
Section 54 of the Ordinance to be amended to make it compulsory for persons seeking 
to sink boreholes or wells to make applications to the Council before proceeding with 
such works, whether on private or public property.  It was through this that the Council 
regulated and controlled not only the supply but also the consumption of water. 
 
The water crisis seemed to have concerned every city dweller.  There were joint efforts 
made for the adoption of viable measures to alleviate the problem.  A John Neale wrote 
a letter to the then mayor of Nairobi proposing the adoption of ‘a special fitting’ that 
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would be attached to the taps to save water.301 The Municipal Engineer reported that he 
was considering the proposal by obtaining the design of the fitting.  This is a case 
example of how users tinker with technologies, especially in times of crisis. Innovation 
becomes an ongoing process that did not necessarily derive from above.  Users 
appropriate things and in their daily interaction with them, make adjustments or 
improvisations, or hybridize the systems, especially where scarcity was not only 
imminent, as in Nairobi at the time, but also where it is part of the daily life pattern.  If 
we were to align ourselves to the old school that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’, 
we would argue that such tampering with the system holds greater potential for the 
sustainability of technologies, as witnessed in this case. 
 
One of the civic leaders further proposed experimentation with rationing, where water 
would be cut off from residential areas at certain hours of the day.  However, the 
engineer in charge advised against this measure, citing the satisfactory response on the 
part of the military authorities and the general public to the Council’s pleas for water 
conservation.  Aggressive public awareness campaigns had been widely carried out, 
urging Nairobi residents to adopt water conservation measures.  These included 
newspaper campaigns, public pronouncements at administrative meetings and posters. 
As the following poster (see next page) shows, behavioural change in relation to water 
use was envisioned as rewarding in terms of reduced cost at a personal level.  However, 
the scrutiny of the message as captured on the posters shows despair and distress in a 
city reeling from an alarming water scarcity.  The contrast is that water and water use 
carries with it strong imageries of culture – for example, denoting cleanliness in a pious 
sense – social class amongst others.  Hence, the question that lingers is how effective a 
behavioural change that entailed firm messages like ‘stop washing your car’ was in 
terms of dealing with a perpetual risk of water paucity. 
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Image 10: One of the posters used in the sensitization campaigns for water saving 
 
Source: Nairobi City Council Records (minutes of 30 June 1944. Vol.XI),Macmillan Library 
Harambee, as seen in this poster, is a corrupted indigenous word used to imply ‘the spirit of co-operation and togetherness’, 
especially towards accomplishing a certain task that involves ‘pooling together’, a joint effort. 
 
Several proposals were floated on how to minimise wastage of water and maximize on 
the available supply.  Top of the agenda was water rationing.  But as one would expect, 
the policy for controlling consumption targeted the African settlements, otherwise 
referred to as ‘Native Settlements’.  Public showers in the African Native Settlements 
were closed down to minimise ‘wastage’. 302  The Municipal Engineer launched a 
proposal to construct a ‘settling tank’ and a pump house for the purpose of utilising the 
effluentthat was at that time running to wastefrom the railway locomotive sheds at the 
cleansing station.  This proposal was approved, with it being estimated that 
approximately eight thousand gallons of water from the public mains would be saved 
for the use of the public.303 
 
However, the most comprehensive campaign carried out that seemed to pay dividend in 
saving water was the ‘public propaganda’ aimed at behavioural change in the way users 
utilised water.  Instilling a sense of responsibility amongst individuals irrespective of 
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race proved to be more effective.  As the poor altered their bathing patterns and 
quantity of water used, the affluent European community avoided watering their flower 
gardens.  This success saw the municipal engineer decline to use water rationing as an 
approach, stating that the willingness to responsibly save water had been witnessed.  In 
addition, with the revamped supplies from the military boreholes and the Ondiri swamp 
project (a project that was instituted to harness more water in the Kikuyu area to 
supplement the Kikuyu Springs), the position had improved to a degree that made 
rationing unwarranted. 
 
Furthermore, the Municipal Engineer stated that storage tanks had been provided at the 
military camps and that a reduction in the consumption of water at the camps 
amounting to 408,000 gallons had been effectedin January 1944 compared to the 
previous months.  Detailed plans for the proposed extensions to the sewage disposal 
works at Eastleigh were submitted in a memorandum on the matter, the extensions 
being estimated to be adequate to deal with the dry weather flow to the site for five 
years, by which time it would be necessary to construct other works dealing with other 
sewage zones.  
 
In 1945, F. E. Kanthack, a consulting engineer andmember of the British Institute of 
Civil Engineers (ICE), released his extensive report on the augmentation of water 
supply for the Nairobi municipal area. 304 Kanthack noted that the potable water 
available as in 1945 from all sources (the Kikuyu swamp, the Ondiri swamp, boreholes 
and from the Ruiru River, amounting to two million gallons per day) was quite 
inadequate.  Population estimates were put at about 10,000 Europeans, 30,000 Indians 
and 60,000 Africans.305 In the twenty years that followed, the total population was put 
at 250,000 people within the municipal boundaries of 35 square miles.  Despite the 
municipal authorities having acquired the water management from the Railway 
Corporation in the 1920s, it was interesting to see them not being factored into the 
water demand scape in the expectation that they would undertake their own schemes.  
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In terms of sewerage, the report alarmingly observed that it was only the commercial 
and administrative portions of the town that were provided with a waterborne sewage 
system.  The disposal works on the Nairobi River near the south-eastern end of the 
town had been designed to deal with 600,000 gallons per day, but it was actually 
dealing with 900,000 gallons per day, the effluent being discharged into the Nairobi 
River being consequently very bad.306 The part of the city that had sewer works was on 
a combined system.  
 
Deliberations on future supply for water revolved around such suggestions as an equal 
or uniform quota supply system.  However, the expert opinion observed that uniformity, 
or what I would call a universalized system of supply, would be unnecessarily lavish in 
the case of the African populationand, to a lesser extent, the Indian population. 
Traditional habits, general modes of lifeand the fact that much of the water used by 
Africans was in communal washhouses and latrines, amongst other uses, all tended to 
lower the per capita rate of consumption. 
 
While it is important to acknowledge how infrastructure systems are shaped by socio-
cultural practices and that they should never be isolated or divorced from their real 
political contexts, if as artefacts they are to be understood for what they encapsulate, 
justifying a variegated supply on racial lines camouflaged by cultural complexity 
helped institutionalize inequality.  This is no surprise as the launching of LTS in the 
Global North has been observed to have been deployed and rationalized the same way. 
For instance, Melosi draws a parallel between how the water and sanitary systems were 
replicated in the US from Europe.  He acknowledges that the resulting American 
systems were not carbon copies of English models, but adaptations modified by local 
and national cultural, economic, technological, environmental and political factors.307 
However, he notes in equal measure that until the political system was pressured to 
encourage public participation, local governments catered for the ‘better sort’. 308 
Despite, the spirit of reform that informed the war period, the system of infrastructural 
provision for water and sanitation maybe for reasons inherent in itself as a model 
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continued to be skewed towards a minority group pushed by economic rather than any 
other considerations.  Even in the face of scarcity, needs were met separately. 
 
As the curtain came down on the Second World War, the municipal council of Nairobi 
continued to receive more and more applications for a water supply and licenses for 
sinking boreholes.  Going by the various minutes of the city council, deliberations 
centred on the economic value of such connections, the ability and readiness of 
applicant to incur the cost of connection and the reliability of the sources to necessitate 
such connections.  With several reforms in native housing, the water demand remained 
high.  Despite the attempt to raise the living standards for natives, the supply of water 
and sewerage as a costly venture analysed in economic terms remained highly limited. 
Water supply remained primarily on the basis of communal standpipes rather than 
individual household connections, and toilets and laundry points were supplied on a 
shared basis.  The post-WWII period would be characterized by increased political 
agitation and far-reaching social economic reforms.  
 
As the shortage of water bit deep into 1945, attention was drawn to the great hardship 
suffered by the inhabitants of Kibra – an area that had been earmarked as a problem 
based on its squalor characteristics and one that had become a pain to the colonial 
administrators for several illegal activities associated with informality, including 
brewing of Nubian gin (local liquor) – on account of the extreme shortage of water.  It 
was noted that, at the time, the population of Kibra consisted of 97 men, 392 women 
and 644 children, the small number of men being accounted for the very large male 
population of Kibra being on active service.309 Following this dire situation in Kibra, 
the municipal authorities agreed to arrange with the government for a temporary 
measure of sale of water to Kibra inhabitants at a standpipe that was already in 
existence near the settlement.  This would be re-considered annually.  As the ‘Kibera 
problem’ escalated, the government had on several occasions pleaded with the city 
authorities to expand their boundary to cover the area that was Kibera, but to no avail.  
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The Municipal Council of Nairobi clearly stated that they did not want to inherit the 
problem.310 This reluctance is what informed their position for reviewing the supply of 
this water supply.  In places like Kibera, already demonised and cited for all the wrong 
reasons, nobody discussed the question of sanitation despite regular crackdowns on 
butchers and eateries by the public health officer.  However, several studies that had 
been conducted in the 1920s concluded that the soil was not tenable for pit latrines; 
hence, the use of buckets had been recommended.  The problem with this approach was 
the question of who was to take responsibility for emptying the buckets (KNA).  In 
divorcing these narratives from the above that serve to bracket all local means of 
provisioning and negate the lifestyles of non-European communities, through 
employing oral sources of history, places like Kibera assert themselves strongly as 
thriving with multiple means of supply.  
 
4.5.  Diversity and Flexibility in Provisioning: Operating on the Fringes 
As earlier stated, much as Nairobi had been planned and developed as a ‘whites only’ 
city, the reality on the ground was different.  Through natural migratory processes and 
the presence of non-native immigrant communities, several settlements sprouted up 
around the city.  The oldest settlements for Africans, including Kibera, Panganiand 
Mathare, had one thing in common; they all lay near either the Nairobi River or its 
tributaries.  This ensured a steady supply of water for domestic purposes.  As narrated 
by Abdallah Omar (not his real name), born and raised in Kibera in the late 1930s, 
Kibra (as referred to in his Nubian language) was a forested and expansive area that 
saw both human and wildlife interact in utilising the available resources that included 
the river.  Water from the River Kortumbro (perhaps one of the tributaries leading into 
the main Mutoini River that cuts across the settlement) was reliable and flowed all year 
round.  The river was a major supply for domestic use. 311  The intervieweein his 
younger days recounts how they would either fetch the water using simple 
wheelbarrows or debe (a metallic container mostly for cooking oil or petrol, cleaned 
and used for this purpose).   Washing would mostly be done at the river and young boys 
would plunge into the river for a bathafter cleaning their clothes, a routine they did 
every Thursdays after their Islamic Madrassa classes.  According to the source, tapped 
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water supply was only a technology preserved for the white settlers and European 
colonial officers.  But the locals would specifically map out tapped water as safe for 
drinking and use both formal means of acquiring it for that purpose through purchasing 
it or, informally, by sneaking into the compounds of their white employers to steal such 
water.312 
 
In many occasions resulting from the governance structure, the colonial state in Nairobi 
had public taps at certain strategic positions, mostly at the administrative offices of 
either the District Commissioner or District officer.  Within the proximity of Kibra 
settlement that lay on the fringes of the official city municipal boundary, there were 
three basic public taps that the residents would buy water mostly for domestic purposes. 
A debe was sold at 20 cents according to the source.  One tap was strategically located 
at the District Officers’ centre.  Another one was located near Kibra Primary School, at 
what was called ‘Kambi Kitchen’.  This was the county of Nairobi’s superintendent’s 
office.  The Sarangómbe and Lomle residents got water from the tap at the railway 
station.  The women who worked in the houses of the Europeans illegally facilitated 
another supply system.  They would allow others to sneak in and steal water without 
their bosses noticing.  The Nubian community that inhabits Kibera is predominantly 
Muslim andwater carries religious functions.  As such, several wells existed within 
Kibera, with the source provided an estimated figure of eight of these.  One he 
remembers was near what is the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) church 
ground today, and it served as a provision for ground water.  
 
Rainwater harvesting was also key as a means of supply.  Every house had roof-gutters 
for collecting water in large metallic drums. It was used for general household 
activities, including drinking.  All of this water was considered safe.  Perhaps for 
Kibera, the greatest threat to pollution of the river was the slaughterhouse or abattoir at 
Dagoretti, but the Sanitary Officer’s intervention had ensured that effluent was 
managed before being released into Mutoini River that traversed Kibera, joining the 
Nairobi River.  The only notable concern of the residents with the water was its fluoride 
content, which led to tainting of teeth.  This they were aware of and it made the tap 
water supplied at the alternative points favourable for drinking. 
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The water business also thrived with the introduction of motorised transport in Nairobi. 
Small trucks would get water either from Kambi Kitchen or the District Commissioners 
site and sell it at an increased cost of 30 cents per debe to minimise the walking 
distance by the residents.  
 
As for sanitation, every household had a pit latrine.  As an expansive area in the 1920s 
through to the period leading to independence, the pit latrine was dug a distance far 
from the family house for hygiene purposes and minimise foul smell.  Once it was full, 
it was covered and another one dug.  The issue of exhausting or emptying the pits 
would come later with congestion.  In revealing an interesting part of how society 
understands itself and employs knowledge or technologies that answer to their 
livelihood practices, the people in Kibera knew well that they relied on the river and 
wells for their own survival.  As such, they were aware of the danger posed by pit 
latrines resulting from the seepage of human waste into the water streams.  They, 
therefore, poured paraffin into the pit and whenever the smell of paraffin was detected 
in the water from a certain well, they would know that there was contamination and 
such a well would be abandoned, or at least not used for domestic water purposes. 
 
Nubians were also known for their brewing of a local powerful spirit or indigenous 
liquor, otherwise referred to in official quarters as the ‘Nubian gin’.  This required a lot 
of water for the process and river water became ideal for the process.  It was prepared 
onsite along the river as it used a lot of water in both the manufacturing and 
condensation process to distilthe gin.  This liquor industry thrived after the disbandment 
of all traditional African brews through the native Liquor Ordinance of 1921.313 The 
reason was that the Nubians as immigrants were not categorised as natives and that 
Kibera had been earmarked as a military camp: security officers were not allowed to 
carry out their operations within military designated areas.  
 
The same story goes for Mathare settlement, which was equally divided by the Mathare 
River.  The settlement was along the river perhaps earmarking the river as the main 
source of water.  Standpipes, vending and the Nairobi River served as the African areas 
of Pangani as they lay within close proximity.  Despite this differentiated system of 
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access, it is important to note that the ability to pay for water basically determined who 
enjoyed the city supply system.  The post-World War II period witnessed a crackdown 
on what were identified as slums. The government adopted ‘slum eradication’ 
programmes, some of whichincluded formalising certain areas through planned housing 
schemes, for example, in Kibra. However, certain complexities and political 
considerations saw some informal areas thrive and grow in size as the evictees from 
elsewhere moved into areas like Kibera and Mathare, where they secured cheap 
housing. 314  How would this inform the modalities of provisioning for water and 
sanitation?  Away from the official characterization of such settlements as defunct of 
meaningful living, what potential in terms of the technologies of supply and 
provisioning lay within these peripheral areas? 
 
4.6  Agitation and Representation: Looking Beyond the Second World War and Retracted 
Efforts Towards City Provision 
The end of the Second World War ushered in a reformatory approach towards 
understanding urban spaces.  The war had drawn in many Africans from the interior 
into the city as technicians, clerksand informal workers.  A small group of government 
workers of African descent was also slowly growing.  The war veterans who had fought 
on the Allied side were also claiming their stake and political agitation was in top gear. 
The Native Settlements Committee had discussed and put into effect several plans for 
African housing through the NCC during the war.  Though these housing projects 
remained inferior to the European and Asian housing plans, water provision and 
sanitation were paramount to their provision.  This had a direct impact on water demand 
for the city. 
 
A proposal for constructing a dam on Nairobi River had been tendered by the chief 
engineer of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours.315The municipal engineer 
submitted the plan from the railway administration showing the site of the dam as 
inspected by the railways engineer.  After the approval of the plan, the site received 
strong objections from the ‘natives’ and, as a result, the government settled on an 
alternative site further into the land that housed St. Austin’s Mission Station, which 
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involved the realignment of the Council’s road scheme.  The work commenced and in 
1946, the Nairobi Dam was completed.  It was laid on Mutoini River, which traverses 
the expansive Kibera, and it helped meet the high demand for water of the military 
personnel. 
 
While a major effort was put towards the provision of water infrastructure, little 
attention seems to have been paid to sanitation – a tradition that the city would continue 
to grapple with for a long time in the post-colony period.  The Nairobi River took a toll 
from the sewage discharges.  In 1945, the senior medical officer of health stressed the 
danger arising from the increasing discharge of sewage and sullage water.   He urged 
the necessity of adequate treatment of sewage before its discharge into the river.  The 
Nairobi City Health Committee noted this and emphasized the need for town planning 
and the extension of a seweragescheme, which had to precede the development of the 
undeveloped or unplanned areas of the municipality.  Several areas were marked for 
connection to the mains sewer, including Pangani, Eastleigh Section III, Race 
Courseand the Fairview area.  
 
The City Council Works Committee noted the continued delay in the preparation and 
execution of comprehensive plans of water supply and an efficient sewerage system 
that was adequate to meet the existing and future needs of the municipality.  As a result, 
it was resolved that the council secure the services of an engineer to look at additional 
sources of water supply, that the it obtain the services of a consulting engineer from 
South Africato carry out a survey and prepare a comprehensive plan for the drainage 
and sewerage services of the municipality.  It is important to acknowledge the 
realization that capacity building and expanding the team of experts was key to 
achieving fast development in the water and sanitation sector of the growing city.  The 
Councilfurther recommended that its Engineering Department be immediately 
strengthened by the appointment of an additional qualified engineer so that accelerated 
progress could be made, with many public health works already approved or in progress 
of being planned.  The ‘bucket system’ had been in use to handle the faecal matter.  
 
The Cleansing Superintendent stated that the ‘double bucket’ system had been 
introduced and extended to include some parts of the city (Hill area), with a total of 516 
  
128  
buckets being attended to under the new system.316 The ‘single bucket system’ had been 
in operation in most areas for quite along time, but, as noted by Nilsson from his study 
of Kampala, Uganda, it was troublesome. Not only was it labour-consuming and a 
nuisance to the inhabitants, it was also deemed unsanitary in itself.317 The buckets could 
not easily be cleaned after emptying, and the emptying also resulted in ‘continuous 
fouling of the ground and surface drains’ as well as of the collection carts.  But much as 
‘the double bucket system’ came in as a way of alleviating the challenges presented by 
the old system of handling faecal and sullage matter, the scarcity of receptors used on 
this system made it difficult to attain the envisaged goals.  Its importation and cost 
resulted in serious delays that prompted the officials to think beyond the system to 
improve water-based methods of sanitation management.  Expanding the trunk sewer 
system became inevitable.  
 
In 1950, Nairobi, through a Royal Charter, officially received city status (see image 
11).318Apart from the administrative ramifications that came with this raised status, this 
elevation in essence meantthe increased ability of the NCC to independently negotiate 
for funding through grants and loans from international agencies.  In 1951, the City 
Engineer submitted plans and estimates in the sum of £1,935 for the construction of a 
branch sewer to serve area off White-House Road.  Under the provisions of the 
Municipalities Ordinance Cap.136, the cost of laying the sewer would be recovered 
from the plot owners.  Just like the water crisis, sanitation for Nairobi was becoming a 
serious challenge that not only required new investments but also faced emerging 
worries on its sustainability. 
 
There was a serious concern over damage to the existing sanitary facilities in most parts 
of the city.  The city engineer reported damage to flushing cisterns and lavatory pans 
which was extensive and, thus, it was unwise to persist with the installation of 
individual cisterns and W. C. suites Tipping buckets had proved unsatisfactory and he 
recommended the fixing of flushing cisterns with continuous troughs.  Amplifying the 
high degree of destruction targeting public amenities, the City Engineer further 
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Image 11: Image from the Times Newspaper, Thursday 30thMarch, 1950 
 
Source: British National Archives, Kew, London. Ref. No. HO 45/24313. 
 
recommended that all bucket type latrine blocks not subject to undue damage or theft 
should remain and that the 30 flush type blocks. with the exclusion of some areas (for 
example Gorofani)319 be converted to automatic flushing with trough-like outlets.320 
 
In late 1955, plans to expedite the Ngong Valley trunk sewer were underway alongside 
efforts by the Director of Public Works to connect to the City Council mains.  Several 
projects were undertaken in various sections of the city to harmonise sanitation systems 
and, many times, expansion efforts were met by strong objections from individual 
landowners who were to be affected by the new outlays.  The development of 
1957/1958 witnessed massive works with huge financial commitments and, as works 
got underway, circumventing objections raised was of primary concern.  In one of the 
meetings, the Town Clerk reported that provisional apportionment notices in respect to 
the cost of constructing the Eastleigh Foul Sewerage Scheme, Phase IV had been served 
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to the concerned plot owners and that two objections had been received.  It was 
resolved that the objections be not upheld and that the work of constructing this sewer 
should proceed.  In the Parklands Foul sewerage Scheme Phase I, two objections were 
also raised.  Pratap Road project saw four objections while the Pangani Foul Sewerage 
Scheme Phase III witnessed sixty objections.321 The authorities, in total disregard of 
these objections, sanctioned the projects to proceed, demonstrating indifference to the 
dissent from the affected parties in the expansionist programmes of the large technical 
sanitation systems in Nairobi.  Despite the clamour for political change in the colony in 
the post 1945 era, these development projects continued to be skewed towards the 
middle-income (Asian) zones of Nairobi.  African native settlements, as they were 
derogatively known, continued to receive piece-meal low technology developments, 
with the main aim being improvement of latrine designs rather than installing flush 
systems.  The poor water supply to these areas meant poor water-borne sanitation 
approaches. 
 
As these new technologies were introduced and implanted from the Global North and 
replicated within a colonial context, they seem to have encountered challenges in their 
use and maintenance, which required regular adaptation, localizationand re-examination 
to sustain them as viable ventures within the city’s sanitation branch.  The indigenes 
were accused of vandalism, but theirs could have been a case of construing the apparent 
destruction as a mode of resistance.  To the coloniser, it was a case of developing an 
efficient network of handling sewerage and best practice for sewage disposal.  For the 
colonised, especially arising from the nationalist protests of post-WWII, these new 
developments could have been seen as a pure reminder of the more than four decades of 
cultural imperialism and servitude. Tools and objects of Western origin not only 
represented westernisation (deculturalisation), but also were in themselves instruments 
for racial segregation as they connoted ‘superiority’ in terms of social economic 
organization. 
 
The 1950s saw other major projects begin as the city grew both in population and 
physical size.  The events of the 1940s had overstretched the inadequate water and 
sanitation infrastructure of the fast growing city.  Consequently, city planners and 
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administrators had to think beyond the constrained water and sanitation resources 
within Nairobi and along its immediate periphery (Kikuyu Springs and Kabete Works), 
which had sustained it for quite a long time.  As Monstadt points out, innovations have 
enabled cities to extend their ecological hinterlands by importing natural resources or 
resource-based infrastructure from afar and, also, by using ecosystems far beyond the 
urban bioregion, as sinks for their emissions. 322  Despite the seemingly parasitic 
relationship that perpetuated this system of ingestion and egestion of water resources, 
sources and sites more than forty miles away became a reality rather than an illusion in 
augmenting Nairobi’s water sources.  Sasamua Dam, located on the Sasamua stream, a 
tributary of the Chania River, near Njabini on the South of the Aberdare Mountains, 
was adopted.  Initially a 33.5-metre high rolled earth dam was constructed and brought 
into operation in 1956.  
 
During the construction of the dam, a small concrete gravity weir was built on the 
Chania River and river flows of between 0.14 and 8.21 m3 /sec were diverted via a short 
aqueduct to the Sasamua stream about five kilometres upstream of the dam (NCC 
1996).  The construction of this dam saw water being pumped 40 miles to Nairobi at its 
completion and commissioning.  Apart from major works on Sasamua Dam, several 
institutions and individuals applied to the city authorities seeking permission to sink 
boreholes.  These applications were discussed by the Works Committee of the City 
Council of Nairobi as the law demanded.  While many were approved, they were under 
very stringent conditions, especially in terms of use.  An application for agricultural use 
was to remain solely that, with all other uses criminalised under the license issued. 
Trunk sewers were also extended in major middle income residential areas that were 
inhabited to a large extent by people of Asian origin.  The African housing projects of 
Ziwani, Mbotela, Kaloleniand Ofafa, amongst others (done in the forties and fifties), 
had been provided with basic sewer connectivity supervised by the government as 
model housing for natives. 
 
By 1959, the Nairobi City Council was gazetted as the sole Water Undertaker under the 
provisions of the Water Ordinance (No.56) of 1951 and the Water (Undertakers) 
Ordinance of 1953.  This monopoly of water management was informed by the need to 
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have a strong centralized system of provision.  Within the same period, the Ministry of 
Health and Local Government proposed amendments to the Water (General) Rules of 
1953 to lay down standards to be observed by sewerage disposal works operators with 
regard to the quality of effluent produced.  Surprisingly, these proposed standards were 
higher than those of the United Kingdom despite the glaring gap between the technical 
and economic capacity of the two countries.  The adoption of these proposals would 
have serious financial implications on all local authorities in the colony.  Nairobi City 
Council had been given up to the 7th July 1958 to object after which the proposals 
would take effect.  The clerk wrote back to the ministry strongly objecting.  The 
existing sewer system was reported by the city engineer to be overstretched beyond 
capacity.  It was inadequate and overflowed even in dry weather andplans to replace it 
were made at an estimated cost of £76,400.323 
 
The 1960/61 Nairobi City Council budget for infrastructural development had two 
major elements: improving the existing already over-stretched systems and expanding 
the network, especially to the middle income areas of Parklands, Pangani, and 
Eastleigh.  Works to improve the layout of Eastleigh Sewage Disposal Works were to 
commence after the finance committee’s approval.  The question of Nairobi’s future 
water supplies was of greater concern at the onset of the 1960s as the country 
underwent a political transitionwhich would mark the end of direct British domination 
in Kenya.  The initial plan was to secure a huge loan (£9,500,000) from the Colonial 
Development Corporation (CDC).  The CDC was hesitant to grant this kind of loan and, 
as such, the city undertook to seek loan money from the International Development 
Authority by applying through the Kenya Government and the Colonial Office.324 The 
period to 1963 witnessed major trunk lines in Nairobi being not only expanded in terms 
of network coverage but also boosted in terms of capacity of flow and carriage by 
replacing the narrow lines with broader diameter mains.  
 
As curtains came down on European colonialism in Africa and, specifically, British 
colonialism in Kenya, it is important to note that this marked the beginning of a new era 
in planning for infrastructure.  The era of the direct influence of Europeans on the 
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physical and social character of infrastructural systems through policies made in the 
colonies and effected through legislation would be replaced by a new era of domination 
through finance agencies like the CDC and the International Development Authority.  
 
4.7  Chapter Conclusion 
The use of LTS as a dominant paradigm in the attempt to understand how technologies 
function within societies especially in urban spaces is greatly limited.  Alternative 
models have been suggested, but the specificities of the process of appropriation call for 
more inclusive approaches.  Nairobi’s gradual growth from a railway outpost to the 
regional commercial and the military headquarters of the WWII period offers a lot of 
understanding of the role of technologies and technologyuse.  The administrative and 
political shifts fromprotectorate to colony were instrumental in locating the dynamism 
embedded in infrastructure systems as political entities.  The first two decades of the 
inception of the British colonial rule in Kenya is argued to have seen a socially 
fragmented space, guided by what was believed to be a system of securing public 
health.  Infrastructural expansion centrifugally progressed either from the railway 
quarters or the CBD, where the colonial authority had pitched tent.  But the colonial 
status from 1920 marked an era of increased tensions along racial lines, fuelled by the 
settler and Indian question.  The stage waslaid and it is within this period of rife racial 
suspicion that Nairobi’s water and sanitation system witnessed expansive growth, 
enhanced by its monopoly and the initial concrete efforts made at urban planning at the 
time.  Inspired by LTS thinking and the reproduction of the ‘network city’ ideal, 
centralized administrative structures and the management of technical artefacts of water 
and sanitation provision were believed to solve major urban challenges; yet, within the 
colonial context of most Global South cities, the irony of implementation and adoption 
of LTSs is the social differentiation.  
 
Using the example of the Indian bazaar, Murunga indicates that the attempt to institute 
white supremacy in Nairobi failed as a result of several factors, on top of which was the 
cosmopolitan nature of the bazaar and perhaps the political agitation of the 1920s. 
Either way, business-inclined settlers demanded a system of town planning that was 
class based rather than racially divided.325 As Njohnotes, the colonial urban designers 
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were not subtle in advocating for racial residential segregation326 and building codes 
were defined clearly based on the European standards of housing and living.  This 
means that European working class people in the colonies were also excluded from 
such areas.  Eastleigh legally remained ‘Indians only’ settlement but in reality housed 
the highly competitive Somalis, Asiatic communities, as well as European middleclass 
settlers.  The colonial enterpriseto differentiate society, therefore, did not achieve much 
as settlement patterns were determined by a plethora of factors.  This instead 
reproduced either a collage landscape or several urban mosaics that remained distinct 
both in character and in terms of the technologies of procuring water and sanitation 
services.  Off-grid locations like Kibera exhibited highly hybridized mechanisms of 
provisioning. As users, the residents of Nairobi maintained their dynamism, 
creativityand flexibility as they interacted with bottom-up approaches to supply, as well 
as conservative European ‘modernist’ ideals of provisioning, planning and urban 
morphology.  It is this complementary stature that must be seen as representing the 
character of Global South cities.  Both state or large organizations’ efforts and the ‘do it 
yourself’ or bottom-linked approaches must be seen as operating alongside each other 
as a means of adopting, adapting, improvising, hybridizingand generally appropriating 
modalities of provision as reproduced at the interfaces of the old and the new, the 
indigene and modernist, or the local and ‘migrant’ technology.  
 
By operating on shoestring budgets, colonial authorities concentrated infrastructural 
development in the white-dominated areas as a way of enhancing  ‘European good 
lifestyles’. Except for government institutions, individuals had to apply for 
connectivity, but the cost of connection from the mains remained solely on the 
interested client.  The ‘willing seller willing buyer’ approach, though not the main 
consideration throughout, meant that the socio-economic environment was a key 
determinant in the production of spatially dichotomized cities.  Infrastructures acted as 
reinforcers of this division in an unintended manner but in a consciously racially 
divided environment.  It is their accessibility through a large centralized network that 
plugs some into the grid and, at the same time,leaves the majority off the grid on 
economic terms.  The infrastructure finance system supported by loans prompted the 
authorities to develop a cost-recovery component to access and provision. Documents 
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of application to the Colonial Development Commission (CDC) that funded and 
endorsed most projects financially were debated on the question of financial soundness 
in terms of the viability of the loan schemes.  Colonies independently existed in terms 
of raising their own revenue for sustenance.  Infrastructural projects undertaken along 
the popular LTS model must be interpreted as investments lacking universalization as 
an end goal.  
 
Finally, the over-emphasis on water provision and limited planning for sanitation 
increased the level of fragmentation.  This in itself exposed the nascent city to high 
levels of pollution of surface water as well as underground sources.  The preference to 
use septic tanks and cesspools amongst the relatively affluent and pit latrines in poor 
neighbourhoods meant a high level of seepage for a city that instrumentally relied on 
boreholes to anchor its supply system.  The great potential that lay in rainwater 
harvesting and the failure to capitalize on it remain the most surprising element in 
planning for Nairobi despite the acute shortage that characterizes the city from its 
inception.  In acknowledging that technologies must be contextually located and 
analysed as non-passive entities, what prospects would independence and post colonial 
ideologies hold in terms of water and sanitary systems for Nairobi? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
INDEPENDENCE, STATE FORMATION AND THE HIGH MODERNIST AGENDA: THE 
WATER AND SANITATION ‘GEOSCAPE’ IN POSTCOLONIAL NAIROBI, 1963 TO 1978 
 
5.1  The Dawn of Uhuru and the Trajectory of Independence 
In tandem with the over-riding assertion that technological systems lack neutrality and 
that they are conceived within a contested milieu that sees them emerge as socio-
constructs, technological artefacts have to be located right at the core of the socio-
economic and political junction that defines a country’s economic and political paths. 
Just as the economics and politics of a state are the flipsides of the same coin, so is 
technology the ambivalent force that mediates and negotiates the end goal of a political 
regime’s public policy.  This in itself is not to bestow enormous determining 
capabilities to technology, as argued in some of the STS literature.  It is merely an 
acknowledgement of the centrality of technology irrespective of its sophistication and 
size in aiding society attain their livelihoods within the respective facets that represent 
the totality of their life.  If we are to operate on the premise that colonial policy 
intertwined with infrastructural provision in a manner that ordered society differently 
and that users, especially those on the fringes of the large technological systems that 
were adopted under the cover of promoting civilization, in their day-to-day survival 
appropriate technology differently, then we must also undertake to analyse the 
dynamics of technology in infrastructure provision, in this case, water and sanitation, 
within the realm of the emerging political state, as juxtaposed on the promise of uhuru 
(independence).  
 
To discern the dictates of the state versus its public service provisioning agenda, its 
foundations have to be unmasked.  The nature and character of the political economy 
have to be discussed alongside the technological agency in provision.  After more than 
four decades of British colonialism, the decolonization process gathered momentum in 
the post-WWII period.327 African nationalism was on the rise, pursuing more political 
rights than the welfare associations of the interwar period that had focused on improved 
wellbeing and equality.  The colonial state in Kenya was politically constituted to serve 
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the minority interests and economically meet the needs of the metropole.  Several 
policies were drafted and even though they were disrupted by global events like World 
War I (1914 to 1918), the great depression (1929 to 1934), World War II (1939 to 
1945) and the post war era,328 their implementation was further compounded by a series 
of contradictions with which the colonial state had to cope, rarely with any success.329 
A good example of these contradictions is the clash of interests between the 
metropolitan capitalists and the colonial state in Kenya.330 In cases where the local 
interests seemed to be clashing with those of the metropolitan financial bigwigs and 
Westminster technocrats, the British merchants and financiers always had their way if 
not their say.  This was no surprise since the colonies were from the beginning designed 
and engineered to serve the metropole in a parasitic and imperialist economic and 
political relationship.  With a Euro-Christian capitalist work ethic created through 
European missionary education, the emergent African elites of the post war period 
served the colonial state and economy as semi-skilled workers, clerksand chiefs.331 
 
Though the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940 and its 
expansion in 1945 signalled an increased interest by the colonialists to promote the 
colonies and improve the welfare of the indigenous communities, historians D.A. Low 
and John Lonsdale equate the post-war period to European conquest and occupation in 
the late nineteenth century. 332  Their assertion results from the premise of imperial 
investment after World War II tremendously increasing and seemingly exhibiting ‘a 
second colonial occupation’.333 This time the justification was that increased investment 
aimed at bringing efficiency that would raise African production, protect African land 
from erosion and Africans themselves from disease, would be in search of the 
democratic support without which no project, however expert, could be implemented.334 
However, this efficiency remained elusive, as it was never an end in itself.335 Instead, 
what was institutionalized was a paternalistic system that would ensure continued 
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European presence in Kenya even after independence through a neo-colonial economic 
system.  As Mwaura observes, independence was not granted to colonial territories out 
of a romantic vision of the equality of peoples.336 It was simply the realization that 
capitalism in the 20th century no longer required colonialism to serve its purposes and 
that the political and military costs of maintaining colonialism were both high and 
unnecessary; there were other, cheaper methods of maintaining economic dominance.337 
 
An understanding of the dynamics that informed the emerging independent states is key 
in providing a basis on which we can attain a relatively instructive and insightful 
breakdown of the nature of and the technological underpinnings of infrastructure 
provision in the post-colony, in this case, water and sanitation for Nairobi.  The history 
of technology has already revealed to us that technology is neither neutral nor passively 
interactive with both human and non-human components of society.  Hence, the events 
that politically and economically characterized Kenya by 1963 must be unpackaged to 
provide a backdrop against which we can attempt to map out an inclusive history of 
water and sanitation in terms of technologies of provision, both in their ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
forms.  How was the new state politically constituted in its urban set-up, specifically 
Nairobi?  What was the inter-play between politics and livelihood provisioning in the 
nascent state under the first independent regime?  What did the ‘exit’ of the colonial 
regime imply for Nairobi, especially for the water and sanitary landscape?  The gaining 
of independence carried with it the promise of egalitarianism and a rejuvenated African 
character away from the colonial patrimonial state.  
 
Though decolonization had sought to ensure that power to self-govern would be passed 
over to the local community through its brand of political leaders, one can sceptically 
state that perhaps in retrospect, independence was tacitly granted by the colonialist 
early enough without ensuring the existence of strong technical manpower base.  This 
would leave the state highly vulnerable torelying on the colonial appendages in form of 
socio-economic and political legacies in total.  How did this shape the character of the 
state and its political capital, Nairobi? 
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While independence would see Nairobi further established as the political and 
economic capital of Kenya, the jubilation with which self-rule had been received had to 
be replaced by planning for critical infrastructure on the principle of egalitarianism. 
However, the infant state found itself trapped in the Cold War web in terms of 
governance and socio-economic planning.  For nascent states like the Kenya of 1963, 
this challenge was compounded by the shortage of local expertise to undertake such 
projects.  The system of education employed by Europeans in their colonies had been 
segregative in nature as it only trained Africans to be artisans and clerks.  For a very 
long time into the independence period, Kenya and specifically the City Council of 
Nairobi would continue relying on European engineers. 
 
In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon talks of the alienation of the black people as a result 
of colonial subjugation.338 However, on a much specific scope, this was an indictment 
of the crop of leaders and the fast rising petty bourgeoisie that emerged at independence 
across Africa, with Kenya not being an exception.  Independence for Kenya did not 
mark any purposeful breakaway from the colonial practices of its immediate past.  The 
Nairobi City Council (NCC) witnessed a change of guard in its hierarchy but remained 
deeply rooted in its past in terms of the way city planning and management were 
envisioned.  The elitist leadership that inherited the reins of power from the colonial 
state presided over a city spatially segregated by class rather than race, the latter of 
which in some respects had informed colonial infrastructure planning and spatial 
appropriation.  The leadership that emerged looked more eager to occupy the 
prestigious spaces left vacant by departing colonialists.  
 
Furthermore, the Cold War scenario that engulfed the post-World War II world 
witnessed sharp ideological differences in the ruling party based on service provision 
and general governance.  The emergence of two rival camps, ideologically split on how 
best to approach development issues and deliver on the promise of independence, 
created an aura of conflict, suspicionand patronage at the national level, which 
sometimes created inertia at the lower echelons of governance, including the Nairobi 
City Council (NCC), which managed water and sanitation for Nairobi.  With the die 
cast on the politics of the immediate independence Kenya, as defined by sharp 
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ideological differences and emergence of a bourgeois political class in an environment 
heavily loaded with the expectations of the masses, it is necessary to first understand 
the developmentalist agenda of the government then within the prism of the high 
modernism debate.  Certain infrastructures were highly favoured and popularized 
foroffering the city and the country at large takeoff alongside the rest of the globe, 
following the path of the ‘celebrated’ West.  
 
5.2  The Paradox of Independence and Nairobi Water/Sanitation InfrastructureDevelopment: 
Positioning Technology and the ‘High Modernist’ Debate 
As highlighted earlier, post-World War II colonial control was marked by a tacit 
reformist agenda that was repackaged with renewed vigour perhaps to revitalise the 
reconstruction of ravaged and dilapidated British economy from the devastation of war. 
For Tischler, British post-war developmentalism was marked by the significantly 
increased provision of development funds, personneland technical assistance. 
Retrospectively, this entailed a ‘reinvigoration and re-legitimisation of the empire’ 
within the dictates of the Atlantic Charter339 in the short term and forging stronger 
‘dependency ties’ in the long term.340  To a greater extent, rather than the colonial 
arrangement that was directly paternalistic to the colonies, the post-war period ushered 
in international financial agencies like the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) as key players 
in the process of driving for internationalized development.  One of the key 
achievements of this shift was the detachment of north-south intervention from the 
colonial networks. 341  In terms of practicability, these new instruments of imperial 
control restructured the arena through the enormous power mediated through global 
market forces as a means of stepping into the ‘utopic future’.  
 
For the colonial and international modernizers, a technocratic rhetoric in line with their 
confidence in scientific planning became the clarion call. 342  The so-called ‘under-
                                                 
339 The Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration released by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill on August 14, 1941, following a meeting of the two heads of state in Newfoundland. The Atlantic 
Charter provided a broad statement of U.S. and British war aims but key its seemingly contradictory stance on European 
imperialism across the globe. 
340 See Tischler(2013). 
341 Cooper and Packard (1997). 
342 Tischler (2013). 
  
141  
developed’ world had no choice other than to pursue development in all its spheres 
through scientification and technological leapfrogging.  The Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) became a prototype worth replicating across the upcoming economies 
in the world.343The international consultants, through their paymasters who constituted 
the international development and financial agencies, doubled their effort in studying 
the Tennessee model and making recommendations on the potential of other nations to 
adopt and imitate.  While it would be approached with some relativity that factored in 
the other unique militating factors on the specifics of geopolitical location, the 
developmentalist agenda centred on large technological projects.  This sometimes 
translated into Dirk van Laak’s ‘white elephants.’344For cities like Nairobi which faced 
critical water shortages and an embarrassingly inadequate sanitary system, all in the 
face of a booming population growth and an economy desperate for expansion, huge 
technological systems of water abstraction within catchment areas miles away through 
dam constructionwere seen as the most secure for posterity.  Solutions to urban and 
national crisis were believed to derive remedies from without rather than from within 
despite all the political rhetoric on Africanisation and indigenisation.  In the true spirit 
of the hubris that characterized most of the post-war period for most colonies of the 
British, scientisation also became manifest in the Colonial Office (CO), where the civil 
servant who ‘knew his natives’ was gradually replaced by the technical expert, 
specialising in particular subject areas, such as health, agriculture or medicine.345 
 
However, how many of the indigenes would take up this new tag of expert organiser 
that was ubiquitously modelled along ‘grandeur’ scientific thinking as a panacea to the 
myriad day-to-day livelihood challenges in the race towards international capital 
homogenization? Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful (1973) analogy found no resonance 
with the post Second World War developmental thinking.  High modernist ideals with 
science and the machine that reproduced large projects, be they in water or on land and 
sanitation infrastructure for urban societies and rural agricultural economies, ruled that 
policy formulation for most states beengineered and supervised under the auspices of 
international financiers and multinational corporations headquartered in London, New 
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York, Brussels and Leningrad, amongst many other industrial and financial capitals of 
the West.  The role played by these institutions as instruments of neo-colonialism was 
central not only in shaping the character of the emerging states but also in determining 
their political fabric in a volatile cold war age driven by two contrasting ideologies.  
 
Tischler, in focussing on the enormous Kariba Dam project along the Zambesi River, 
which pits modern day Zambia and Zimbabwe, vividly paints a clear picture of how 
development was conceived and technology in its largess granted a deterministic 
potential to drive emerging economies to unrealized greatness: 
 
The imperative of development implied that all 
societies had to break radically with ‘tradition’ and 
‘backwardness’ in order to enter ‘modernity’. If the 
poorer (i.e. underdeveloped) countries did not 
successfully adapt, they were doomed to collapse.346 
 
In hindsight, Tischler, rather than being a critic of this notion of gigantic pursuits that 
characterized the post-1945 world, comes across as either a high modernist or a 
sympathiser of high modernism.  In referring to positivists of high modernism, she 
states that while this dichotomous approach of ‘traditionalism’ equalling economic 
doom and ‘modernism’ being equivalent to development can be dismissed as arrogant 
and oppressive, it also has empowering effects.  Here, development has a ‘transitive’ 
meaning, since differences between societies are framed in terms of quantity, not 
substance, and poorer countries can catch up with a prosperous West, whose experience 
help accelerate the transition process.347As the German-born Australian economist, 
Heinz Wolfgang Arndt, notes, the idea of development as ‘everyman’s road to 
utopia’ 348  needs to be set against the cultural essentialism of indirect rule or 
trusteeship. 349 Cooper and Packard summarize the ambitious, positivist and overt 
optimism bestowed on the thinking of mid-20th century modernists as follows: 
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One cannot appreciate the power of the development 
idea without realizing that the possibility that modern 
life and improved living standards could be open to 
all, regardless of race or history of colonial 
subjugation, was in the 1950s a liberating possibility, 
eagerly seized by many people in the colonies.350 
 
By envisioning a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to 
improve the human condition,351high modernism packaged in large-scale technological 
projects was expected to deliver predictable results.  The ‘avant-garde’ undertakings 
represented illusionary progress.  The repackaging of the European order and setting the 
former colonies in a rat race became the undoing for most of the infant states. 
 
For political figures like Lenin, the motivation to construct large technical systems was 
not only to jumpstart a forward march of history, but also to prevent any backslide by 
counter-revolutions. 352  Borrowing from Langdon Winner’s political debate on 
technologies,353 this would imply that political regimes especially of an autocratic kind 
see certain technologies as operating within specific political milieu for control and 
stability in governance.  But to believe that the ‘strong-man’ rule that emerged in most 
former colonies at independence encompassed deliberate decisions to institute certain 
technologies as political instruments of stability and control would in itself be to over-
stretch the imagination.  The high modernist ideology to a greater extent stemmed from 
the West and was anchored in the former global imperialist web.  Global South capitals 
after several years of colonial rational planning failed to disentangle themselves from 
the global network mired in the exploitation of the periphery and the development 
agenda of post-independence remained an off shoot of high modernism planning to be 
run by the West for the West.  As such, what would be the technological domino effect 
for emerging independent cities like Nairobi? 
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Borrowing from James Scott’s Seeing like a State (1998), David Nilsson affirms that in 
the course of transforming the nineteenth century city, state actors and urban planners 
reduced complexity by simplifying, as well as standardizing, social and physical 
structures in order to make them legible and controllable.354 However, these conscious 
approaches prescribed by high modernist thinkers and practitioners ignored the 
multifaceted nature of things.  They also ignored the viewthat it is the aspirations 
manifesting at the interstice of deployment and usage that offer utility to the respective 
process of appropriating things and ideas.  Granted powers to order or reorder, technical 
artefacts are underpinned by political ramifications.  What the proponents of modernism 
through large scale technological endeavours did not realise is that their externalist 
development agenda, as espoused by under-development and neo-colonialist 
scholarship, served well as a recipe for exploitation of the periphery by the centre.  
 
In contrast to the expected grand march forward, most of the projects undertaken 
metamorphosed into ‘white elephants’ that choked the emerging economies into debt 
crisis by virtue of the heavy investments factored in through loan agreements. The 
environment of total disregard for gradual processes of development and the potential 
for invention and innovation at a small scale served perfectly to alienate the majority of 
the citizenry in nascent polities like Kenya, which was struggling to shake off the 
shackles of more than six decades of European colonialism. In its place, it promoted 
class differentiation as the minority elite accumulated wealth and the masses were 
further thrown to the periphery on their own means.  The envisaged dream of 
independence either aborted immediately or lacked a local basis it would have thrived 
on, supported by more bottom-linked technological approaches, especially in the 
provision of basic services like water and sanitation.  Rather than being accommodative, 
which would have led to an opportunity for hybridity between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ or 
‘big’ and ‘small’ for these countries with entangled histories, the modernisation rhetoric 
provided a wrong footing for a society that had been promised egalitarianism and the 
splendour of self-rule.  
 
Perhaps high modernism failed to acknowledge the multiplicity of actors within a 
system and unilaterally bequeathed science, as understood in the West, with the 
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unquestionable ability to determine the future of society along a predetermined path. 
High modernism is believed to have implied the rejection of the past as a model to 
improve upon and a desire to make a completely fresh start.  The more utopianthe high 
modernism, the more thoroughgoing its implied critique of the existing society.355In the 
break from the old, the machine acquired almost an idolised status as a non-human 
actor in production without paying attention to the nature of the interactive process that 
is shrouded with cultural and political underpinnings.  It is a case of either the machine 
having been humanised to disregard human agency in the making of history or high 
modernism ideology having trusted the engineer, technocrat, shrewd business person or 
autocratic administrator, with the ultimate role of determining the course of history 
through the planning and implementation of grandiose futuristic plans.  By seeing 
infrastructures and technological artefacts as apolitical, modernist scholarship and 
implementers of LTSs would see most projects either come to an outright dead end or 
precipitate a perpetual crisis that engulfed cities like Nairobi.  
 
In the unpacking of the concept of technological determinism and understanding the 
push factors behind high modernist thinking, Rosalind Williams acknowledges that 
indeed fate can be engineered and that we should look at those who choose to invest in 
large, complex technologies, and consider that they may do so quite deliberately in 
order to create technological determinism.356 After independence, most states lacked the 
where withal to chart their own courses.  Yet, having undergone more than several 
decades of colonial domination and cultural imperialism, the indigenous was either 
rebuked as ‘backward’ or non-urban.  Colonialists deliberately chose to see the 
indigenes in the city as ‘detribalized’ communities.  While ‘detribalized’ would have 
mostly meant an urbanite society that had broken ties with the rural lifestyle, it was 
tacitly settled on as a means of culturally colonising the Africans to shedtheir own 
identities and view themselves as ‘modern and civilised’.  
 
One of the ardent visionaries of a high modernist city is Le Corbusier. City planning 
until the 1960s had been dominated by a functionalist approach that mapped out 
different zones within the city according to their respective functions, for example, 
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government offices, entertainment spots, residences and industrial zones.  Nairobi, from 
the 1960s to date has exhibited firm imprints of this functional segregation approach. 
However, on a global scale, Le Corbusier drew the contrasts between the existing city, 
which is a product of historical chance, and the city of the future, which would be 
consciously designed from start to finish following scientific principles. 357 The Le 
Corbusian high modernist city was designed with strict scientific stipulation of the 
human needs as a workshop for production.  He deplored both the conditions of the 
slums and people they had created.358 If high modernism abhorred ‘the deplorable’ in 
its futuristic city, then it reinforced the notion of it being basically a utopic pursuit that 
was so much divorced from the reality of the city, whether North or South.  All in all, 
the emergence of ‘rational planning’ shaped the nature of most cities in the post-war 
era.  Although, despite the redrawing of master plans in the former colonies, little 
translated into actual planning as colonial legacies persisted to continue shaping the 
cities.  
 
The city in itself tailormade within principles of high modernism which are non-
accommodative to indigenous means modes of living, yet its creation continues to 
represent a differential spatial and social systems of centre versus periphery, serviced 
versus unserviced and planned versus unplanned settlements.  As Freund indicates, the 
dual city in Africa is a widespread phenomenon necessitated by various historical and 
political factors in the face of European hegemonization.359 If high modernism and 
capitalism are bedfellows, then social differentiation is an unavoidable imprint on the 
city.  The pursuit of wealth accumulation by a few thrives on the poor masses for whom 
the city implies survival for the fittest in Darwinian terms.  
 
The colonialists had granted ‘flag independence’ to their former colonies but reinforced 
the patrimonialist system that ensured their eternal presence in the economic and 
political arena of such states.  The ‘puppet governments’ that emerged in the former 
colonial capitals continued to be operated like marionettes as global financial and 
development corporations did the bidding. How did the entry of the Colonial 
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Development Bank and IBRD into the water and sanitation sector financing for Nairobi 
shape the technospace in terms of deployment, access and power relations in the 
infrastructural domain?  Faced with the grandeur that has cost implications, how did the 
periphery reproduce itself technologically to attain water and sanitation services?  What 
kind of overlaps and intersections can be discerned within the intricate history of 
technology for most Global South cities like Nairobi?  While these are questions from 
which complex narratives can be anticipated, the history of technology itself is expected 
to capture every case as unique yet entangled in the larger scope of colonial and 
postcolonial histories.  It becomes imperative to historically interrogate Nairobi in 
terms of its water and sanitary endeavour as it chased its modernist dream, especially in 
the first two decades after independence. 
 
In White Elephants, Dirk van Laak observes that the development of technologies has 
always adhered to the delusions of grandeur and greatness that characterises 
engineering as a whole.360He asserts that the development of power plants and citywide 
electricity networks, as would be the modus operandi for all other 
infrastructuralsystems, are paradigmatic examples of the expansion of ‘large 
technological systems’.  Many of them were initially designed to serve only a few 
downtown office blocks but as soon as demand was awakened, aggressive plans were 
made for much more grandiose schemes.361 However, unlike the West, where these 
schemes ended up being extrapolated to cover and re-engineer what some have referred 
to as ‘a network city’, in the Global South, which was reeling from European imperial 
control, the pattern of development seemed to be determined by economic 
considerations many times equated to race differentiation, rather than their own nature, 
through what the father of LTS, Thomas P. Hughes, termed as ‘technological 
momentum’. 362  Large-scale technological systems reshaped city planning as they 
demanded a long-range vision on the part of municipal officials for population 
forecasting, technical network design and infrastructural financing. 
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Despite the high modernist thinking, there are urban planners like Jacobs who see the 
city as an inclusive space that has the capability of providing something for everybody, 
only when they are created by everybody. 363  In contrast to the exclusivity that 
characterizes the high modernist city, counter paradigms as propagated by planners of 
Jacobs’ ilk consciously make room for the unexpected, small, informal, and even non-
productive human activities that constitute the vitality of the ‘lived city’. 364 
Furthermore, despite the attempts by urban planners at designing and stabilizing the 
city, it escapes their grasp; it is always being reinvented and inflected by its 
inhabitants.365 The city as an organic space remains alive to the forces of change and 
transformation engineered by both its human and non-human components.  Colonial 
baggage dating back to 1899 and the burden of remaking itself into a ‘modern’ capital 
faced Nairobi in 1963.  With a burgeoning population eager to share in the allure of 
urbanization and an economy devoid of large investment capital, what was the nature of 
the water and sanitation infrastructural planning?  What was the political climate and 
how did it shape technological developments in the social provision sector, of which 
water and sanitation constitute the core? 
 
5.3  Independence, Technology and the Universalization of Water/Sanitation Infrastructure for 
Nairobi 
5.3.1  The Political Landscape: Informing provision 
On 12 December 1963, Kenya got political independence from its colonial master, 
Britain.  The struggle for independence and constitutional reforms that had preceded 
independence had been on the premise of egalitarianism, good governance and great 
economic growth based on functioning infrastructural systems.  The slow but steady 
reforms necessitated by the lessons and aftermath of the Second World War had seen 
Nairobi make headway towards improving service provision forthe African-settled 
areas.  The housing schemes established in the late 1940s into the 1950s had only 
catered for a fraction of the rising number of Africans trudging into the city of Nairobi 
in search of off-farm employment.  Most of the people who settled in the new 
middleclass residential estates were drawn from the bulk of low and middle cadre 
colonial employees, who were basically clerks, meter-readersand office messengers. 
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The rest of the African population was located on the fringes of the city, thriving within 
non-serviced or underserviced spaces.  The movement for political independence 
promised to reverse this reality and redraft the socio-economic landscape of the entire 
country, Nairobi included.  The advent of independence as a result guaranteed people 
freedom of movement, which spurred a high rate of rural-urban migration.366 
 
This post-World War II ‘urbanization boom’ spelt a different picture for each social 
group in Nairobi.  As the fast rising petty bourgeoisie replaced the departed Europeans 
in exclusively planned high-end zones, the high number of unskilled or semiskilled 
people trickling into Nairobi compounded the housing problem. Thiswas directly 
related to the sanitation and water infrastructure supply as these immigrants occupied 
what looked like abandoned, unoccupied or less habitable enclaves.  The early 1960s 
were basically transition years, which presented unique challenges, not only to the 
national leadership but also to the authorities in the capital city, Nairobi.  The fact that 
most of the expertise needed for municipal works was still entirely comprised of former 
colonial officers of British descent made it difficultto initiate any major shift in city 
infrastructural planning, management and general governance to capture the ideals of 
uhuru,as promised by the nationalists. 
 
The political climate around the mid-sixtiesbecame highly polarized as those who 
characterized themselves as socialists became more and more disillusioned.  The first 
president, Jomo Kenyatta, quickly moved in to amend the independence constitution. 
He established a highly centralized system of governance, away from the 
constitutionally envisioned federal system that was otherwise referred to locally as 
themajimbo367  system.  Understanding this shift in governance of the new state is 
critical in attempting to understand the operations of NCC as a major water and 
sanitation undertaker for Nairobi.  Actions of historical magnitude by people, especially 
those in positions of authority, and outcomes of historical relevance must be interpreted 
within a broader scope of not only wanting to answer the why and how questions, but 
also doing it in connection with the outward forces of the time in context.  To be able to 
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explore the meaning, effectand use of various technologies in providing water and 
sanitation in post-independence Nairobi, the socio-economic and political profile of the 
country at large and the city in particular must be unpacked, if only at a glance.  Was 
the consolidation of power by the Kenyatta regime towards an oligarchy a conscious 
scheme to enhance autocracy that the high modernist goal depended on for 
achievement? Apart from gaining more control on determining the future path for 
Nairobi as independent Kenya’s capital, the exercise of power informed the debate on 
the position of providing for the urban underclass.  How did the indigene fit in the new 
city with little disengagement from the colonial practice in city administration?  
 
Kenya was one of the most important Cold War frontiers in East and Central Africa 
because of its geographic and strategic position.  Concomittantly, the governance and 
economic models through which technologies were conceived were impacted on by the 
dynamics of the war.  The international politics of the Cold War era spilled into the core 
of Kenya’s political structure.  It pitted those who seemed to be identified as capitalists 
and rent-seekers against those who were branded as radicalists-cum-socialists, 
sympathetic to the USSR.  The radicalists led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Bildad 
Kaggia argued for the government to play a socialist role in service provision by 
prioritizing the poor.  They called for heavy investment in social welfare and general 
improvement of livelihoods.368 The president himself had identified disease, povertyand 
ignorance as the key evils that afflicted the country.  Fighting disease and poverty 
amongst the rising urban population in Nairobi meant adopting all-encompassing 
approaches to the water and sanitation crisis that had been made complex by the 
prevailing housing shortage and skewed planning ideals.  Yet, the same government 
that had prioritized combating pestilence continued to exhibit a benign neglect of 
informal spaces cutting across Nairobi. 
 
Be it as it may, the government responded to the critics of its neo-colonialist and 
capitalist tendencies by producing a social, economic and political blueprint, Sessional 
paper No. 10 of 1965, titled, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in 
Kenya. 369 In this blueprint waswhat popularly came to be known as the harambee 
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philosophy.  Harambee was adopted and popularized by the autocratic leadership of the 
time to ‘imply pooling together for development’.  Social economic growth was to be 
realized through joint efforts or partnerships in a semblance of a communitarian system, 
believed to be embedded deeply in the African social structure.  In a wider perspective, 
this implied self-help as an integral part of provisioning services.  While this would be 
the norm in the informal areas, prompting Hake to characterize Nairobi as a ‘Self-help 
City’,370 the greatest impact in terms of development through the harambee system was 
recorded in the countryside rather than the cities, which sought to develop along 
modernist ideals. 
 
5.3.2  A Blueprint for Development and its Implication for Technology 
The Kenya blueprint for social, economicand political development, Sessional Paper 
No. 10 of 1965, came on the heels of a very divided political leadership and the waning 
optimism that had greeted independence two years earlier.  The government, through 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development,  felt compelled to produce a 
blueprint or a policystatement that would not only provide a socio-economic road map 
to prosperity but would re-engineer the greater ideology to define the country’s political 
fabric.  The state was entrenching capitalism to an alarming extent, leaving the masses 
disillusioned and dispossessed, with the promises of uhuru also turning into a 
smokescreen.  From the president’s statement in the document’s preamble, it was clear 
that Kenya was on a path of attempting to plug its economy into the global arena by 
seeking new markets and new areas of technical support and trade co-operation in the 
world.  This linked well with the popular modernization rhetoric at the time.  The so-
called Africanisation of the economy and public service was expected to be clearly spelt 
out in the document.  
 
However, while it appeared on paper, it was not clearly articulated in attainable goals. 
Instead, the contradiction was clear as East is to West.  All it seemed to imply was the 
filling of public service positions formerly held by Europeans with an indigenous labor 
force.  The document failed to emphasize and highlight what African socialism and 
Africanisation meant in terms of bridging the incoming knowledge and the indigenous 
expertise, especially in terms of technical capabilities in small-scale industrial 
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production and service provision sector.  This was despite the acknowledgement in the 
document that the nation’s work force remained largely uneducated, untrained, 
inexperienced and unrewarded by the growth of the economy.  
 
Much as the general public and the socialist wing of the government expected this 
blueprint to mark a departure from the stubborn formerly colonial exploitative 
arrangement and organization of all spheres of life, the document sought to explain the 
dilemma the country only in terms of development.  Compelled by external pressure, it 
was almost impossible to disengage from the former colonial ties and the need to 
pursue development as defined and supported by the major powers of the West.  It 
stated: 
Kenya is in a period of multiple transition set in motion 
by the attainment of independence.  We are in transition 
from a subsistence to a monetary economy, from an 
economic dependence on agriculture to a more balanced 
growth, from a development of natural resources for 
others to a development of human and natural resources 
for the benefit of the people of Kenya.  The progress 
wanted cannot be easily won and it cannot be achieved 
by reverting to pre-colonial conditions. The best of 
Kenya’s African social heritage and colonial economic 
legacy must be re-organized and mobilized for a 
concerted, carefully planned attack on poverty, disease 
and the lack of education in order to achieve social 
justice, human dignity and economic welfare for all.371 
 
Despite being expected to emphasize the role of the indigene in building the human 
and material resources for a vibrant economy, especially for the urban populace, the 
government clearly believed in an economy organized along the colonial capitalist 
ideals, as demonstrated in the above excerpt.  The policy paper further stated that 
Kenya needed to avoid making development dependent on a satellite relationship with 
any other country or group of countries, yet the high modernist agenda especially for 
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urban growth remained wired into the western ideals of city planning.  To qualify the 
close ties to the western developmentalist agenda, independence was singled out as not 
implying isolationism. ‘Non-alignment’ as the major foreign policy was stated to 
connote a willingness to borrow technological knowledge and proven economic 
methods from any country.  
 
Further, Kenya anticipated seeking and accepting technical and financial assistance 
from any source without strings.  The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the UN were singled out as permissible partners in 
development.  As discussed earlier, these institutions were in themselves citadels of 
high modernist planning and Kenya remaining perpetually reliant on their support in 
development meant remaining vulnerable.  Growth from below in terms of increased 
per capita incomes and technical capabilities remained a pipe dream in the face of the 
grandeur of western-driven development planning, including water and sanitation 
provision for Nairobi.  As Tischler argues, high modernism’s hubris, the belief in 
calculability and malleability of social, economic and ecological processes, as founded 
within the elevation of scientific knowledge, thrives through the alliances of politicians 
and experts (and facilitated by huge financial corporations) by ignoring local 
specificities. 372  The failure to incorporate the local agency has seen many mega 
projects of high modernist orientation turn into cash cows for politicians or simply 
become  ‘aborted dreams’.  
 
While acknowledging the need for an expanded technical base, this policy paper noted 
in very clear terms that untrained people could not be used as teachers, planners, 
engineers, surgeons, doctors, surveyors, architects, managers and administrators 
without turning growth into decline.  Just as it had become apparent that development 
as envisioned depended heavily on foreign investment, rapid growth would only be 
realized by supplementing the small pool of domestic trained personnel with large 
numbers of skilled people borrowed from abroad.  It was no surprise, therefore, that 
the NCC, which was incharge of most of the basic infrastructure in Nairobi, continued 
to operate and rely heavily on engineers from Europe, specifically Britain, and 
logistical technical work undertaken by foreign consultancy firms, specifically Howard 
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Humphreys and Sons Ltd, an engineering firm that had monopolized all major large 
technological systems undertakings from their actual survey to planning and 
implementation.  By 1965, when this policy paper was being drafted and adopted in 
parliament in record time to show the government’s desperation at defining a 
development roadmap, only 22 hydraulic engineers existed in the government and only 
one was of African descent.373 Seven vacancies were in dire need of being filled and 
the autonomy with which Nairobi City Council was expected to function, especially in 
the sourcing offunds, though seen as positive, complicated the task ahead as the 
council struggled with budgetary limitations and personnel shortages of a critical level.  
 
An interesting twist in the policy paper is its assertion that the country faced a planning 
failure.  Unfortunately, it cited self-help schemes that were expected to harness local 
resources for development as being initiated and promoted without proper coordination 
with the development plan.  Many municipal and even district projects were not 
incorporated in the development plan, it was noted.  Independent solicitation of 
external funds by various ministries, including the NCC, as noted earlier, was faulted 
for the likelihood of reducing the total foreign aid Kenya received.  This fear on the 
side of the emerging autocratic state points towards an obsession of the leadership 
regime with the power not only to centralize development but also to have control over 
external funding.  More autonomy would have provided a window for locally defined 
modes of development, especially for the ‘self-help’ schemes that were expected to be 
a bottom-linked approach to planning, implementation and management.  For the 
highly controlled urban spaces, there was little room for local participation within the 
official sphere, hence the characterization of all local-based efforts be they in trade, 
industry, or land tenure and provision as informal and bordering on criminality. 
 
The assessment of this blueprint leaves a lot of questions unanswered in terms of it 
been flaunted as a local approach to development. The African initiative and 
independent path it sought to espouse was a mere public relations exercise.  This is 
because despite the emphasis on the need for autonomy of state, the policy paper put it 
in clear terms that rapid growth remained hinged on external funding and an external 
manpower resource.  The external appendage in management and technical expertise 
                                                 
373GoK(‘Sessional Paper no. 10 1965: On African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya,’ 1965) p.62 
  
155  
would persist.  Is it surprising, therefore, that several decades later, urban laws remain 
the same as during the colonial era and that skills have not evolved to cope with 
contemporary requirements? Did the optimism and high modernist positivism 
expressed in the planning blueprint for Kenya mark a boom or doom for the water and 
sanitation infrastructural development?  While much was expected, little seems to have 
been done in implementing the core tenets, as stated in the policy paper.  
 
5.3.3  Planning for Water and Sanitation for Rapid Growth 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Nairobi had emerged and developed as an 
‘exclusive’ city for the indigenes.  It was also an important administrative capital for 
the colony of Kenya and the Uganda protectorate and a city of choice for a growing 
number of white settlers.  Despite restrictive and repressive laws, it had attracted a 
sizeable number of indigenous communities, which came to constitute the majority in a 
disadvantaged arrangement.  Independence had promised to reverse the colonial state 
and secure gains for the local communities along a path they themselves decided, 
which is what self-rule entailed.  However, as discussed above, the high modernism 
planning ideals came to vehemently define the one and only path to rapid growth as 
defined by the emerging political class of the petty bourgeoisie.  
 
The financing for the water and sanitation infrastructure in Nairobi had heavily relied 
onexternal funding from the Colonial Office in London and the establishment of the 
colonial development fund in 1940 had made it possible to adopt some of the largest 
supply schemes of the time, which included the Nairobi Dam project and the Sasumua 
Dam plant, in addition to the expansion of the historical Kikuyu Springs, to revamp 
their capacity.  As Kenya approached self-governance, Nairobi’s role in the new state 
was obviously going to assume even more importance in the region and the high influx 
of the population in the post-WWII period had plunged the city into a serious water 
crisis.  Increased capacity for the supply system became a necessary undertaking for 
augmenting its supply.  The dire situation demanded that NCC prepare plans for 
expansion and kick start the search for external funding. 
 
IBRD turned down the application for the Nairobi Water Supply scheme (an extension 
on River Kibiru within the Aberdare range) made in October 1961, terming it a scheme 
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for white men, ‘a luxury designed system suitable for the standards of white men in 
Europe rather than majority of the population of Kenya’.  It would not merit 
IBRD/IDA assistance because it would make no significant economic contribution to 
the development of Kenya.  The IDA/IBRD rejection of the scheme in February 1962 
meant a reapplication to the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC).  However, the 
application to CDC was scaled down from the original proposal of £1.35 million to 
£280,000.  The NCC’s proposals were discussed with CDC during the ministerial 
delegation’s visit to London in August 1962.374 
 
In December 1962, CDC agreed to help the Nairobi City Council in financing an 
extension of its water supply.  The scheme, which would increase Nairobi’s water 
supply by 2m g/d, involved the construction of two major and two minor dams for 
diverting water from the Kiburu River into the existing Sasamua Reservoir.  The job 
was to be completed before the end of 1964. The total cost of this scheme was 
£280,000, of which the CDC was lending £125,000, repayable over 10years; the 
balance of the required finance was provided by the Government of West Germany 
and from the City Council’s own resources.  The Kiburu River diversion scheme, 
comprising of two major and two minor intake dams and weirs on the Kiburu River for 
diverting raw water through a steel pipe aqueduct into the Sasamua Reservoir, was 
estimated to take from 15 to 18 months to carry out, and was due for completion by the 
middle of 1964.  The water undertaking was wholly owned by the NCC and was 
operated as a separate accounting unit.  All the sums borrowed for the undertakings 
were secured on the whole of the property and revenues of the NCC paripassu with 
existing NCC loan liabilities.375 
 
The Colonial Development Corporation could not get approval of guarantee from the 
British Treasury for its loan for Kenya.   One of the officers in London who was charged 
with the responsibility of pursuing the matter, an. E.C. Burr indicated: 
 
The Treasury are naturally rather cautious about their 
indirectly guaranteeing that the C.D.C. will get its 
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money back since the C.D.C. is established as a 
statutory corporation that has to take the rough and 
smooth and balance its books one year with 
another.  That is to say that Parliament has hardly 
expected that the Treasury, out of another pocket, 
will help the C.D.C. to balance its books.376 
 
Further correspondence revealed that the Treasury had no objection to funding the 
projects since they had funded the first phase (the construction of Sasumua 1).  This 
funding was to be done on two conditions: that on the basis of the information 
provided in the CDC’s original capital sanction (correspondence document No. E/5 on 
1960/62), the volume of water provided by the further development was more than was 
required at least up to 1970; the CDC suggested that the whole scheme would not have 
been viable between 1964 and 1966 unless the demand for water was to rise by four 
million gallons a day.  In February 1964, the CDC approved the application for a 
capital sanction of £300,000 for the Nairobi City Council’s scheme for heightening the 
Sasamua Dam. 377 
 
NCC proposed to embark upon the heightening of the Sasumua Dam and ancillary 
works (the Sasumua Scheme) at an estimated cost of £ 1,112,000 to augment the 
available water supply of Nairobi and district by four million gallons per day(mgd) to a 
total of 14mgd by about 1966.  This was the second stage of the first phase of an 
overall plan to meet the city’s increasing water requirements.  The first stage, the 
Kiburu Diversion Scheme, was underway by NCC with the assistance of a £125,000 
loan from CDC that had been granted.  The US Agency for International Development 
(AID) agreed to lend the government approximately £761,000 for on-lending to NCC 
for part-financing of the Sasumua Scheme.  It was proposed that £300,000 be lent by 
CDC, and the balance of £51,000 be provided from NCC’s internal resources.  The 
scheme proposed to raise the embankment of the Sasumua dam 26 feet, 6 inches by the 
placement of additional clay and rock fill.  The spillway, valve tower and footbridge 
were also to be raised.  
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The rated capacity of the existing Sasumua treatment works would be increased from 
10 to 14 million gallons per day (mgd) by the installation of additional settling tanks 
and gravity filters.   An additional service reservoir would be constructed in Nairobi 
for increased storage and new 9-inch’ to 18-inch’ distribution trunk mains laid in 
Nairobi to replace existing mains, some of which were only 7 inches’ in diameter and 
had been laid 40 years previously.  The development was to be spread over four years, 
with the dam heightening commencing as soon as it was possible.  The additional 
storage reservoir was to be constructed mainly in 1964 and the renewal of trunk mains 
was to commence in 1964, the whole scheme being due for completion by the end of 
1966.  
 
As was traditional, such investment through aid came with attached conditions.  The 
condition for this funding was that part of it would be tied to the procurement ofUS 
goods and the CDC loan to be used partly in the purchase of British goods.  What this 
meant was that the materials for construction were to be procured from the lending 
institutions’ home countries.  This was the irony of such funding arrangements in 
calculating their net effect in growing local economies.  By virtue of the consultancy 
firms being also western owned and enjoying huge monopolies, as was the case with 
Howard Humphreys and Sons of London, it was not difficult to imagine that over 70% 
of these funds remained abroad.  As a form ofloan funding, it would, thus, land the 
local economies in perpetual debt, especially when these grandiose projects failed to 
achieve their revenue targets to comply and meet the cost-recovery principle.  This 
would see theimpoverished urban class being thrown off the grid as the large 
technological systems of supply continued to connect the middle class that was 
comprised of civil servants and the upper class that was made of up of the ruling class 
and those who owned the means of production in the nascent state that was Kenya.  
The plight of the poor, caught up in the ideological rifts amongst the political class, 
remained rife and rose to almost fever pitch up to 1966, sparking the resignation of the 
then vice-president, JaramogiOginga Odinga.  He was seen as thesymbol of socialism 
and was a key advocate for a welfare state that responded to the needs of the masses. 
Subsequently, his exit and the formation of the first opposition party in 1966, the 
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Kenya Peoples Union (KPU),378 and its subsequent crushing, meant the triumph of 
capitalism as packaged in a highly modernist agenda of development. 
 
The success in suppressing ideological dissent in the upper echelons of power in the 
country meant that the urban underclass was, to a large extent, left to its own means. 
The complexity of their plight resulted more from the government’s indifference 
towards the fast-growing cadre of the urban unemployed and informal sector operators. 
As the central government fought hard to consolidate political power and develop the 
economy, colonial urban governance laws remained mostly intact, to the detriment of 
the poor in informal settlements.  The government continued with the massive slum 
clearance policies of the colonial era.379  Informal areas were seen as an‘eyesore’, 
deserving outright clearance rather than consideration for extension of water and 
sanitation infrastructure.  As rhetorically expressed by one of the strongest proponents 
of high modernism, Le Corbusier, ‘…those who come from the countryside to make 
their future are simply a dead weight on the city and an obstacle, a black clot of 
misery, of a failure, of human garbage?’ The poor were simply unwanted within the 
arrangement of the modern city.  Yet, radical urban planner Jane Jacobs points out that 
while the slum might not have much social capital, what it did was something to build 
on within the realm of change, renewal and invention.380 
 
The indifference with which the city authorities treated the urban low class in Nairobi 
sparked even more questions in relation to the new Kenyan government’s commitment 
to its pledge of improved livelihoods for all, as stated in the socio-political and 
economic planning blue print of 1965.  In retrospect, the government, in partnership 
with the United Nations, sought to cope with the serious problem of urban housing in 
the 1960s.  Their efforts paid off with the establishment of the National Housing 
Corporation (NHC).381 Through the on-siteservice schemes, low cost housing projects 
were undertaken, with the extension of the city’s water supply network and sanitation 
systems that were hybridized either through septic tanks or direct overflow into the 
council’s mains.  However, this resulted in gentrification as the cost-recovery model 
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employed as part of the terms for occupation made the built houses and 
complementary infrastructure systems unaffordable to the urban-poor.  The middle-
income group, mostly consisting of public servants, ended up occupying the houses to 
the predicament of the poor.  Since most informal settlements resulted from 
gentrification, and had developed adjacent to most of these housing projects, it can be 
argued that the proximity to these planned areas provided an avenue for water supply, 
either through illegal tapping into the system or purchasing from households and 
standpipes at these ‘on-site service’ scheme sites.  
 
The notion of exclusive spaces and exclusive infrastructure took shape, not through a 
conscious initiative to push the urban underclass off the grid but as an unintended 
consequence of the capitalist model of economy favoured by the president, Jomo 
Kenyatta, and his loyalists within the highly polarized Cold War atmosphere.  While 
informal settlements developed as a form of self-initiative of urban low-income 
households, the attitude and response of national governments consisted of active 
hostility or benign neglect, adopting measures ranging from passing tough, stringent 
regulations to excluding such settlements from any infrastructural extension plans to 
outright demolition.382 While the Kenyatta regime continued the ‘slum’ eradication 
programme through outright demolition, as had been the case during colonialism, 
Kibera and Mathare, for reasons known to the authorities (perhaps political), remained 
untouched and continued to receive more people, including new entrants and evictees 
from the other informal areas. 
 
In the 1950s, as cited by one of the respondents interviewed, the colonial government 
channelled water to Kibera, but this extended to the Makina area of the settlement 
only; Makina lies within the proximity of the major housing projects and the District 
Commissioner’s office, which is served with pipe water and a functional sewer 
network.  The independence governments, as earlier stated,did not feel obliged to 
provide services, including water, to the Kibera Settlement, which was seen as an 
illegal settlement.  The haphazard construction of houses and the illegal allocation of 
land did not allow for the provision of water.  
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Just as sanitation and the construction of latrines were never a priority of the structure 
(rental houses) owners in Kibera, water supply never featured in their plans.  Shelter 
seemed to be the primary concern of the residents and this left them vulnerable to 
unscrupulous developers.  Water kiosks, standpipesand vendors continued to dominate 
the water supply chain and increased settlements in Kibera opened up to strained 
sanitary situations, with less options for remedial intervention.  According to the field 
interview conducted, the bucket system of emptying the shallow pit latrines thrived but 
it became a challenge to the river supplyas the bucket emptying would take place on 
the riverbanks.383 This was not only a threat to the residents of Kibera settlement 
whose river water usage declined but also to the Nairobi Dam which relied on these 
rivers that traversed through Kibera and other informal settlements for its source. 
 
As for Mathare, the government encouraged the selling of land through land-buying 
companies.  This, in away, helped as a number of companies, throughself-help 
initiatives and the pooling of resources, otherwise identified as the Harambee spirit in 
the government blueprint, managed to undertake not only the building of a shelter for 
its members but also provided water through communal standpipes fora fee.  The land 
buying co-operative societies, as they were known,provided membership through a 
share ownership system and after the purchase of land, they either built and subdivided 
the houses amongst the members or sub-divided the land and left it upto the owner to 
put up structures.  The membership or number of shareholders of the companies varied 
greatly from 3 to 520. In the case of the larger ones, a committee was selected, but the 
smaller ones saw all members join the committee.  Inflated land prices meant that 
purchase by the ‘squatters’ could only be through such companies. This was a classic 
scenario of a bottoms-up approach to development and urban growth. 
 
As non-controlled development sites, people had the autonomy to employ local 
expertise and resources to procure their own livelihoods.  They utilized local building 
materials to put up brick houses with corrugated iron roofs or semi-permanent mud and 
wattle houses.  The corrugated iron roofs were utilized for rainwater harvesting and, 
where streams were available, they were protected to minimize pollution.  The Mathare 
River remained an important source of water for brick-making, washing and other 
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domestic purposes.  As for the groups that could raise enough capital, apart from 
putting up relatively better-designed houses for owner occupancy and rental purposes, 
they were able to lay piped water and make septic tanks and cesspools for sanitation 
purposes.  Standpipes were strategically located at central points in the settlement to 
sell water to residents, for which a price was set using the standard container referred 
to as a debe. This carried close to twenty litres of water cost between 20 and 30 cents.  
 
Images 12: Mathare Development: A case of bottoms-up approaches 
(i) Communal water standpipe 
 
source: Etherton, D.1971 
The photo shows a water dealer (seller) and residents purchasing water from a communal standpipe tap using a ‘debe’—a metal 
container that was adopted as a standard measure in terms of value per capacity.  
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(ii) Sewerlines: construction in progress 
 
Source: Etherton, D.1971 
 
(iii) On-site laying of PVC pipes for water supply 
 
Source :Etherton, D. (1971)  
The photos show a communal approach to developing infrastructure by relying on local initiatives. By organizing into land buying 
companies and enjoying tenure security, the incentive to improve their livelihoods by laying water infrastructures increased. Such 
self-organized approaches shaped and improved access by employing the creativity of members in reproducing locally situated 
technical approaches like communal water standpipes, drainage trenches, shared pit-latrines draining into septic tanks and water 
storage facilities, and roof-water harvesting. 
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In the late sixties, NCC came up with a plan for the redevelopment of the vacant land 
at the western end of the Mathare Valley.  It was proposed that this would avoid some 
of the impediments that had bedevilled the UN-popularized and National Housing 
Corporation-implemented on-site and service schemes.  Though the principles of this 
proposal by NCC were embodied in the council’s ‘site and minimum service’ project, 
the council decided to provide a waterborne sewage system disposal were the plans to 
materialize.384 Apart from the question of public utilities, all the proposals for this plan 
were based on the assumption that security of tenure would be handed to individual 
heads of households.  Except for the schools and other public facilities that were put 
off site, the council was to adopt two housing schemes, namely the ‘Site and Minimum 
Service’, which entailed the construction of 6 room houses on 513 plots measuring10.5 
metres by 12 metres each; and ‘Aided Self-Help’, which would see three roomed 
houses put up on 760 plots, each measuring 7.6 metres by 11.5 metres.  
 
However, as David Nilsson notes, the city engineer’s department had thought that by 
adopting low cost housing schemes involving the use of local materials and design 
requirements, the housing menace would be nipped in the bud.385 But the conflict with 
the Ministry of Housing, in whose docket housing was located, meant another plan was 
shelved.  This case of how the duplication of functions and patronized development 
hindered localized approaches to problem-solving would also affect water provision, 
which was a function of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Natural 
Resources, and later shifted to other ministries that morphed from the parent one.  As 
for sanitation, emphasis continued to be placed on the water supply, without a 
concerted effort to secure the means of getting rid of wastewater.  Sanitation received 
less attention in the prior years, thereby seeing the popularization of either open 
defecation or the use of septic tanks; yet due to water shortages, borehole(s) continued 
to be explored as supplementary supply systems. 
 
Along with the housing problem, it goes without saying that the government, through 
the city department, found themselves trapped in the neo-colonial web due to limited 
resources and the personnel to re-engineer inclusive infrastructure regimes.  As 
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highlighted in the conclusion of the previous chapter (Chapter Four), the exit of direct 
domination by the British colonial masters was replaced withnew forms of control 
through financial institutions that lentexpertise and financial support.  The nature of 
large technical systems as grand investments warranting heavy funding exposed the 
government’s underbelly to the instruments of neo-colonial control.  
 
Despite the highly polarized political climate of the first decade of independence in 
Kenya and the indifference of thegovernment to the underclass of the explosively 
urbanizing Nairobi, the primacy of expanding the water networks to deal with the 
perpetual shortage and mechanisms of managing the subsequent wastewater remained 
of paramount concern to the NCC authorities and engineers.  Negotiations with the 
various national departments in charge and the international financial agencies went 
into top gear starting as early as 1964, promising the start of major projects.  Apart 
from physically planning for infrastructure, major re-organizations and re-alignments 
at the national level were seen to be a way of streamlining the management of water 
resources. 
 
Interestingly, the government’s water development policy was the responsibility of the 
Minister for Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Water Resources.  Under the Water 
Ordinance (1951), the minister had a number of statutory powers and duties affecting 
not only water development, which was sponsored and executed within his own 
ministry and the ministry of works, but also water development undertaken by 
municipal and other local government bodies and private companies.  However, the 
Water Resources Authority, as a supervisory authority in water development, had the 
mandate to appropriately advise the minister on water matters.  Water resource 
management was further delegated in a hierarchical structure to the five urban local 
authorities in Kenya as of 1964, which included Nairobi.  Amongst the local 
authorities, Nairobi had a greater mandate as it was in charge ofthe water beyond its 
official boundaries, covering some townships like Kikuyu.  The reason for this could 
have been because Nairobi’s major water resources derived from neighbouring 
ecological zones, mainly Kikuyu and Ruiru.386 
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Another unique factor about Nairobi City Council is the fact that unlike the other four 
urban local authorities, it had total autonomy in raising funds for its projects.  The rest 
relied on government funding while NCC could negotiate with partners for funds 
independently.  All the councils, including Nairobi, employed consulting engineers 
from outside for their major design works and also had their own local engineering 
staff.  The government’s chief hydraulic engineer scrutinized their designs when 
applications for funds were made to the Local Government’s loans authority.  The 
Minister for Local Government exercised supervisory powers over all local authorities, 
obtaining his technical advice from the appropriate department of government.  Water 
supply management and operation by local authorities was subjected to certain checks 
and controls on the adviceof the chief hydraulic engineer.387  An analysis of these 
institutional arrangements leads to the conclusion that the managerial overlaps 
prompted delays in making key decisions and conflict in the management system, 
especially within the politically polarized environment that characterized the 1960s and 
early 1970s, as highlighted earlier. 
 
Despite the shortage of personnel and the restructured institutional arrangement, NCC 
prioritized expanding its water network as early as 1961.  Planning for the projected 
urban population and industrial growth informed most discussions, and reforms were 
of paramount urgency. 
 
By 1964, the debates on how best to manage the water resources had become 
inevitable and invited broader discussion.  This is contrary to what many scholars have 
posited: that the water reforms agenda in Global South countries is an issue from the 
1980s onwards, particularly in the post-structuralist period.  As early as 1964, the 
centralized network system of water and sanitation services provision for Kenya and 
Nairobi, in particular, was being faulted, and avenues for reforms tabled.  For instance, 
the minutes of the Water Resources Authority, which was an offshoot of the national 
government, as pointed out earlier, stressed that some countries, particularly the less-
developedand, notably, ex-British colonies, had attempted to reach the ultimate 
solution at an early stage in their development by placing all water development under 
central government departmental control.  
                                                 
387Ibid. 
  
167  
Consequently, the system ended up being obviously weak.  The reason for this 
weakness as noted in the archival documents was basically financial.  Water 
undertakings, whether dealing with pure domestic water, raw rural water, irrigation 
waters, or sewerage and drainage wastes are essentially industrial enterprises, and to 
attract outside capital, must be run on business-like lines, be efficiently managed and 
be self-supporting.388 However, informed by this assertion and the justification for the 
need for reform of the water and sewerage service sector, this simply served to fan and 
exacerbate the belief amongst the critics of the government that it was in favour of 
surrendering dynamics its social responsibility to the market.  As will be highlighted in 
this chapter, the prevailing politics informed many decisions appertaining to the 
technologies to be adopted in dealing, especially with the rampant water crisis in 
Nairobi.  To borrow from the Weberianconflict perspective, as espoused by Mikael 
Hard,389 the ideological differences played out through political competition and the 
government favoured an economic structure and a social distinction agency.  This 
retroactively affected major shifts not only in dealing with the water and sanitation 
infrastructure inadequacies of the 1960s into 1970s, but also informed the 
technological measures to be employed, for example, metering and the pricing of 
water.  The process of negotiation and approval of the grand technical systems of water 
and sanitation brings into perspective several forces, including the conflict of 
interestbetween several actors, for example, consultancy firms.  A case in hand is the 
ambitious Lake Naivasha water abstraction scheme for Nairobi that never saw the light 
of the day, butwas one that put a wedge between government officials supposed to be 
working in tandem.  
 
The monopoly by Howard Humphreys and Sons Engineering Consultancy firm for the 
major water works in Nairobi from the colonial period also comes to the fore.  This 
proposal perhaps becomes not only a clear case of how development was not only 
pursued on the modality of sound investment policy but was also mired in international 
politics, pitting global powers (in this case, seemingly between British and French 
engineering consultancy firms) and the local politics of former colonial settlers who 
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had remained in the country after independence practising farming and to whom the 
Naivasha waters meant a recreational facility for their bourgeois lifestyles that 
involved fishing, swimming and bird watching.  The over indulgence by these sons and 
daughters of colonial ranch owners and their kin and friends from Britain saw 
Naivasha being called ‘the Happy Valley’.  It was both an important agricultural zone 
and a leisure spot. 
 
5.3.4  Competition and Power Dynamics to Provision 
Nairobi’s dire need for water and the alarming rate of population growth created an 
environment that required all stakeholders in the water sector to imagine the 
unthinkable.  Traditionally, science has been relied on to provide solutions to stubborn 
challenges like that of water for Nairobi. It is within this realm that Lake Naivasha, 
which lies 40 miles away from Nairobi, was earmarked as a viable option for 
stabilizing the water supply system to meet the skyrocketing demand.  With the 
country yearning to industrialize fast, water demands were beyond the existing 
capacity and the under-connected sanitation technical systems.  
 
5.3.4.1  Peeling Off The Political Mask In High Modernist Planning 
Despite Kenya having attained political independence in 1963, the repeal of the 
constitution in 1964 to establish a republic and lay the foundation for a strong 
centralized government provided the impetus for take-off. For water and sanitation in 
the major cities of Nairobi and Kisumu, there was aconsensus on the need for the 
development of master plans.  The WHO advised a UNDP application should be 
submitted for this goal of supply. The government treasury department declined this 
approach.390 It first clarified that it was in full agreement that these two cities very 
much needed master plans for water and sewerage and that such guides should be 
developed on an urgent basis.  But the question for them was: how many such plans 
could be developed most quickly, competently and economically?  
 
In the treasury’s view, the UNDP approach would have taken too long and, thus, they 
favoured obtaining bilateral technical assistance to do the job.  At the same negotiation 
table, four options were floated: one was that the NCC could hire the necessary staff 
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(higher level expatriates plus junior supporting personnel) at a minimum cost of about 
£200,000; a second was thatthe NCC could employ a consulting firmfor perhaps the 
same amount; a third was that the UNDP could be asked to do the job, the cost to 
Kenya being £20,000 in cash and £186,000 for support staff services; and a fourth was 
that donor countries could be approached for technical assistance, which would also 
involve a substantial amount of supporting services.  It was emphasized that the 
recommendations made by a UNDP team would be the most favourably regarded by 
the World Bank, which, through its East Africa representative, had already stated that 
it would work with the UNDP in selecting the team and supervising the study.  The 
technical assistance situation would be the next preferable one from the Bank’s point 
of view.  This notion was reinforced by the belief that since the Bank would certainly 
be the principal source of loans, it would save a lot of time by settling on an option of 
their preference.391 
 
It is at this juncture that it is imperative to state that, the migration of ideas, ideals and 
models of infrastructural outlays from the Global North to the South and using the case 
for Nairobi was reinforced in the post-colony through the key financial institutions, 
either as direct financiers or supervisors or by providing technical support.  Lack of 
financial clout compelled the NCC to adopt options that appealed to the donor 
community rather than relying on home-grown expertise and independently pursuing 
their own projects.   A consensus in water infrastructural development for Nairobi thus 
did not imply a negotiated agreement but one more of compulsion.  
 
The Nairobi City Council,therefore, subcontracted Howard Humpreys and Sons 
Consulting Engineers of London to do hydrological surveys on the possible water 
supply schemes for Nairobi.  Reports submitted by the consultants in March 1961 and 
January 1966 had recommended the development of a source of water on the Chania 
River in exploring the question of what the possible future supplies were for Nairobi. 
A population of 895,000 in 2000 was estimated, with a demand of treated water of 
62.7 mg/d.392 In January 1967, the City of Nairobi Planning Report No.1 gave high and 
low forecasts of population for the year 2000 of 4,549,900 and 2,221,300 respectively. 
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The corresponding first estimates of treated water demand were 182 mg/d and 111 
mg/d respectively.  This figures were, however, liable to change based on future 
studies.  The consultant’s report vouched for the Chania-Kimakia-Thika catchments 
water schemes, terming them the most economical. 
 
On the same wavelength, as required, Howard Humphreys and Sons submitted their 
report on Lake Naivasha as an alternative source.  However, this report was damning 
and revealed the power play and underhand dynamics of large-scale technical projects. 
The summary report submitted to NCC in May 1968 referred to studies of the pumping 
of water directly from Lake Naivasha to Nairobi.  The conclusion reached was that the 
reliable yield obtainable would be less than 5mg/d and that the cost of water would be 
much higher than from other available sources. 393  The recommendation by the 
consulting engineers for the dropping of the Naivasha project did not go well with 
some powerful officials of the Water Resources Authority.  They doubted the report’s 
findings, laying the fault on many of what looked like shoddy and contradictory 
conclusions.  The report, thus, became an instrument of contestations within the 
broader perspective of possible alternative supply systems for Nairobi.  Those who 
opposed this report were strongly in favour of having an informed hydrological survey 
report on Lake Naivasha and boreholes as alternative supply links.  
 
On the question of the cost, which was rated as high and uneconomical by the 
consultants, the senior Water Resources Authority officials, who were of British 
descent, stated that in pumping the Lake Naivasha or the borehole scheme, most of the 
expenditure would have to be incurred to justify it, because it was uneconomical and 
often technically impossible to raise up the dam (going by the favoured Chania project) 
by small increments, while one could increase the pumping time or drill new boreholes 
to follow the increase in demand.394 Another take by the experts was that pumping the 
lake at the rate of 5mg/d would have caused the lake to be pumped dry.   This assertion 
was termed far-fetched by the government officials who opposed the validity and 
reliability of the report.  They implored that even in accepting the statement as 
presented, it was not up to the consulting engineers to decide whether pumping the 
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lake dry was a good thing.  They felt that only the government could decide whether 
recreational considerations outweighed the economic benefits of the project.  As those 
economic benefits had not been stated, it was impossible to take the decision at that 
stage.  
 
One indictment of the report that seemed strange and caught the eyes of its doubters 
was the observation that a dam considered on one of the tributaries of the lake 
(Turasha River) would be capable of supplying 37mg/d.  This was rated as the most 
favourable option by the consultants.  The question that arose was that if 37mg/d could 
be abstracted from one of Lake Naivasha’s tributaries, more than three times Nairobi’s 
supply at that time, then it was difficult to understand why a much smaller quantity 
taken from the full lake would cause it to be pumped dry.  
 
On the question of Lake Naivasha’s water fluoride content, the government officer, 
though in doubt of the report, refrained from belittling it.  The officer weighed in on 
the options of minimizing the fluoride by either mixing the water with that from the 
Kikuyu plant or reducing the fluoride content through filtration.  Another angle to this 
was introduced by stating that of Nairobi’s total water consumption, only a very small 
proportion was actually used for human consumption.  Thus, it was believed to be 
foolhardy and inordinately expensive to reject completely a suitable project for use 
representing 3% of total consumption. Hence, fluoride-free water would be sold in 
bottles for human consumption only.395The senior government official finally, in his 
report, concluded that there were powerful interests working against any abstraction of 
water from Lake Naivasha, and that health considerations, though not negligible, were 
to some extent being used as a smokescreen for what were mostly recreational reasons. 
Kenya still had a large population of Europeans owning large tracts of agricultural land 
and strongly linked with the government.  As such, their use of the lake for recreational 
reasons was alluded to as being the force behind the unsubstantiated rejection of the 
Lake Naivasha project.  
 
Based on a comparison between the Chania project and the one on Lake Naivasha, it is 
clear that there was a strong bias at play.  Chania had begun on a small scale and 
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would gradually increase with the construction of the dam.  Boreholes as an alternative 
were considered by some quarters as most important, not just because of the additional 
volumes that couldbe brought in from underground but also because of the way it 
being tapped as a resource could materially affect the capital and maintenance outlays 
for reticulation.  After reviewing a map which showed that high fluoride water lies 
under Central and Eastern Nairobi, with low fluoride content on the west and north 
east, it was found out that the city officials could agree with the consultants not to 
undertake to connect outlying growth point to the city system if they could privately 
develop acceptable water supplies from boreholes.  However, for those areas without 
such access to good water, which included large regions occupied by low-income 
families, water could be supplied from the city system. 
 
Another aspect that remained divisive at this juncture in the attempt to address 
Nairobi’s water crisis and anticipating future development was that of raising the water 
rates.  While some ministry officials and the consultants vouched for increased cost of 
water as a way of stabilizing consumption and effecting new behavioural water use 
practices that were more oriented to conservation, such as by refraining from watering 
flower gardens and lawns, the Minister for Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Water 
Resources, Bruce Mackenzie, noted that water rates could not be increased in an 
election yearunless if they were clearly linked to a project for more water.396 This he 
cited was politically impossible and, as noted in the minutes of one of his meetings 
with water officials, he was so firm in his rejection that no further discussion on the 
issue was necessary.  Bruce Mackenzie was one of the British nationals with a strong 
link to the settler community who had politically angled themselves to secure the 
interests of the white farmers unwilling to exit Kenya.  His support for the consultant’s 
report against the Naivasha project was derived from the belief that he was amongst 
the interested parties who wanted to secure Naivasha both for recreation and support 
for agriculture through irrigation.  The NCC was complicit in this matter and embraced 
the consultant’s report.  
 
Mr. Laulanie, a senior engineer from the water department, took a strong position 
against the report, further tabling evidence of existing hydrological studies by his 
                                                 
396KNA EPD 56/64/04. 
  
173  
department that supported the view that 40-50 mg/d could be withdrawn while keeping 
the lake at about 25 miles.  However, his views received no consideration, further 
pointing to the suppression of expert voices on many major decisions undertaken either 
by the city council or the government.  Many experts in the government water 
department, most of them engineers of reputable experience in India, South Africa, and 
their home country, Britain, felt frustrated and depressed by the outright dismissal of 
their opinions either for political gains or in favour of a single sourced consultancy 
firm.  As evidenced by Mr Laulanie’s personal opinion in a short letter to other 
members of his department, they would adopt a strategy of saying nothing in 
subsequent meetings. 
 
Reflecting on these events of 1968 following the release of the report on possible 
future water supply alternatives for Nairobi, it is clear that the process of developing 
infrastructural projects has many aspects other than the design works by engineers. 
Artefacts are controversial and promote certain ideals that are either premeditated or 
arise as unintended consequences of decisions made at different levels by various 
players.  However, politics and economic considerations inform these processes more 
than any other.  As Winner points out, the very process of technical development is so 
thoroughly biased in a particular direction that it regularly produces results that are 
counted as wonderful breakthroughs by some social interests and crushing setbacks by 
others.397 The process of adoption of certain technologies is equally conflictual and 
coercion or submission is integral to instituting them within society. 
 
5.4  Inertia, Shrinking Economies and the Politics of Infrastructure Funding 
As intimated earlier, the 1970s marked a downturn in the economic fortunes of most of 
the infant states in Africa that had laboured a great deal to remove the shackles of 
several decades of European colonialism.  The first decade of the 1960s, during which 
most countries had gotten self-rule, had seen countries like Kenya, and Nairobi as its 
capital, ride high on a wave of increased investments and improved social welfare 
status.  
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However, the global economic crisis occasioned by the ‘oil shocks’ of the early 70s, 
coupled with population explosions in the urban areas, led to most states being 
incapable of financing and undertaking major development projects, especially for 
water and sanitation, which were key services to emerging and developed cities. The 
primacy of water and sanitation systems that are adequate and functional, thus, 
necessitated the entry of global external financial players into the array of 
infrastructure provisioning for what was then referred to as the ‘developing or third 
world’.  The debate was not only on the provision of those services but on appropriate 
technologies and stopgap measures which included population control.  
 
It is important to note that population and infrastructure planning cannot be divorced as 
they are directly proportionate. The UNDP, in its acknowledgement of the close-knit 
relationship between water and public health, empowered the WHO as its partner 
agency to refocus the provision of water and sanitary infrastructure systems for 
Nairobi by soliciting funds for development from the World Bank through bilateral 
agreements and multi-scale cooperation. In the same respect, several studies were 
undertaken to establish the long-term and short-term needs for Nairobi against the 
backdrop of the then prevailing challenges.  
 
In the 1970s, the government realized the crucial role played by the water sector for the 
country’s general economic growth.  Therefore, in 1974, the Water Department under 
the Ministry of Agriculture was elevated to a full Ministry of Water Development, 
with the mandate to actively steer the water sector activities.  Due to the positive 
economic growth at that time, the ministry aimed at increasing coverage through its 
motto of ‘water for all by year 2000’. 398 A new plan of action was initiated, aimed at 
investing more resources in the water sector to improve efficiency and expand the 
water services to as many citizens as possible.  In order to ensure the success of this 
new move, the government moved in with a very ambitious programme and took over 
many water supplies which were previously managed by the local authorities, local 
communities, and other public and private institutions.  This programme was, 
however,short-lived as the government realized that it was constrained in terms of 
resources for investment.  
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Assessing the situation for Nairobi, a report on the future water supplies for Nairobi 
identified in 1973 that water conservation was the only viable solution for the critical 
water crisis. With the consumption figures approaching the city’s maximum 
production capacity of 17.5 million gallons per day, the situation was threatening to get 
out of hand. The report stated that there were no real immediate possibilities of 
increasing water production, so consumption had to be reduced through restrictive 
measures by involving more public participation to understand the crisis.399 It was not 
the first time conservation measures were being proposed for Nairobi, afterwitnessing 
the public campaigns of the 1940s.  Water-intensive industries within the city were 
highlighted as aggravating the situation.  
 
Water was and had to be taken as a development resource that was limited in supply 
and had to be considered along with other inputs in planning and designing 
development activities.400 It was further noted that experience with self-help water 
supplies had shown that the small-scale water schemes worked very well.401 However, 
the over emphasis on the larger river water supply schemes led to a push for large-
scale self-help schemes.  This in itself was a setback because what it meant is that the 
larger the scheme was, the greater the operational and maintenance costs, which would 
lead to unsustainability.  
 
Despite Kenya having realized greater economic potential during the first decade of its 
independence, the oil shocks of the early 1970s reversed all the economic gains, 
leaving the government vulnerable. Major government projects, including water 
works, had to heavily rely on the donor community for financing.  The 1974-1975 
period saw the World Bank become a major stakeholder in the water provision, not 
only for Nairobi but for the entire country.  UNDP partnered with the World Bank to 
finance a number of hydrological surveys in an attempt to augment the water supply 
for Nairobi.  
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In March 1975, a special technical study report prepared for WHO as the executing 
agency for UNDP was done. 402  The report gave its survey report on Nairobi’s 
groundwater. It was noted that the Nairobi area, by 1975, had 330 boreholes scattered 
throughout.  Of this number, 225 boreholes were privately used at an average 
extraction of 5,700 gpd/borehole.  An important observation of the report was that the 
private boreholes were being operated at a lower extraction rate than the public and 
industrial boreholes.  The assumption was that some of these private boreholes could 
be revamped to extract at a much higher rate.  It was further noted that 30 to 40 
boreholes had been abandoned but could be restored to extraction. More ground water 
surveys were recommended.  
 
With state intervention in infrastructure planning diminishing fast and international 
financial institutions augmenting their role in designing, prescribing and implementing 
plans, infrastructure provision was emboldened into ‘international best practices’ that 
further alienated local initiatives and user agency.  It was not long before the question 
of viability started dominating debates in the financial capitals of the North, and this 
saw ideas around appropriateness of technology represented by the use of local 
expertise and local materials, and investing in small technologies receiving an 
audience. 
 
5.5  Chapter Conclusion 
While the pursuit of a high modernist developmental agenda characterized the 1960s 
into the 1970s, the utopian goals envisioned remained as suchdue to the failure to 
incorporate the local initiatives.  Independence gained was no independence as 
international financial players continued to set the agenda for the Global South states 
through neo-colonialist ties.  Their technological prescriptions marketed as wholesale 
commodities rather than to reduce urban poverty reproduced urban squalor, 
suppressing the potential for improved accessibility to social services.  If the Mathare 
case in the early 1970s is an example to go by, it demonstrates that bottom-linked 
approaches that see the indigenes and non-formalized technologies or what can be 
identified as small-scale approaches possess greater potential in spurring development 
through expansive access to services, whether through networks or fragmented and 
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devolved systems.  The faltering start of the first two decades auctioned the Global 
South to western ideals of urban development and the entry of the global institutions 
like the World Bank, which had an expanded mandate from its former IBRD.  The 
UNO, through UNDP, WHO and other agencies, continued to prescribe solutions that 
purported to consider local involvement.  The pattern of development adopted, and the 
bracketing of indigenous systems of thought, survival, and development as bordering 
on illegality, militated against technological invention and innovation in the water and 
sanitation provision for Nairobi despite its continued existence as a water deficient 
city.  However, it will be interesting to explore what some of these initiatives that were 
broadly categorized as ‘appropriate technologies’ were able to achieve.   Did increased 
funding tip the graph positively towards more inclusive city planning, access and 
recognition of bottom-linked approaches as viable technological options in the face of 
disintegrating and non-performingcentralized technical systems of supply? 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF WATER/SANITATION PROVISION: 
CONSTRAINTS, TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 
FUTURE, 1979 TO 2015 
 
6.1  (In) Appropriate Technologies and the Globalist Rhetoric in Water and 
Sanitation for Nairobi 
As many studies reveal, the development of public services or utility companies in the 
North to at least some semblance of universalized status, where no one was excluded, 
was a process full of conflict spanning more than a century.403 Yet, despite this , it was 
taken for granted that to supply similar services in the emerging Global Southin the 
post-WWII era, it could take a shorter time span, perhaps with importation and 
implantation from the North being seen to necessitate such optimism.  The South was 
expected to emulate these ‘best practices’ and the ‘power of the machine’ from the 
North through replication and adoption without adaptation, hybridization or even 
rejection.  
 
The process of appropriating incoming technology, as earlier espoused, was assumed 
to be a passive process flowing seamlessly from the upper echelons to jumpstart the 
‘lower’ cadre societies.  The political and institutional preconditions were ignored, 
with service provision being largely seen as a matter of expertise and funds. 404 
However, the optimism placed in the efficiency of large technologies construed and 
conceptualized from ‘without’ (the North) and believed to be actualized in the new 
frontiers (the South) by renowned experts (engineers and economists),along with huge 
budgetary allocations from global financial institutions, ended up as mere illusions by 
the dawn of the 1970s.  Was development from below, therefore, the integral missing 
link for attainment of improved livelihoods?  How did the fragility of the state and the 
developments in the last quarter of the 20th century shape the water and sanitation 
socio-spatial outlay of Nairobi in terms of modalities and technologies of provision? 
                                                 
403 see de Swaan (1988) 
404MarikenVaa and NordiskaAfrikainstitutet research report no.94, 1993. 
  
179  
The following sub-sections attempt to re-question the popular dynamics in water and 
sanitation provision, and their use, meaning and effect.  This is in line with the central 
theses of technological non-neutrality, appropriation as a multifaceted process that 
manifests at an individual level within the day-to-day life provisioning and the location 
of the indigene in the debates appertaining to science and technology studies.  
 
6.2  Appropriate Technologies: Meaning and Implications 
Arising from ‘oil shocks’ of the 1970s, many polities in the Global South found 
themselves at the mercy of international financial and humanitarian players. The 
utopian high modernist and optimistic technological paths of the immediate post-colony 
had proven expensive.   Most had ended up as‘white elephants’ in the face of booming 
urban population and exponential rate of poverty.  While the role of the state in socio-
economic spheres of life in most countries was dwindling, as occasioned by collapsing 
economies, the vacuum created was fast being filled by developmentalist agencies from 
the North.  
 
However, the issues of instituting a paradigm shift in managing the social services 
sector that includes water and sanitation was of necessity rather than choice.  External 
funding, though conceived under the pretext of spurring fast and guided economic 
growth, left the Global South in a precarious position.  Such growth entailed charting 
independent economic growth paths that tapped into the local potential in terms of 
indigenous people’s manpower and technical power.  A change of tact in terms of not 
only the question of technologies of provision and development but also on the 
approach mechanisms adopted by the key actors, mainly the state and international 
financiers was necessary.  If the planning models and technological designs of the 
period leading to the 1970s had alienated many people and created poverty rather than 
wealth, ‘appropriate technology’ movement’s basic principle was to try to help people 
develop out of the situations they were in by providing technologies appropriate to 
those situations, but which afforded some improvement in users’ economic and social 
circumstances.405 
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The failure by the developmentalist blueprints,406 to translate into any tangible growth, 
increasing creativity and alleviating poverty, meant that the blueprints themselves and 
their theories of development had to be subjected to scrutiny, re-questioned, and if 
possible, overhauled. 
 
It was within such a necessaryre-questioning of technology and the development 
agenda modalities that ‘appropriate technology’ (AT) found resonance with the 
economists and planners who sought to redress the failures in the economies of most of 
the Global South, especially in the period approaching 1980 and onwards.   As Fressoli 
and Arond observe, between the 1970s and 1980s, ‘appropriate technology’ became a 
worldwide grassroots innovation movement that sought to redefine technology as a tool 
for development in South America.407 
 
In 1973, Schumacher, a renowned economist, published his mercurial seminal work, 
‘Small is beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered’. As a result, debate on 
the need to rethink development by incorporating ordinary people became common. 
Cast against the backdrop of crunching economies, indigenous technologies and, 
basically, the incorporation of people into planning gained root.  The idea of ‘small’ 
(indigenous) and ‘large’ (Western) technologies had earlier been elucidated in Gandhi’s 
writings and his vision for India.  He had stated clearly that he visualized electricity, 
shipbuilding, iron works, machine making, and the like existing side by side with 
village crafts, but if the same work could be done by a small machine, then to him, 
there was no need to employ a large one.408 Technology had to work for the good of 
humanity rather than the end goal being large-scale production for profit.  
 
Through the founding of the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) in 
London in 1965, Schumacher together with his colleagues, George McRobie and Julia 
Porter, became the progenitor of ‘intermediate technology’,from which ‘appropriate 
technology’ as a movement sprouted and gained roots progressively.409 In using the 
term ‘intermediate technology’, Schumacher envisioned a technology that was an ‘in-
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between’ or rather one that was midway between, for example, a hand hoe and a 
tractor.410As propounded, the concept of ‘intermediate technology’ transcended the 
issue of relative modernity; but the fact that efficiency and modernity were not 
necessarily correlated reinforced the assumptions concerning technology choice, which 
was claimed to underlay ‘intermediate technology’.411 
 
A USAID 1976 policy document titled, Proposal For A Program In Appropriate 
Technology, defined AT to be intensive in the use of domestically produced inputs and 
also in the use of less capital and few highly trained personnel.  Further, it explained 
that ATs were small scale but efficient, replicable in numerous units, readily operated, 
maintained and repaired, of low cost and accessible to low-income people.  In terms of 
the users or beneficiaries, appropriate technologies were claimed to have sought to be 
compatible with local cultural and social environments. 412 All in all, for the lead 
proponents of AT, ‘intermediate technology’ as the founding concept had to be simple 
so that the demands for high skills were minimized not only in the production process 
itself but also in matters of organization, raw material supply, financing and marketing, 
and that production had to be mainly from local materials and mainly for local use.413 
 
The economic meltdown of the 1970s gave a new lease of life to the concept of 
development through small-scale approaches.  The future lay in bringing on board 
indigenous modes of production and sustenance not only in rural agriculture but also in 
terms of technologies of procuring social services like water and sanitation.  It is also 
important to observe that large and highly sophisticated technologies were slowly being 
questioned for their ecological impact, hence the attempt to describe some small 
technologies as ‘eco-technologies’ or ‘humanized technologies’. 414  International 
monetary agencies and Western governments, as chief financiers of major projects in 
the so called Least Developed Countries (LDCs), sought to go back to the drawing 
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board rethink their strategies of engagement so as to put value to their money and, at the 
same time, make observable progress.  
The millions of investment in form of external currencies into water dams and treatment 
plants had failed to serve the intended purpose of instituting lifestyle changes and 
through cost-recovery mechanisms, raise enough revenue to qualify the projects as 
sound investments.  Municipalities were faced with growing populations juxtaposed 
against weak infrastructure systems and shrinking revenue collection.  The attempt to 
redress the situation lend credence to AT turning it into a social movement at whose 
helm were optimists who saw responsive planning as that which is anchored in the 
people as users and in which users are participants, innovators, tinkerers, thinkers, and 
mobilizers of resources rather than passive recipients of donor aid and foreign tools of 
production.   Scholarship around AT suggests that ‘appropriate technology’ included 
the belief that human communities could have a hand in deciding what their future 
would be like, and that the choice of tools and techniques was an important part of it.   
It further included the recognition that technologies could embody cultural biases and 
sometimes have political and distributional effects that went far beyond a strictly 
economic valuation.415 
 
Appropriate technology became an important international phenomenon in a climate of 
despair in most countries of the Global South who were reeling from the shackles of 
failing economies as earlier emphasized.  As Whitcombe and Carr (1982) note, the 
London-based ITDG Limited conducted a survey whose results showed that the number 
of institutions in the world that were operating under the rubric of ‘appropriate 
technology’ had grown from a handful in the early 1970s to over five hundred by 1977 
and with an estimate of about one thousand by 1980.416 As earlier observed, appropriate 
technology was noted to differ from the other kind of technology by being labour 
intensive, accessible to users readily, frugal of scarce resources, un-intrusive on the 
natural ambience, and manageable by the individual or small groups.   Futurists cited 
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the experience of the US, stating that one of the key advantages of AT was that it could 
be an effective way of shifting to advanced technology.417 
 
Though AT was seen as promising, Anthony, citing Anderson (1985), cautions that 
scale, complexity and expense are not always positively correlated.   It is possible for a 
large machine to be both simple and cheap and for a small one to be highly complex 
and expensive.418Anthony acknowledges that appropriate technology may have been 
practised for many generations in the past, but there was something new about it in the 
context of the AT movement of the 1970s.  To him, appropriate technology had evolved 
into a developmental approach that aimed at tackling community development 
problems.419 Viewed as such, appropriate technology did not have to be seen simply as 
some identifiable technical device; rather, it was an approach to community 
development that consisted of a body of knowledge, techniques, and an underlying 
philosophy.420 Whether that philosophy is what Schumacher calls ‘small is beautiful’ or 
what I may refer to as ‘small works too’, AT’s proponents firmly contended that it was 
important to realize that the use of ‘appropriate technology’ did not imply turning the 
clock back to the 18th and 19th centuries.  Concomitantly, they believed in it being a 
complete systems approach to development that is both self-adaptive and dynamic, 
because as its users become wealthier and more skilled, they can both afford and use 
more expensive technical means.421 
 
Though this line of thought clearly sees indigenous technology as emerging out of 
poverty, AT considerations became the cornerstone of the 1970s and later planning and 
social service provisioning in the Global South.  This was financed and driven by 
international development agencies at whose forefront was the World Bank and a 
plethora of NGOs.  
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6.3  Appropriate versus inappropriate technologies for water and sanitation in 
Nairobi 
To discern what appropriate technology as a movement means, it is important to reflect 
on its ‘inappropriateness’.  The greatest indictment of the post-WWII approach to 
development, which not only reified Western technology, but also placed greater belief 
in large technical systems as drivers of rapid growth, was its failure to meet the 
aspirations of the users.  Many projects to which millions of dollars had been 
committed and spent became mere monuments, with little socio-economic return if any 
at all.  This question of inappropriateness, therefore, can be summed up as follows: 
 
Inappropriateness of technology may be reflected in the severity 
of unforeseen side effects, or by the gradual (undesirable) change 
in the dynamics and structures over time of a society through its 
dependence upon technology. The inappropriateness of 
technology might stem from its being deployed in a context quite 
different to that for which it was designed, or it might be 
manifested in the harmful effects of technology upon one class of 
people. Technology might even be inappropriate for the specific 
purposes for which it was designed due to the technical 
incompetence of the designer or the inability to effectively relate 
technical parameters to the real world of practice.422 
 
Arguably, it followed that the popular centralized model of water provisioning and 
sanitation system outlays had failed to supply and empty wastewater for the Global 
South cities that were burgeoning with both internal and immigrant populations.  The 
deputy director general of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Corporation 
cited technological inappropriateness as being economic, social, institutionaland purely 
technical in nature, and that no other sector could provide so many examples of 
inappropriate technology as the water and sanitation sector.423 The discussion around 
technology and development was more pronounced amongst professionals, especially 
within multilateral agencies involved in identifying and implementing various 
development projects in the Global South.  The disconnect was always between popular 
westernized approaches plus the millions that came with instituting the grand projects 
                                                 
422Willoughby  (1990), pp.18-19. 
423Holmsen (1988) in Gamser(ed.)(1988), pp.26-35. 
  
185  
and the local realities that were threatening to get out of hand as time lapsed and cities 
found themselves constrained in terms of resources.   Global health institutions were 
not only concerned with substantial supplies of domestic water and the cities’ ejection 
of their waste water but also the question of safety of such in the face of increasing 
environmental pollution.  
 
The rationale for centralized and networked systems of water supply and sanitation 
since the time of the great world civilizations and their augmentation in industrial age 
Europe and North America was to improve health and prevent epidemics, yet the 
systems, as observed by major scholarship, often became health hazards in 
themselves.424The management and provision of water and sanitation services was 
under the auspices of municipal councils within highly autocratic political regimes. 
Despite the shortage of personnel and duplication of roles under government ministries 
and departments, most of the municipalities could not afford the cost of maintaining 
pipes and treating the effluents.  Leaking systems accounted greatly for non-revenue 
water while water scarcity saw the city further sink into what was becoming an urban 
health crisis.  Wasteful practices have for long been associated with water use, 
sometimes making water a lifestyle issue that requires behavioural interventionist 
measures on its usage.   In industrialized countries as well as ‘developing’ countries, it 
has been estimated that there is often a difference of between 30%and 50% between the 
water delivered into a system and the amount paid for by consumers, partly because of 
leaking pipes and partly due to faulty meters. 425 The large networks seemed to 
presuppose a supply of water that was often not there, hence rendering them as highly 
inappropriate.426 In spite of these failures, the symbolism attached to these technologies 
as a result of the hubris and the reification that accompanied them saw them remain 
favourable to the minority urban dwellers in the upper middle class group and above. It 
ison the fringes of the networked city that subsidiary systems emerge from below.  The 
appropriate technology paradigm purported to focus more on such forgotten or 
marginalized urban landscapes as sites for innovation and inventiveness.  
 
                                                 
424See MarikenVaa and NordiskaAfrikainstitutet.Research report no.94, 1993, p.12. 
425Kalbernmatten and Middleton (1991), p.28. 
426See MarikenVaa and NordiskaAfrikainstitutet, research report no.94, 1993, p.12. 
  
186  
In Drawers of Water, White, Bradley and White studied systems of water use and their 
improvement in East Africa.427  The authors gave an in-depth account of the water 
sources, the amounts used and the ensuing costs in energy and time to households in a 
variety of environments.  Their major finding was that nine out of ten households, both 
urban and rural, at that time in the history of these nations, drew their water from 
sources outside their house and carried it home.  As a follow up, their appraisal of the 
costs of different types of improvements and the evaluation of the relationship between 
water quality, water quantityand the health of users provided no economic basis for 
providing each household with purified and piped water.  The attention, thus, shifted to 
aspects of how to desirably improve the supply systems that existed in relation to their 
costs and offsetting gains, and, further, to asking about the kind of improvement that 
would be acceptable and preferable for the users.  User-focused approaches became an 
acknowledged norm if not a practicable enterprise.  
 
The United Nations took cognizance of the challenges of water and, resulting from the 
1977 Mar del Plata (Argentina) International Water Conference, various undertakings 
were made to secure water. It was the first deliberate intergovernmental conference 
dedicated to finding solutions to water problems and applying them at national, 
regional, and international level in order to improve the social conditions of humankind, 
especially in the South.428Based on the deliberations in Vancouver and Mar de Plata, 
the UN General Assembly declared the period 1981 to 1990 as the International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD), setting the very ambitious 
goal of ensuring universal access to good quality drinking water and adequate 
sanitation.  The debate on appropriate technology shaped up greatly within this 
framework.  The question of inappropriate technology and that of uncoordinated 
interventions had been singled out and efforts were made by the major agencies to 
cooperate towards achieving the decade’s goal.  Through WHO, UNDP, UNICEF and 
the World Bank, the Inter-Agency Decades Steering Committee that had been formed 
in 1978 was able to meet semi-annually to review the joint strategies.  The committee 
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also set up various subcommittees through which it pursued more specific objectives of 
making the decade’s key goal jointly attainable.429 
 
The decade saw consultation and cooperation at a scale never witnessed before and, 
through conferences at both national and international levels, avenues for shared 
experiences and dissemination of knowledge were created. Eventually, the 
consultations transformed into what came to be known as the Collaborative Council of 
External Support Agencies (ESAs), comprising both representatives of multilateral and 
bilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Its overall objective 
was to ‘… accelerate provision of water supply and sanitation services to all, with 
emphasis on the un-served rural and peri-urban poor, by using coordinated programme 
approach.’430 However, the irony of this approach is its presupposition that solutions to 
the scarcity that faced most of the populations in the South would be solved through 
coordinated financing and collaborative planning with national and local players.  As 
long as the financial institutions continued to wield financial power, appropriate 
technology would continue to be another miscalculated approach.  The idea ought to 
have been to place technology choice in the hands of the local people through enabling 
environments void of the competition with western technologies that continue to 
cement social differentiation.  It was no surprise, therefore,that appropriate technology 
was associated with the poor.  
 
Despite the criticism, the momentum created by AT as a movement and the concerted 
effort from the global development agencies saw several research activities undertaken 
and a number of projects initiated.  However, a closer analysis of Nairobi in the 1970s 
reveals the continued institutionalization of large water and sanitation projects.  The 
World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bankand the 
Japanese OECF partnered to finance the construction of the Thika Dam and the 
associated pipeline and water treatment plant.  This was a paradox since the AT debate 
had indicted continued investment in large projects ashad been the practice of the 1940s 
onwards.  The criticality and obduracy of the water problem in Nairobi perhaps made it 
difficult to encourage ‘small approaches’ to provisioning as concerted efforts were 
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adopted as a matter of importance against the backdrop of population explosion 
projections.  At the inception of the Thika Dam, the city began to rely exclusively on 
surface water by closing down the last wellfield used for piped water.  Perhaps at the 
inception of the Thika Dam, it was imagined that Nairobi would be a water-sufficient 
city, as such beliefs were a characteristic of such large-scale projects.  With little 
improvement to the fast aging colonial infrastructure for Nairobi, it was foolhardy to 
expect Nairobi to become water secure.  The lack of s culture of repair and maintenance 
meant that the problem of non-accounted-for water persisted, which complicated the 
issue of water sustainability for a city such as Nairobi.  
 
In the context of changing approaches to technology choice, the water sector in Kenya 
underwent an administrative overhaul.  In 1974, the Ministry of Water was created. 
Prior to that, the implementation of a few existing water supplies, which mainly 
covered the urban areas, had been conducted by a small department in the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  The majority of Kenya in the rural and peri-urban poor settlements had 
been left to depend solely on non-piped modes of supply, which constituted river and 
spring sources.  During the rainy season, harnessing rainwater would be affected too, 
with rainwater being considered safe for drinking if collected from clean corrugated 
iron roofs.  This was before massive pollution threatened these small-scale non-
networked sources of supply.  
 
The Ministry of Water found itself with the responsibility of conserving, constructing 
and developing, as well as operating and maintaining, water supplies (except for the 
five major municipal councils led by Nairobi that enjoyed autonomy), sewerage 
facilities and pollution control of all water resources in the country, which included 
securing the catchment areas, key to which is the Aberdare ranges where Nairobi draws 
almost 90% of its piped water supply.431The National Water Conservation and Pipeline 
Corporation was also established.  Its responsibility entailed borrowing funds from 
whichever source was deemed viable for various projects under its responsibility.  Part 
of these responsibilities included supplying water in bulk to water under-takers, as 
specified by the government and the water board.  The absurdity of having a 
corporation hitched on solicited funds in the face of a continued lack of decision-
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making power on requisite and appropriate technology choices exposed the institutions 
further to the moribund state that had characterized most government agencies in the 
postcolonial period. 
 
Another development in the context of administrative reforms in the water sector for 
Kenya was the establishment of the research division in the ministry.  Its key 
responsibilities entailed revising the existing design criteria for water supply and 
sewerage as a way of contributing to the technical knowledge essential for such 
undertakings.   Further, it was to help synthesize hydrological and hydro-meteorological 
data and inform about the rational utilization and protection of water resources.  Last 
but not least, the Kenya Water Training Institute that was founded back in 1970 had 
grown into a large institution that played a crucial role in equipping young people with 
the technical skills necessary for employment by the Ministry for Water, parastatals, 
local authorities and the private sector.  
 
6.3.1  Nairobi Sewerage and Groundwater Survey Report of 1975 
The World Bank instituted a survey for the status of Nairobi’s ground water sources, 
with the aim of providing a basis for action due to the diminishing levels of water 
security and safety for the city.   A special technical study was undertaken and a report 
prepared for WHO, which was acting as the executing agency for UNDP.  The report 
noted that by 1975, the conservation area of Nairobi contained approximately 330 
boreholes scattered throughout the area.   Of these, 225 boreholes were privately used at 
an average extraction of 5,700 gpd/borehole.  The rest of the boreholes were for public 
and industrial use, and they produced water at a rate of 33,000gpd/borehole for public 
use and 16,500 gpd/borehole for industrial usage.  These figures were derived from 
another report, by J. F. Geita, titled ‘Some Aspects of Groundwater of Nairobi’.  The 
general deduction from the report was that most private boreholes were being operated 
at much lower extraction rates than public and industrial boreholes.  This meant that an 
assumption that a certain number of private boreholes could be operated at higher 
extraction rates could be made.  However, what would be the institutional and 
organizational challenges for this?  
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Further, it was noted that by the period referred to in the report, there was awareness 
that approximately 30 to 40 boreholes had been abandoned, yet some of them were in 
such a condition that they could be restored.  The implication of this was that it was 
possible to bring them back to production as a viable means of facing the existing 
challenge of water shortage for Nairobians. 
 
On an optimistic note, the report saw the large number of boreholes that were 
abandoned or being operated under their full capacity as representing an investment that 
was not fully utilized.  A rough estimate of an increase of about 15,000 gpd over 225 
private boreholes would add approximately £3.5 million (sterling) to the city’s water 
supply.  Despite all ofthese proposals centring on boreholes, it was not certain whether 
the shortage that prevailed in the water supply for Nairobi by 1975 would be alleviated 
through ground water extraction.  Hydrological surveys had proven that groundwater in 
the Nairobi area was generally good except for the fluoride content, which had been 
marked as sometimes high and varying from borehole to borehole.  
 
Despite the optimism over the potential of a groundwater approach as a means of 
supply for Nairobi, increased extraction from existing boreholes was earmarked as 
being probably more attractive than the drilling of new boreholes.  Perhaps this was in 
recognition of the increasing costs of procuring drilling services and conservational 
concerns in terms of the ecological balance. 
 
As for sewerage, a similar study to the one conducted for water revealed that out of the 
total population for Nairobi in 1974, 60% or about 460,000 people were projected to be 
connected to the sewerage system by 1975.  The remaining 40%, it was believed, would 
be served by septic tanks, cesspools and bucket latrines.  In a few cases, pit latrines 
would be used.  In 1976, the World Bank undertook another research project on 
appropriate technology for water supply and waste disposal in ‘developing’ countries. 
Emphasis was put on sanitation and reclamation technologies, particularly as they are 
affected by water service levels and by the ability and willingness to pay on the part of 
the project beneficiaries.432Although efforts were aimed at linking development to the 
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bottom, user participation centredless on incorporating local knowhow in making 
informed, workableand affordable technology choices.  
 
Perhaps the notable development from the appropriate technology rhetoric and the 
reversal in the mode of engagement was the increased attention paid to sanitary matters. 
Despite it being an open fact that a water supply had to be coupled with a system of 
getting rid of wastewater, most Global South cities had continued to give sanitation a 
wide berth.  While many donors were willing to invest heavily in huge water supply 
systems, none was willing to develop sewer systems.   The period from 1974 saw more 
surveys being instituted in Nairobi to assess its sanitary situation.  The main sewers 
serving the city included the Mathare Valley trunk sewer, which discharged to a 
temporary pumping station that pumped the wastewater to the Kariobangi sewerage 
treatment works.  However, it was noted that the temporary pumps were too small and 
their layout unsuitable, hence, making the station un-operational.  In some parts of 
Eastleigh, the majority of the houses had not been connected to the trunk line.  This 
resulted in wastewater from these houses being discharged into open drains that posed 
massive health risks.  The owners of the houses wererequired to connect in accordance 
to the Nairobi City by-laws.433  What the authorities failed to appreciate in such a 
situation is that the mode of instituting the centralized sewer system in itself created the 
problem as it heaped the cost of connectivity on the individual.  
 
A technical study conducted in 1974 noted that the quality of the sewers laid at the time 
was rather poor and that efforts had to be made almost immediately to improve the 
quality of the pipe material.  In the same year, it was noted that there were thirteen 
sewerage treatment plants in Nairobi, of which six were waste stabilization ponds.  The 
Nairobi Airport stabilization ponds had first been created in 1959 and were intended to 
run parallel with an existing overloaded surface aeration plant.  However, it was 
necessary soon after commissioning the ponds to close down the aeration plant and the 
ponds quickly became overloaded.  A new primary pond was added, the original ones 
becoming secondary and tertiary ponds.  At certain times in the subsequent years, the 
records of which are not available, the ponds were operated as two parallel primary 
ponds with a small common secondary pond.  There was no equipment for measuring 
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influent or effluent flows.  The ponds had been designed using a classification guide 
borrowed from South Africa on the basis of the climatic similarities between the two 
countries; however, the question was how efficient such designs were for a fast growing 
city such as Nairobi.  
 
In addressing the issue of sanitation, the Nairobi City Council built another pond in 
Karen to serve a proposed high density-housing scheme and, by 1974, only phase one 
of the projects had been completed.  The General Service Unit stabilization pond was 
built to serve the Kenya police’s GSU unit on site.  As part of taking responsibility for 
its waste, the Kenya Breweries Limited (KBL) had built a stabilization pond to deal 
with spent grain liquors and discharge from a bottle washing plant.  Some minor ponds 
were also set up in 1972 at the PostOffice training school.  The St.Thomas Aquinas and 
Industrial Area sewage treatment works were constructed too using the same South 
African technology as it had been used for the GSU and Karen plants.  
 
Even though Nairobi of the 1970s witnessed developments in the expansion of its sewer 
lines, one key characteristic to note is that most of the mentioned sewer trunk lines 
connected major institutions and government offices.  Despite planned on-site service 
schemes and other pre-planned housing projects, most Nairobi residents were left to 
their own means.  When one could not connect to the mainlines due to the high costs of 
connection, septic tanks and cesspools became popular and almost synonymous with 
thesanitation systems for Nairobi.  Deprived and informal areas like Kibera and 
Mathare continued to rely on pit-latrines if not open defecation.  This had a negative 
impact on the sources of surface and shallow ground water supply and, as a result, they 
became a health risk.  Rivers increasingly became polluted as more and more space for 
sinking pit-latrines shrunk due to the increased influx of people into the city, and this 
ushered in the squalor that was the hallmark ofsuch informal spaces.  
 
As established through oral interviews, due to pollution, there was a major cholera 
outbreak in Kibera and other places in the mid-1970s.  Though oral sources rarely give 
us specific dates, the epidemic warranted the reluctant government to extend the water 
supply pipeline slightly into the informal area especially to most structure owners who 
could afford a connection and sell it to their tenants.  One lady recounted the moment 
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and from her conversation, as it is the norm in most African cultures to preserve 
historical events in memory by calling them certain names, the pipeline into the Kibera 
and other informal areas earned the name ‘Maji ya Kipindupindu’ which is the Swahili 
(local language’s) word for ‘cholera water’. 434  It was easy to connect the 
‘Kipindupindu’ pipeline, as it was a stop-gap measure for the menace, prompted by the 
need to secure the population even for the future.  This, thus, increased accessibility as 
more and more people put up water kiosks and standpipes.  
 
As poverty increased tremendously in the 1970s and diminished the role of the state in 
providing social services, informal settlement areas ballooned to alarming levels 
compared to non-existent systems of water and sanitation.  Where the government was 
absent, people as users continued to find their own means of provisioning, key of which 
was access through water vending.  As Jean PierréGoubert states, water vending and the 
use of water kiosks is as old as civilization itself.  Even when France was receiving its 
first household connections, water fountains that had been key providers of water 
persisted and society clung to the old.435 Water vending through pushcarts became a 
key system of supply alongside standpipes and kiosks.  
 
However, as most informants stated, faced with scarcity, poor neighbourhoods 
witnessed multiple forms of usage by which water was categorized according to the 
quality of its source.   While river water would be used for washing clothes and bathing, 
well or borehole water would be used for cooking,while tap water purchased either 
from a central point or from mobile vendors would be used for cooking.   Storage also 
becomes a key component of water usage due to unreliable sources.   The inability to 
break the hardpan and dig deep pit-latrines as a result of topographical factors meant 
that the construction of pit-latrines involved raising them a few metres from the ground 
and whenever it rained, one side of the raised walls would be opened for the raw sewer 
to be carried away through open drains into the river.  
 
One other important aspect to note is that appropriate technology debates for most of 
the Global South focused more on sanitary efforts.  Several pit latrine designs were 
                                                 
434 Mohamed Oman (not his real name) O.I, 31/07/2016, Kibera, Nairobi. 
435Goubert (1989) 
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drawn to take care of the local realities.  Where water was available, pour-flush toilets 
that incorporated socio-cultural components were built. Terms like Ventilated Improved 
Pit-latrines (VIP), Ventilated Improved Double Pit Latrines (VIDP) and Reed Odorless 
Earth Closets (ROECS) emerged to connote different designs that sought to employ 
local expertise and materials for their set up.  Despite these attempts at designing 
sanitary systems that had an indigenous touch and incorporated the locals, for the high 
density urban poor settlements, the question of available space for such construction 
was a big challenge.  
 
A study by John M. Kalbermatten and his colleagues, Appropriate Technology for 
Water and Sanitation: A Planner’s Guide (1980) noted that specific designs were 
recommended in particularfor sanitation which had emerged to receive centre-stage 
attention.  Despite the acknowledgement that planning had to be context specific, all 
ofthese efforts by trying to universalize the technical aspects of sanitation provision fell 
into the same trap of previous years, where expert groups assumed the primary role of 
planning for the poor.  How the new technological choices were being effected 
remained delinked from the bottom, and poor coordination meant that most of the 
proposed projects did not go beyond the pilot stage.   Scaling up remained a challenge 
to attain universal access.  
 
Under such pressure, made worse by the biting poverty, open defecation and the 
carrying of nightsoil through the bucket system thrived in most informal areas of 
Nairobi.  Communal (shared) pit-latrines were utilized but their being unattended 
mostlymeant that their efficiency in reducing health hazards was very low.  In some 
cases, they werehealth hazards as they became overwhelmed by the huge number of 
people that relied on them and the failure to empty them, either through the lack of 
requisite technology or no one taking responsibility to manage them.  Some structure 
owners prioritized providing the pit-latrines as a way of attracting tenants and justifying 
the high rents charged for very poor housing.  This demonstrates how sanitation was not 
only a matter of human hygienic and health necessity, it had also become an instrument 
of power aimed at mediating between structure owners and their tenants.  One other 
aspect noted from the field research carried out was the presence of on-site landlords 
who lived among their tenants and the existence of absentee landlords, mostly 
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speculators. ‘Landlords’ who lived amongst their tenants sought to provide water (at a 
fee) and dug pit-latrines and bathrooms to be shared by their tenants.  One such incident 
involves a ‘landlord’ in Kibera who, while digging a pit-latrine, hit water.  The pit-
latrine was abandoned and it became a shallow well that serves him and his tenants to 
date, supplementing other means of supply.436 
 
All in all, the 1970s and beyond, apart from augmenting the role of international players 
in the water and sanitation sector for the South, including cities like Nairobi, the 
appropriate technology momentum tended to fizzle out with time, partly because of the 
criticism levelled against it as either patronizing or promoting poor technology to 
maintain the statusquo in North-South relations. The introduction of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in themselves made the situation in the South very 
complex for smallholdings and technologies to thrive.  The tendency for innovators to 
become almost exclusively oriented towards generic, turnkey technological solutions 
was advantageous in being disseminated easily through a diffusionist approach, it 
tended to eclipse critical local development contexts and goals.437 The assumptions 
(low capital investment, small scale, simple design) on which appropriate technology 
was anchored could easily become its own constraint, especially with explosive 
population growth, which put a strain on available resources.  Appropriate technologies, 
as a consequence, struggled to induce broader innovation dynamics and capabilities 
beyond the solution to basic needs and specific production problems.438 
 
Despite the dwindling opportunities for mainstreaming, small technologies or rather 
appropriate technology as a movement had served to raise ideas about technology 
whose influence would manifest in most sustainable innovations of today.  Whether in 
housing, energy, food processing, mobility, light manufacturing or other domains, 
innovations that were now finding a niche had roots in appropriate technology.439 In 
addition, the principles of public participation and a people-centredapproach to 
                                                 
436 Oral Interview, Bw. Musa (real name):08/08/2016, Kibera. 
437 Smith et al. (2013), pp.1-11 
438Ibid, p.6. 
439See Kaplinsky (2010), pp.193-203; Smith et al. (2013), p.6. 
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development continued to inform governance and planning into the 1990scourtesy of 
the AT debate.440 
 
Furthermore, the debate set the stage for understanding technology from a social 
constructivist point of view, which not only spurred tremendous gains in STS studies 
but informed development planning today in seeing technology as more than mere 
artefacts.   One of the greatest experiences with the Appropriate Technology movement 
was the fact that technologies are socially constructed, as demonstrated by De Laet and 
Mol through their explanation of the success of the Zimbabwe water pump.  The 
working of a specific technology must be comprehended beyond its technical terms and 
be seen to contain embedded beliefs and value systems of the society within which it 
functions; hence, contextual analysis is required.441 
 
Looking back to the water and sanitation status against the backdrop of the appropriate 
technology debate, it is necessary to note that despite international agencies 
consolidating their position in the social lives of most Global South economies, AT 
managed to prioritize water and sanitation issues.  The declaration of the Water and 
Sanitation Decade(1981-1990) helped put into perspective key aspects that would 
inform provisioning for the years that followed and, at the same time, set a precedent 
for concerted efforts being made to progressively attain growth in the referred-to 
sectors.  The 1980s were dominated by policy approaches that promoted supply-driven 
programmes, with the state being recognized as central in providing water and 
sanitation services.  Planning remained ‘top-down’ and the major weakness of the 
approach was the laying of much emphasis on the hardware component of provision 
that prioritized water, hence, leaving sanitation lagging behind.  The 1990s coming on 
the heels of SAPs and their neo-liberal ideology would reduce the state to a facilitator 
rather than a provider.  Where did this paradigm shift in the provision leave the urban 
underclass that occupied the fringes of the ‘networked city’? 
 
                                                 
440See Pieterse (1998), p.343-373. 
441De Laet  and Mol  (2000 
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6.4  Governance, Political Pluralism and Flexibility: Off-grid provisioning 
practices and reforms 
Nairobi as the capital city of Kenya was the melting pot for political agitation for 
pluralism.  The attempted military coup of 1982 had witnessed the government institute 
a de jure single-party state characterized by autocratic governance.  There was little 
space for divergent ideas to thrive.  The state controlled most aspects of human life and 
for urban areas like Nairobi, this meant little people participation.  The 1980s to the 
1990s witnessed a lull in localized initiatives and over-reliance on institutions like the 
World Bank and other western donor agencies spearheading planning and service 
provision.   As such, external ideals continued to be imprinted on the local landscape.  
 
The 1992 Dublin Conference on Water and the Environment encouraged the 
privatization of the water sector in the Global South countries.  It declared that water 
has an economic value and must be treated as an economic good.  It also stated that 
access to water and sanitation at affordable prices was a fundamental human right.  The 
fourth principle of the Dublin Declaration states:  
 
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
should be recognized as an economic asset. Following this 
principle, it is especially crucial to recognize the basic right of 
all human beings to have access to drinking water and 
sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the 
economic value of water led to wastage and to uses that were 
harmful to the environment. To manage water as an economic 
asset is an important path to the achievement of efficient and 
equitable use; and to the encouragement of the conservation 
and protection of water resources.442 
 
This set in motion a process of commercialization and privatization of the water and 
sanitation resources in Kenya.  Commercialization is defined as the transformation of a 
public body into a private company with public capital443 or, contextually, as ‘a form of 
privatisation which entails establishing and registering of water and sanitation 
                                                 
442Petrella (2001), p. 66 
443Jaglin (2000) 
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companies owned wholly by local authorities’.444 As a concept, this was not new as it 
had been effected in Britain decades earlier with mixed results.  The neo-liberal 
ideology in water and sanitation was centred more on the belief in the superiority of the 
markets in allocating resources and the claim that interactions with nature were best 
served by a market economy and a liberal international order.  The perception that the 
problems witnessed in the social service sector were caused by government failure, 
through corruption and malpractices or despotic control, greatly informed the push for 
the commercialization and privatisation of public utilities.445 
 
With the centrality ofinternational players in determining the course of things, countries 
such as Kenya, by virtue of being signatories to international conventions, the Dublin 
Declaration being one of them, had to embrace the popular neo-liberal ideals of the 
1990s and set into motion reforms geared towards being facilitators rather than 
providers of key infrastructure services, with water and sanitation being a target. 
Facilitated and financed by the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ), the 
German Bank of Reconstruction (KFW) and the Urban Water and Sanitation 
Management (UWASAM) Project, the commercialisation process was set in motion 
with the goal of decentralising water services and providing services at a cost that was 
economically sound and one that would be sustainable investmentwise.  The piloting of 
the project involved the commercialisation of water and sewerage services for three 
municipal councils in Kenya, namely, Nakuru, Eldoret and Nyeri. 
 
Benchmarking involved taking study tours to Zambia in1995 and Malawi in 1996 to 
learn from others,446 and holding several workshops and conferences to agree on the 
roadmap towardsfull privatisation, which had a legal component that had to be drafted 
and adopted in parliament.  From such tours and boardroom deliberations, efforts to 
develop a new water and sanitation policy for Nairobi and the rest of Kenya were set in 
motion.  However, a closer analysis points to such efforts having been dictated by the 
liberal norms of commercialization and privatisation, with a focus being put on 
managerial and administrative restructuring. The model of private company 
                                                 
444UNCHS-Habitat (1998) 
445 see Hassan (undated) UNESCO, p.82 
446See K’Akumu (2006) 
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management seemed to be a zero-sum game in these concerted efforts as little or no 
investment targeted overhauling the almost century-old technical artefacts of supply. 
 
Nairobi’s water and sanitation status meanwhile remained dire and alarmingly in crisis. 
The reliable water yield from its existing resources (Kikuyu, Ruiru, Sasumua, and the 
intake from Chania) was rated as 207,000m3 per day.  Later on, the commissioning of 
the Thika Dam in 1996 did not meet the water deficit but increased the water supply for 
Nairobi.  The supply link was divided into two distinct operating areas centred on major 
service reservoir complexes at Kabete and Gigiri, handling supplies of 82,700m3/day 
and 809,700m3/day respectively.447 
 
The mushrooming of informal settlements towards the end of the 1980s and in the first 
half of the 1990s continued to pile pressure on the water and sanitation resources for 
Nairobi.  The poor economics and the post-election conflicts of the multi-party era had 
pushed more and more people into the city, leading to a mushrooming of informal 
settlements.  By 1994, 55% of the population of Nairobi lived in informal settlements, 
sitting on only 6% of the entire city’s land, and only 12% of plots in these settlements 
had piped water.448  In 1998, a report released for the NCC on water leakage and 
improvement on the distribution system noted that approximately 930,000 people were 
connected to the NCC water supply, hence leaving an estimated population of 
1,050,034 relying on other sources.  
 
The report exposed the inability of the water system to meet the demand and noted that 
this deficiency was more due to institutional issues than any lack of technical 
capabilities or manpower available.449 One of the major highlights of the failures was 
the soaring percentage of unaccounted for or non-revenue water, which stood at 52%.450 
The mushrooming of slums basically as a result of a melting economy and political 
turmoil would witness several illegal connections and leakages.  These lowered the 
pressure in the system, leading to the problem of water flow.  The crisis in sanitation 
saw the emergence of what popularly became to be known as ‘flying toilets’, which 
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involved defecating in a polythene bag and hurling it into either limited open space or 
onto a roof.  This in itself was dehumanizing but yet it remained an option to many 
households, especially where basic services were completely absent.  It is this menace 
that saw many NGOs and CBOs regroup to provide shared/communal toilets in most 
informal settlements and the emergence of concepts like ECOSAN toilets amongst 
others as technological interventions to the crisis.  
 
Debates bringing together various players in the water and sanitation sector 
characterized the late 1990s, with an emergence of private-public partnerships.  This 
effort culminated in the Water Act 2002 and the creation of the Nairobi Water and 
Sewerage Company in 2003, whose agenda was improving the supply network to make 
water flow steadily for the already connected and accessible for the deprived bulk of the 
city residents.  
 
The inception of the Water Act of 2002 aimed at professionalizing water provision in 
Nairobi and it served as the last step towards water commodification.  Through a new 
organizational structure for managing water resources and privatizing water utilities, the 
stage had been set for a system that was ready to meet its opportunity costs.  The 
Nairobi City Water and Sewarage Company (NCWSC) was formed in 2003.  More 
private players had come on board to supply water and enhance accessibility.  Today, 
the company is at the centre of water provision, enjoying a monopoly administratively 
within the framework established by the Water Act of 2002.  Furthermore, embedding 
water as a basic human right under Chapter Four (the bill of rights) of Kenya’s new 
constitution 2010 changed the urban water dynamics. 
 
But despite these achievements on paper, in practice, the Nairobi City Water and 
Sewerage Company’s (NCWSC) network coverage has remained limited in supplying 
water to all city residents.  The inadequacy of the company’s system can partly be 
explained by the aging and dilapidated infrastructure network inherited from the 
previous water regimes dating to colonial days, and continued planning and engineering 
practice based on ‘modern infrastructure ideals’ rather than being informed by local-
based realities.  Since the initial layout of a centralized water infrastructure, there has 
not only been minimal expansion of the existing networks to unserved areas, but also a 
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poor repair and maintenance record for the installed works by the company’s water 
engineers. Currently, only 50% of Nairobi’s residents have access to piped water, with 
the rest obtaining water from kiosks, vendors, illegal connections and boreholes.451 
 
Coupled with the burden of rapid urbanization under resource constraints, it is clear that 
the NCWSC is unable to cope with the water demand of the burgeoning population. 
Beyond the technical issue of the inadequate network expansion, the challenges that are 
now bedevilling NWSC appear to be more on the management side, with the question 
of the (re)integration ofthese non-connected areas remaining.  This means going beyond 
the dominant paradigm of the network to create a new way to extend the service to all. 
 
6.4.1  The Prospects of Universalized Provisioning and the Technological 
Dilemma for the Urban-Poor: Small is beautiful 
 
6.4.1.1 Water kiosks versus formalization of small-scale water provisioning 
approaches 
 
In 2015, it was estimated that only 40% out of the 50% connected households had a 
continuous or regular water supply.452 What this implies is that a majority of Nairobi 
residents, both ‘connected and unconnected’,have to think beyond the network for 
provisioning.  Water vending and the use of water kiosks are not a phenomenon of the 
20th or 21st centuries.  As such, they have remained as one of the most enduring 
imprints of the issue of water supply.453 However, there has been a serious upsurge in 
their adoption, especially for ‘informal’ settlements and the middle income areas that 
are mostly targeted for water rationing by most Global South water providers. 
 
The centrality of kiosks has seen the utility company, NCWSC, adopt them for 
supplying informal areas.  This has been motivated by the ratification of water as a 
basic human right in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, in its demanding that it be enjoyed 
equally.  One way of achieving this is through increased access and by penetrating the 
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areas that the city has treated as blind spots through a localized communal access model 
via water kiosks in itself represents recognition of how these small technologies of 
provision complement the key or large infrastructures that reach only a fraction of the 
city, being deployed along class lines.  In the absence of network connections, forces 
from below, comprising neighbourhood groups – sometimes of ‘a militia nature’ that 
take advantage of governance vacuums in most informal areas454 –and other players 
‘fill the gaps’ from below.   Some of these include the standpipes, water kiosks, push or 
pull carts, boreholes and shallow wells.  While kiosks imply continuity and the 
persistence of the analogy of ‘going for water’, vending through push/pull carts and 
human porters becomes an essential link between the sources and users (households).455 
 
Over time, what started as ‘illegal’ connections of water became the key supply 
networks, easy to reinstall even when uprooted by the water company.   In tandem with 
the 2002 Water Act and the 2010 constitution, NCWSC has established the Informal 
Settlement Department through local level partnerships for organized regulated and 
improved supply.  Through these efforts, NCWSC has made an 18-km extension of its 
network to cover residents in parts of Kibera (Mashimoni), Mathare 3A and Mathare 
3B, amongst other informal settlements, as a way of enabling improved access for over 
200,000 residents.456 This was enabled through what has been established as the Water 
Services Trust Fund as a proactive kitty aimed at anchoring the financing of water 
provisioning services to underserviced areas of Kenya.  
 
The rationale for implementation brought on board Pamoja-Trust, a local-level non-
governmental organization working in informal areas towards community capacity 
building and local-level participation.  It has a long-standing reputation in initiating 
bottom-up approaches to service provision amongst the urban poor of Nairobi through 
community mobilization and partnership with international and state actors.457Pamoja-
Trust prior to this had provided formalized connections to the key storage tanks and 
standpipe points, which ensured that the poor residents accessed water regularly and at 
a relatively moderate fee away from the exploitation by cartels.  However, water cartels 
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and other private suppliers targeted their connections and storage tanks with vandalism 
and sabotage attacks so as to maximize their profits by eliminating the 
competition. 458 Currently, NCWSC is up-scaling this approach in the mid-level 
settlements.  While the main interest is to increase coverage for low-income groups by 
employing mid-level technology, it must also be seen through the lens of maximizing 
revenue by eliminating illegal connections.  
 
To improve access to water and sanitation for informal settlements, specifically Kibera, 
the slum-upgrading programme prioritized the housing that came along with networked 
pipe supply and trunk sewer lines.  For example, as part of the KENSUP programme, 
NWSC under the Kibera Water and Sanitation Project (K-WATSAN), which received 
funding jointly from G.o.K and UN-Habitat, provided a water supply network to eight 
community blocks within the villages in Kibera.459 Each block consisted of nine water 
kiosks, an overhead water storage tank, a communal bathroom and a toilet facility.  The 
laying of major sewerage pipe that cut through the informal settlement enhances the 
evacuation of faecal matter and other forms of waterborne waste from the ablution 
blocks.  
 
By virtue of NCWSC lacking administrative capability within informal areas, it 
partnered with a local NGO (Maji naUfanisi Kibera) to implement a programme of 
ensuring community mobilization and a participation component as a means of ensuring 
a people-centred approach.  The technical design component of the toilets basically 
involves the pour-flush design due to low water pressure and regularized usage through 
water-saving means.  Kjellen tackles the questions of the cost of water and states that 
public kiosks are a safeguard measure as the government should guarantee water 
services to the poor and regulate any private sector involvement in water services. 
Private operators should supplement rather than substitute the public sector in water 
provisioning, especially for the poor urban residents.  
 
                                                 
458 Oral Interviews, John Juma (not his real name), 07/09/2016, Mashimoni (Kibera) Nairobi, Kenya. 
459 UN-Habitat (2008) 
  
204  
6.4.1.2   Small-scale independent water suppliers 
The informal areas of the water scape in Nairobi have historically been treated as blind 
or blankspots on the city planning maps, and have become a melting pot for the bottom-
up approaches that serve to complement rather than replace the centralized networks, 
which basically operate along the boundary of such settlements.  Existing in non-
serviced or underserviced spaces, small scale low level initiatives have been undertaken 
either at an individual or communal level to fill the gap left by state and other major 
actors in the mainstream infrastructure sector.  Small-scale suppliers of water come in 
the form of fixed-point water providers and portable or mobile suppliers.  Fixed-point 
vending in Nairobi has a long history, from the first colonial standpipes strategically 
located on the fringes of the African-settled areas that were mostly characterized as 
informal due to their lack of tenure and owner-vending, whereby some peopleconnected 
to the city municipal mains decided to sell water in standardized jelicans (formerly 
debes) and kiosk supply systems operated by different groups connected legally or 
illegally to municipal mains.  Those with private boreholes have also been in the 
business of selling water to their neighbours or motorized vendors and pushcart 
operators.  For a long time, water has been characterized as a ‘free gift of nature’,worth 
sharing and freely accessible.  This cultural and religious connotation in a way provided 
a platform for communalized provisioning, especially in deprived settlements.  
 
As for the mobile or portable suppliers, oral interviewees in Kibera pointed towards the 
use of trucks as early as in the 1940s, locally made wheelbarrows and push/pull carts. 
They either deliver water to the users as close as possible or do household deliveries 
based on the road network.  The difference between fixed-point supply and mobile 
providers manifests itself in the cost as door to door deliveries and motorized supply 
charge higher fees compared to the user covering a distance to ‘go for water’.  
 
While the centralized system as defined by a pipe network employs rates easily 
deductible from the metering system, mobile vending and fixed standpipe supplies have 
seen a standardized evolution of the debe (the metallic container reused from being a 
commercial oil carrier) to the modern day 20-litre plastic jelican that is used as a 
  
205  
standard measure of value.   It costs between 2 and 5 Kshsduring regular supply, but 
this can rise as much as 60 Kshsduring periods of scarcity.460 
 
 Drawing the line between housing and supply mechanisms, informal settlements 
exhibit temporality in the construction of houses and congestion on unsecured tenure of 
land.  As such, they have precarious systems and as much as their mode of supply 
follows the same temporality through use of cheap materials, it exposes the poor 
residents to contamination, especially when the dominant open-drains means of 
wastewater disposal prevails.  
 
When it comes to the mobile or portable water supply means, they thrive best during 
scarcity or intermittent supply.   Scarcity is sometimes artificially engineered by ‘water 
cartels’ as a way of cashing on the users.  Mobile water suppliers source their water 
from NCWSC, standpipes, kiosks and boreholes.  Motorized vendors and water 
bowsers serve individual homes in relatively high-end estates who suffer from water 
rationing and who refill their storage tanks for extended usage or high-rise buildings 
that are underserviced due to low pressure in the network or have been developed in 
under-serviced areas, for example, in the fast-growing residential estate of Pipelines to 
the southeast of Nairobi.  Vendors and water bowsers also serve construction sites or 
buy in bulk and retail in informal settlements, institutions, restaurants and health 
facilities.  Manually-pulled carts and porters serve almost the same clientele but, as 
might be expected, they dominate low-income areas, partly because of the convenience, 
the personalized networks or the cost implications. 
 
To emphasize the ability of what begins as small or illegal and gradually gains 
legitimacy through acceptance and eventually is anchored as a major system of access, 
the NCWSC, adhering to the provisions of the 2010 Constitution, has entered into an 
arrangement that has seen these small-scale providers incorporated into the supply 
chain.  
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Image 13: Private operators’ metered connections to the mains 
 
Source: Photo taken by this researcher at theLangáta Sub-County Commissioner’s grounds 
 
Standpipe and water kiosk operators receive water from the utility company at a subsidized cost and they reconnect their individual 
pipes, mostly ending up with a ‘spaghetti outlay’. This venture attempts to regularize supply to informal areas as well as help the 
utility reduce the non-revenue water losses. 
 
Thetacit partnership between the ‘informal water operators’ and NCWSC reinforces my 
argument that the bottom-up approach complements the large technical systems of 
supply that are hampered by either politics and the economics of provision or other 
embedded forms of differentiation.  This has led to the registration of water and 
sewerage companies that are licensed to undertake the water supply through trucks and 
bowsers via the bottling and packaging of water.  This partnership helps in regularizing 
supply and pricing for consumer protection.  For small operators, the system of metered 
access helps the company to reduce non-accountable water and also ensure the quality 
of the water supplied. 
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6.4.1.3   Spaghettization in water provisioning for informal areas 
Image 14: Individual and communal water operators 
 
Source: takenin Kibera by this researcher. Itshows the pipe connections. 
The image shows one of the water operators inspecting his line whichconnects to the NCWSC central metering section. The 
technology of supply used is simple to allow for an owner ‘fix-it yourself’ approach incase of leakages caused by vandalism by 
competitors, accidental breakages or ‘tear and wear’. The influx of cheap PVC pipes in the Kenyan market since the mid-1990s has 
led to a high level of ‘spaghettization’, reducing the distance covered to ‘get water’ and the cost. 
 
 
Before the rampant connection process, both legal and illegal, a community-based 
organization, Umoja wa Maji Safi, spearheaded the supply of water by negotiating with 
the city authorities and installing storage tanks that would be supplied with water at 
subsidized rates and allowed for resale to the residents.  This association recorded 
tremendous success, but with liberalization came competition.  One community 
operator through the association blamed water vendors for water shortages by claiming 
that they sabotage community projects of supply so as to exploit residents by selling at 
higher rates.461 Apart from the water supply, such associations provided communal 
toilets that were connected to the main sewers, thus enhancing the sanitary situation in 
informal settlements.  
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The 1990s, despite witnessing tremendous change in the administration and 
management of water resources, also initiated another movement of runaway 
connections that are popularly referred to as ‘spaghetti connections’.  The case of these 
forms of connection comes intothe limelight as a grassroots initiative that initially 
started as an illegal activity but later gained recognition and acceptance from the other 
players.  The 1990s, despite witnessing the expansion and emergence of informal areas, 
also saw the emergence of militia gangs or neighbourhood/area boys who filled the 
governance vacuum in the informal areas that were being treated as blankspots by the 
city authorities. 462  The youth gangs established pseudo-systems of utility supply, 
working in cohorts with some corrupt utility companies’ employees.  
 
Facilitated by the emergence of cheap PVC pipes that required less expertise to fix and 
minimized the losses whenever uprooted by city authorities or vandalized by rival 
gangs, a network of pipes became visible, traversing open sewers and coiling along 
corridors in the congested settlements.  Despite exposing the residents to an exorbitant 
cost of water (making poor people pay more for water than the metered serviced well-
to-do residents), 463  these connections saved them the agony of walking for long 
distances in search of water and, sometimes,ensured a regular supply of water as they 
would be plugged into the water mains leading to important institutions or high-end 
residential areas where they knew the pipes never go dry.  The intricate system became 
difficult to stop and, due to more participatory deliberations spearheaded by the Civil 
Society and Rights groups, NWSC found a middle ground in the early 2000s to 
systematically connect water operators through a centralized point from where they, as 
providers, were metered and allowed to run their own supply chain deeper into the 
informal settlements.  Apart from providing some semblance in the systems of supply, 
making them a little secure from contamination, these corporations saw increased 
applications for connection, further improving water accessibility.  
 
Through the field observation and surveys, it canbe argued that the high-level 
acceptance of the bottom-linked approaches witnessed for almost two decades has 
improved livelihoods and made informal areas liveable.  Increased spaghettization has 
                                                 
462 Akallah (2012) 
463 see Kjellen and Mcgranahan (2006) 
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not only made water accessible but initiated another system of sanitation through ‘pay 
toilets’.  Several women and youth groups saw the opportunity of earning income 
through providing waterborne sanitary services.  Through partnerships with the World 
Bank, UN-Habitat, and other agencies focused on slum-upgrading programmes, major 
sewer lines were installed to cut across the settlements, allowing such decentralized 
systems of sanitation provision to plug in and provide the essential services at a 
relatively affordable cost.  Mostly, the enterprises involved an integrated bathroom or 
shower and toilets.  This has not only restored dignity to the residents but also has had a 
ripple effect in many other areas, including security (by offering former idle youths 
employment, hence keeping them away from crime) and a clean environment.464 
 
6.4.1.4     Dreaming with flying water pipes: The SHOFCO story 
Shining Hope for Communities (SHOFCO) is a local movement in Kibera, Nairobi, 
which is modelled on the principles of self-help and bringing hope to community 
through joint locally-based initiatives.  Started in humble conditions by a young man, 
Kennedy Odede, through soccer as an instrument of social mobilization and later 
partnering with Jessica Posner Odede, SHOFCO has grown through leaps and bounds 
to emerge as one of the most transformative local-level non-profit making 
organizations.  Though education for the girls and women remains their core objective, 
by mobilizing resources, SHOFCO reorganized itself to provide one of the most radical 
engineering ideas in water supply.  The first visit that I made in March 2015 witnessed 
a steady integrated system of water supply, with secure connections from the NWSC 
despite the normal shortages that characterize water supply in most parts of Nairobi. 
With massive overhead water tanks raised onto towers that are visible from kilometres 
away, SHOFCO presents a case of technology thatcan be made relevant by embracing 
the realities of time and society.  SHOFCO also had an automated card system that 
could be swiped to reveal important data on the consumption of various users and, 
sometimes, their consistency in accessing water from the various points.  This in a way 
allowed for subsidized rates and, at the same time, ensured loyalty due to the various 
competing suppliers.  The level of innovativeness exhibited through the appropriation 
of various services onsite at the user and provider level laid a strong foundation for a 
sustainable model of provision. 
                                                 
464 Focus group Discussion, Makina Kibera, 10/08/2016. 
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Apart from having the massive storage tanks for water and running an integrated public 
toilets/bathrooms-biogas system (to be discussed later), SHOFCO had taken advantage 
of its prudent management capabilities and resource mobilization to have a borehole 
sunk.  This in itself was very ambitious because Kibera as a site is known to be made up 
of a very rocky surface, having been a quarry and jungle at inception.  All in all, 
adhering to all statutory requirements and going through the requisite tests, the borehole 
was successfully sunk.  This was a deliberate measure to provide cheaper rates for 
water almost on a universal scale as the goal may expand to incorporate the entire 
Kibera area in the future.  The most challenging task seemed to be that of laying the 
pipe system for pumping water to all their distant water kiosks and the units being 
operated under their management.  The site had been attained through negotiation and a 
buy-out agreement of some structure owners.  However, piping needed an innovative 
approach, with all the space occupied leaving only corridors that served as dirty 
footpaths and open sewers for waste.  
 
It was at the moment of such a dilemma that the SHOFCO team dared to dream of the 
impossible by imagining an aerial system of water supply using electricity cables.  This 
was no mean feat.  As revealed through the conversations on site, this was a long-term 
goal, requiring maximum consultation with experts and community workers of all 
kinds.  The most interesting thing is how the management took advantage of their 
organization, receiving many researchers to solicit professional advice of any kind on 
their envisioned project.  Through sound mobilization expertise, SHOFCO not only 
won the admiration of local players but also attracted big corporations like the huge 
Kenyan Telecommunication Company, Safaricom, and famous individuals who were 
ready to partner with them.  Hence, the would-be huge fees for consultation and 
materialswere easily secured.  As a self-help social movement, SHOFCO aimed at 
harnessing local labour and materials where possible todeliver service to the 
communities they were serving at no or little cost. 
 
It was, therefore, encouraging to witness the project officially kick off in October 
2016. 465  The SHOFCO story became a story of bottom-linked approaches gaining 
viability, especially in environments where they were enabled to generate solutions they 
                                                 
465For more of an insight, see the launch at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKMEwuuH2Pk 
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best understood suited their local environments.  By understanding the dynamics of 
land tenure, the risk of surface piping systems getting contaminated, and, hence,the 
health hazards, the local needs and the threat of vandalism of water systems by rival 
water kiosk and standpipes providers, SHOFCO sought to exploit the aerial space, 
which  involved no extra costs in the form of enticers and negotiated fees with structure 
owners.  They, hence,drafted a system that would meet their social and organizational 
needs.  At the moment, SHOFCO have exported their concept to other informal 
settlements in Nairobi, specifically Mathare where they are actively engaged. 
 
6.4.1.5  Integrated water and sanitation systems: Umande Trust and the bio-centre 
concept 
One of the other visible landmarks in most informal areas of Nairobi is the bio-centres. 
Umande Trust, a rights based agency, prides itself as a believer in modest resources 
being able to significantly improve access to water and sanitation services if financial 
resources are strategically invested in support of community-led plans and actions.466 
The Trust’s underlying philosophy of ecological sanitation, as explained, is that if 
treated properly, human waste is a valuable resource.  This is no new phenomenon 
ashuman and animal excreta were used in previous times and after the sanitary 
movement in Europe for fertilizer production.  
 
To deal with the challenges of water supply and sanitation that compromised the health 
of informal areas and the city at large, the Athi Water Service Board (AWSB), which 
manages water resources in Nairobi, developed strategic guidelines to improve water 
and sanitation services in Nairobi’s informal settlements (Kibera, Korogocho and 
Mukuru).  The project was funded through the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Emergency 
Physical Investments Project (CKE 3005) – Package 4 Construction of Ablution Blocks 
in Informal Settlements in Nairobi.  This was part of a funding agreement between the 
French Development Agency (AFD) and the Government of Kenya, titled ‘Nairobi 
Water and Sewerage Emergency Physical Investments Programme (NWSEPIP)’. The 
project was financed by AFD through AWSB and the memorandum of Agreement 
(MoA) between AWSB and Umande Trust was signed on 6 August 2007.  The bio-
centres have improved water and sanitation in the area, contributing to the reduction of 
                                                 
466Binale (2012), p.1 
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related problems and access costs while fostering cohesion in the community, among 
other benefits.467 
 
Image 15: Ongoing construction of the dome shaped bio-digester 
So
urce: Umande Trust, 2008 
 
 
The bio-centre incorporated a lot of aspects that had informed the appropriate 
technology debate of the 1970s by using local skills and incorporating social 
components at all stages, where people were not only trained but were made to 
participate in the actual construction and running of the centres.  By incorporating a 
business model that allows members to charge subsidized fees for the bathrooms 
facilities and cooking gas, members were able to meet the operational costs and earn 
livelihoods for themselves.  The social hall at the top allows for community meetings, 
promoting coherence, solidarity and corporation as important grassroot aspects of 
citizenship representation and mobilization.  The bio-centres being coordinated and 
instituted through partnerships with major stakeholders has allowed for the provision of 
                                                 
467Ibid. 
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a piped water supply system to the site by NCWSC, enhancing coverage, access and 
affordability to the users of such facilities. 
 
Image 16:  Grassroot participation at the technical and social levels 
 
Source: Umande Trust, 2008 
 
 
Though brilliantly conceived and implemented, this approach has not been up-scaled to 
cover wider areas.  Perhaps the positive side of it is how other NGOs and community 
organizations, such as the SHOFCO, as discussed above, were able to borrow and 
incorporate this model in their approach, not only to provide water points and sanitation 
facilities but also to harness cooking gas to supplement their energy requirements in 
their school feeding programmes.  
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Image 17 Complete dome shaped structure with toilets and bathrooms, gas 
chamber/cooking area and social hall (upper floor) 
 
So
urce: Umande Trust, 2011. 
 
6.4.1.6  Pit-latrine emptors: The big and small of sanitation in informal areas 
The ground in Kibera does not allow for pit-latrines to be dug beyond six feet in depth. 
This had been revealed in a major studied carried by the colonial government in the 
1920s as it grappled with what it called the ‘Kibera problem’.468 This is not only the 
case in Kibera.  Most of the informal settlements have the one major characteristic of 
being mostly uninhabitable zones, such as abandoned quarry fields.  The construction 
of pit-latrines, where they really existed, thus had to be done innovatively by raising 
them a few metres from the ground and sometimes having mechanisms for emptying 
into open drains during heavy rainfall on one side and, at the same time, allowing for 
handemptying.  However, it is the congestion in such areas that makes it difficult for 
emptying.  While partners like UNDP and the World Bank thought of providing tractors 
to help in dealing with this situation, a group of local people have re-organized 
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themselves by mounting a metallic oil-drum on a two wheel cart tiny enough to 
circumvent the narrow alleys that litter most informal settlements.  The tractor would 
mean a very long pipe, and wastherefore inefficient,and alsomight not have been able to 
deal with clogged latrines due to dumping of non-biodegradable materials in the pits.  
 
The operators interviewed cited mixed materials finding their way into most pit-
latrines, making hand emptying the most efficient approach as sorting can be done to 
facilitate removal of excreta.  Having worked for over twenty years, the hand-emptors 
are widely known and their services are easily procured from a common site where they 
hang out when not contracted.  While dumping of the raw excreta can be a challenge 
that can easily pose a threat to the rivers where they would probably be dumped, 
partnership with other agencies has allowed for coordinated working between city 
authorities and these operators.  They take the excreta to a centralized site where it is 
taken over by the city authorities for treatment.  This clearly reinforces the notion of 
devolved systems working seamlessly with centralized networks to attain a formidable 
equilibrium rather than a conflictual interaction between the large and small, and the 
formal and informal, amongst other binaries.  Furthermore, it clearly demonstrates 
Abdou Malique Simone’s thesis of ‘people as infrastructure’469 since these small-scale 
operators have cemented themselves as an integral part of the day-to-day lived 
experiences of the residents of informal settlements in Nairobi.  
                                                 
469Simone (2004), pp.407-429. 
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Images18: Motorized exhauster versus pushcart emptor 
Ph
oto by researcher: hand-pulled pit-latrine emptying 
 
 
Ph
oto by researcher: UNDP/World Bank funded sanitation/septic tank/toilet exhauster 
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6.5  Revisiting Localised Technological Approaches 
To see ‘small technologies’ simply as a non-departure or reversal of a nostalgic past 
becomes more of an acknowledgement of its centrality to development in terms of 
improved livelihoods and ecological balance, with large technologies being seen as 
pervasive and destructive to the environment.  Appropriate technology and current 
(small and localised) technology as suggested by Harvard professor, Harvey Brooks, 
are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and the potential benefits of both 
would be greatly enhanced when the two were made to co-exist.470 Of importance is the 
understanding that alongside the co-existence of the large and small, the contemporary 
and the old, the sophisticated and the simple or the imported and the indigene, 
appropriate technology in itself represented a heterogeneous set of social and technical 
options rather than a homogeneous phenomenon, and the best choices between the 
alternatives were based on the objectives to be accomplished and the possible human 
and environmental effects.471 
 
It is utterly unrealistic to describe any technology that enhances the capacity to satisfy 
community goals and aspirations as inefficient.472 Rather than paying attention to the 
product, the emphasis should be on the process of how tools mediate between humans 
and the attainment of their needs for sustenance.  Such a process, of course, is loaded 
with socio-cultural and political connotations.  Hence, many technologies fail not 
because of their innate qualities of the material or system being implemented, but 
because of the way they are introduced into local situations.473 In the same realm, where 
technologies travel into new territories and along other frontiers, the attention should be 
on the methods of transfer and the new zones as contested spaces.  Incoming 
technologies in themselves are also contestable, with choice being an integral quality of 
any technology, large or small.  
 
By technology concentrating on non-human factors, it remains divorced from the 
realities of the communities where it is applied and expected to serve.   People have to 
be anchored at the centre of any process of technology transfer and in the production 
                                                 
470 Brooks (1980) 
471Akubue (2000), p.8. 
472 CSIR Built Environment Unit, Appropriate Technologies in the water Sector in South Africa(Position Paper), May 2008, p.3 
473Ibid. 
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cycle.  Putting everything in perspective, it is justifiable to observe that, away from the 
emphasis on a ‘quantum leap’ kind of economic planning that is externally driven, local 
people have to be allowed to operate on a trajectory that recognizes ‘self-organization’ 
by utilizing indigenous skills, local materials and personal innovative skills, and, 
through small groups, pursue a path in which they co-exist as assets in the system of 
provisioning.  They must be seen as co-producers, but more than co-producers also. 
Whether reactive or proactive, the appropriateness of technology must be context 
specific not just as an approach but also as an outcome deriving from below.  The 
power of people to understand their problems better and self-organize towards 
providing localized solutions to their daily challenges cannot be downplayed in the face 
of the trumped-up ability and efficiency of grand projects.  Different players in 
technology development and transfer determine the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ component of the 
resultant artefacts, and how this manifests itself at a social level is what determines its 
appropriateness.  
 
Concurrently, disbursement based on annual budgetary allocations easily becomes an 
end in itself as pursued by the implementers and not the responders to the needs, 
capabilities and the participation of the recipients or those to whom the various projects 
are purported to serve. 474  There is greater authority wielded by consultants and 
contractors in defining which problems and how they ought to be solved.  With such 
power enjoyed by virtue of the prominence of scientific expertise and ‘best practice’, 
the choice made is heavily pegged on technical competence and business interests.475 
As such, there may be little incentive to look for appropriate technology in a wider 
sense, but, rather, a tendency to stick to technical solutions that are known, without 
going into what those solutions embody or presuppose in the way of institutional 
arrangements or users’ preferences.476 In the end, the external agenda and interests 
result in the exclusion of the end users, contrary to the general goal and vision of the 
projects in the first place. 
 
                                                 
474See MarikenVaa and NordiskaAfrikainstitutet, research report no.94, (1993). 
475See Gran (1985) 
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6.6  Which way Forward: Hybridity or Exclusivity? 
Contemporary water practices in Nairobi demonstrate that contrary to the widely agreed 
argument of public utilities not serving informally developed areas (seen as legitimizing 
illegal settlements), NCWSC is actively increasing its water supply to informal 
settlements across the city.  As already mentioned, the water sector in Kenya has 
undergone various institutional regimes, with the current policies recognizing pro-poor 
approaches that emphasize every citizen’s right to safe and clean water supply.  This 
constitutional right gave NCWSC the impetus to form the informal settlements 
department to execute its mandate accordingly.  Under the new department, water 
engineers have acknowledged the inadequacy of a purely engineering approach in water 
supply. 477  The department employed a team of sociologists to work on the social 
components of servicing informal settlements. The Mathare and Kibera cases 
demonstrate how NCWSC worked closely with locally-based NGOs in gaining ground 
support for the water kiosk projects while, at the same time, understanding the 
dynamics of supplying such settlements with water.  Here, NCWSC drew important 
lessons that are relevant for servicing low-income groups outside engineering 
knowledge. 
 
Given the inadequacies of the utility’s piped water to reach every household, water 
kiosks can be a viable alternative, which NCWSC can use to improve access to water 
supply to low-income groups. Rather than insisting on individual household 
connections as envisioned by the universal aspects of the networked infrastructure, 
NCWSC can still achieve ‘water for all’ through pipe-fed kiosks.  This is a practical 
solution, especially for servicing low-income settlements where the laying of water 
infrastructure in the conventional way may be difficult due to dense settlements that 
may call for the demolition of structures and relocation processes, have complex land 
tenure issues, and have cost implications.  This complex picture, present across the 
informal settlements of Nairobi, further, does not hold for a networked infrastructure 
model, which presupposes a properly planned city providing guidelines on 
infrastructure layout. Instead of a ‘plan-service infrastructure-build-occupy’ 
development model, Nairobi’s development pattern depicts the reverse, where residents 
first occupy and build before the planning and provision of infrastructure is done. 
                                                 
477 Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company, (2009). 
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Aware of such realities, NWSC in the meantime cannot wish informal settlements away 
when close to 55% of Nairobi’s resident live in such areas.478The utility company has, 
therefore, had to revise its approach to water supply if it is to live up to its mandate of 
serving all residents living in Nairobi. 
 
Nairobi’s water supply involves a complex mesh of actors with varied interests. 
Whereas the literature on ‘modern infrastructure ideals’ point to a monopolistic 
infrastructure supply, the case of Nairobi water supply presents us with an array of 
actors, ranging from the public utility (NCWSC), NGOs and CBOs to self-help 
community groups, individual vendors and privately-registeredsmall-scale water 
operators.  The increased number of actors in the water sector has reconfigured the 
traditional centralized supply mode to include varied technologies in producing and 
distributing water to city residents.  The drilling of boreholes and use of motorized 
trucks or manual-driven carts and bicycles to deliver water to unserviced areas and the 
overt reliance on fragmented sanitation systems of the same nature have become a 
predominant practice in various parts of Nairobi.  This leads us to yet another related 
argument of consumers as passive receivers of services.  On the other hand, many of 
NCWSC’s customers are dissatisfied with the water and sanitation supply service, 
resorting to alternatives of digging boreholes and tapping into the water vending 
business or constructing septic tanks, cesspools or pit-latrines that are exhausted either 
by tractors or handheld/pulled appliances.  As for the interests involved, whereas 
NCWSC’s target is to reduce unaccounted-for water, build revenue base and reduce 
illegal connections through water kiosks in informal settlement, water vendors’ interest 
rest in maximizing business opportunities through profit making and earning a 
livelihood.  The liberalizing of the water sector has meant that water is commodified 
and, as an economic good, water attracts interest from private market actors.  It can be 
said that the current thriving of small-scale water supplies is a manifestation of 
operationalizing the commercialization policy, as provided by the Water Act of 2002. 
 
Despite the critical role that water vendors play in servicing areas cut off from the 
utility company’s water, their operations often come with considerable consequential 
effects on water supply.  For instance, vendors are seen as exploiters, –charging high 
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prices for low quality water.  While water prices at public kiosks are highly subsidized 
for the sake of public interest through a non-revenue water policy, private vendors 
overcharge for their services, with the poor bearing the brunt.   Private vendors’ sources 
of water often raise questions, linking them to illegal tapping of the utility company’s 
mains.  On the other hand, borehole water vendors submit applications for the drilling 
and operation of boreholes, but testing of the water quality is only done at the 
commissioning stage, with no subsequent testing.  In as much as boreholes offer a 
reliable supply of water compared to those dependent on the utility’s supply, borehole 
vendors tend to charge higher prices to take advantage of their reliability.  Recognizing 
the potential role performed by private vendors offers an opportunity for the NCWSC to 
regulate the water price and quality in a collaborative approach. 
 
6.6  Chapter Conclusion 
The relative failure of the water network and sanitation infrastructure in Nairobi can 
partly be explained by the legacies of the colonial engineering, which, in itself, 
contained elements of spatial segregation of the city based on race and were never 
conceived to attain egalitarianism within the urban spaces. Until today, major 
engineering efforts have been oriented towards increasing the water supply offerby 
tapping water from distant catchment areas and believing in networked household 
wastewater evacuation through large technical systems in the direct continuity of 
colonial engineering. 
 
With the challenges of rapid urbanization and a lack of resources, the centralized 
approach actualized through the LTSs comes short in terms of water supply networks 
expansion, leaving one part of the city unconnected and reproducing the inequalities of 
the past.  AS during the colonial times, the skewed water connectivity and supply by the 
NCWSC has left many residents living beyond the networks, depending on alternative 
water supply systems.  Even among those living in areas connected to the central 
system, the unreliability of the system for delivering water all the time, partly due to 
extended water rationing and system breakdown, has forced residents to seek external 
alternatives in supplementing the utility’s water supply.  The same goes for deficient 
wastewater removal mechanisms, leaving the majority of the populace to adopt 
devolved systems that are context specific, such as septic tanks for low-density 
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settlements and communal washrooms for congested informal areas.  The growing 
reinforcement of these other non-networked systems in everyday practices presents an 
opportunity for leaving the old colonial engineering practices and building an 
innovative model that could universalize the service provisioning to all citizens.   
Rather than sticking exclusively to a network supply approach, NCWSC has recently 
opened an informal settlement department to adapt to the realities of the city, and the 
engineering practices seem to be embracing new rationales in moving towards a more 
demand approach, which is currently leading to the implementation of decentralized 
options, such as water vendors and water kiosks, with a sustainable diminution of the 
water consumption.  This path, which recognizes the complementary role played by 
variegated or decentralized modalities of water and sanitation provisioning, offers a real 
opportunity to build a new water and sanitation regime for universalizing the right to 
social services for all citizens in Nairobi beyond the network paradigm. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
7.1  Introduction 
While it is overly ambitious and herculean to imagine that a history of over a hundred 
years of the development and evolution of Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructure 
system can be unravelled in one thesis, I undertook this move with the aim of 
unbundling the large technical systems of supply and the multi-faceted process of 
appropriation which acknowledge bottom-linked technological shifts.  Global South 
urban spaces present mixed narratives that for long have either disappeared or continue 
to be suppressed by the methodological and theoretical approaches that treat the South 
as lacking agency or incapable of progress.  As a way of ‘worlding’479Global South 
studies of technology, I questioned how provisioning for water and sanitation has been 
mapped out in Nairobi since its foundation in 1899, with the goal of producing 
narratives of the daily experiences of the users.  Seeing colonialism and urbanity as 
contested processes 480  informed this undertaking, not only as a way of filling the 
historiographical gap that exists in the history of technology in Africa but also as an 
effort at de-bracketing Global South histories of urbanization.  For this purpose, this 
study walked the thin line between addressing the theoretical and empirical concerns 
concurrently in developing a history of technology responsive to the Global South, 
especially Africa, and being anchored in what is considered today as global scholarship 
(for example, Global HOT).  Before I draw the key conclusions deriving from this 
study, it is important to revisit some of the lingering theoretical aspects of inclusive 
global scholarship which the history of technology (HOT) cannot escape.  This is 
important as a way of setting the right backdrop against which to unravel emerging 
issues within the Global Southas unique and equally relative to the North, and as 
intertwined histories and topographies of both regional and global processes of 
development. 
 
                                                 
479‘Worlding’is borrowed from the aspect of ‘Provincialising Europe’ advanced by Chakrabarty (2000) to encompass the 
efforts aimed at complicating scholarship by challenging the assumed universality of theories derived from experiences in 
the North. See Ananya Roy in Oldfield and Parnell (2014), p.9 andKooy and Furlong (2017), p.4. 
480Bigon(2012) and Arnold (2005); see also Fourchard (2011), pp. 223-248. 
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7.2  Revisiting Theoretical Aspects in the Global South Studies 
This study was informed by David Arnold’s call for a shift towards a history of 
technology that focuses on use, effects and meaning so as to capture the experiences of 
the Global South without privileging the North.481 David Egerton’s The Shock of the 
Old (2007) and his ideas of creole technologies provided reference points, even when 
not conspicuously visible in the thesis, as it addresses not only users’ agency but also 
unbundles centralized large technical systems as ubiquitous imprints.  From the advent 
of colonialism to date, large technical systems of supply more often than not continue to 
co-exist harmoniously or in conflict with indigenous technological ideas, ideals or 
artefacts.  Alongside many authors whose primary concern has been to lend a voice to 
the Global South, theoretical questions which help mediate the achievement of this end 
abound.  From Thomas Hughes’ ‘seamless web’ metaphor, which alludes to the 
inseparable connections among technical, social, and economic aspects of large scale 
technological systems, to John Law’s ‘heterogeneous engineering’, which provides an 
extensive way of talking about the interactions among the technical, social, political and 
economic dimensions of engineering work,482 many talking points have emerged to 
witness a shift from technological determinism to a SCOT analysis, which 
acknowledges the centrality of context in understanding the invention and innovation of 
technology and the need to see technical artefacts as socio-culturally constructed. 
 
Acknowledging this progress in the history of technology and other technology-related 
studies, Hecht in The Radiance of France (2009) observes that a loose consensus has 
developed around the notion that technology, politicsand culture are mutually 
constitutive.  However, by and large, the history of technology and its disciplinary 
cousins – as she refers to other sociological studies – have expended considerably more 
energy on the construction of technology than on the construction of culture or 
politics.483 Though it is understandable that the fear of relapsing into technological 
determinism or reified and hubristic representations of technology have led scholars to 
use culture primarily as an explanatory factor, what has preoccupied studies of the 
history of technology, the foundation for this study has been the relationship between 
                                                 
481 Arnold (2005), p.87 
482 See Law’s essays in Bijker et al. (1987) and in Pinch and Law (1992), as cited in Hecht (2009), p. 39 
483 Hecht (2009), p.40 
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politics, technology and culture.  The assumption here is that political, social, and 
cultural choices shape the design and growth of technical artefacts and systems.484 
Moreover, technical artefacts and the process of appropriation, especially of incoming 
technologies, must be understood as non-neutral and users as not just mere passive 
recipients.  The technological and spatial patchwork or collage that manifests itself in 
cities like Nairobi – as demonstrated throughout this work by the multiplicity and 
‘decentred’ modalities of provisioning for water and sanitation – has to be understood 
away from the conventional technological determinism perspective or Daniel 
Headrick’s ‘Tools of Empire’ narrative. But it must also visualize technological 
processes as multi-lineal and heterogeneously constituted. 
 
In locating and localizing Global South studies, the idea, as Michelle Kooyand  Kathryn 
Furlong argue, is not to draw a line between ‘North’ and ‘South’ as distinct categories 
to be theorized independently.  The South, like all spaces, is relational and exists 
through a complex network of connections that are always unstable. 485 Clapperton 
Chakanetsa Mavhunga draws attention to the inadequacy of conventional (Western) 
STS at redressing itself to non-Western contexts.  The explanation is that while STS in 
traditional practice is good at identifying banal forms of science and technology, it is 
severely limited in the Global South societies in which the black and white of things 
that are technological and scientific are not or may not be readily recognizable.486 The 
binary of North and South that is presented asymmetrically by being skewed towards 
the North ordinarily distorts both theory and practice by ‘treating places outside the 
Anglo-American (read as Euro-American) heartland as sources of data rather than sites 
for theorization in their right’. 487  Even though when reading Mavhunga, whom I 
categorize as one of the leading African scholars with special interest to STS, one feels 
a strong urge to adopt an Africanist approach to technology studies, yet this may lead to 
writing revisionist history or falling into the trap of the colonial historiographers as has 
often happened with nationalist African historiography.  In challenging the ‘neo-
colonial narrative about Africa’, Murunga envisions the need to invert the old model of 
                                                 
484See Hughes (1983), MacKenzie(1990), Noble (1984), Pinch and Law (1992), and Bijkeret al. (1987), as cited in Hecht 
(2009), p.40. 
485Comaroff and Comaroff(2012) and Mabin(2014) in Kooy and Furlong (2017), p.4. 
486Mavhunga (2017), p. xi 
487 Parnell and Robinson (2012), p. 596 in Kooy and Furlong (2017). 
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North-South and construct new forms of knowledge that encompass ordinary people’s 
daily experiences.488 In recognition of this, I see the acknowledgement of the cyclic 
nature of movement and transfer of knowledge as more informative as long as the 
Global South locations are viewed as historical rather than ahistorical, and that they 
exist as active sites for knowledge production rather than passive recipients of the 
Western ‘development, modernity and progress’. 
 
Our concern should not be about addressing Africa and the entire Global South as 
special sites but about the historicity and particularities of these spaces.489 For example, 
despite Nairobi being uniquely a city in East Africa that is replete with local histories, it 
cannot be understood extensively without acknowledging its connection to the British 
imperial histories and the configurations of the entire commonwealth of nations.  It is 
against this backdrop that this thesis explores interconnectedness as manifested by the 
complementarity argument that conspicuously arises as we follow in the footprints of 
Nairobi’s urbanity and its water and sanitation technological scapeof both centralized 
and ‘decentred’ technologies of provision and access.  By questioning existing 
historical trajectories and the general scholarship on urbanity, technology and society in 
Africa, this study sought to locate the ordinary people’s agency in infrastructural 
developments as localized processes.  In doing so, it addressed itself to the interaction 
between conventional or popular engineering models of social service provisioning and 
the shifts from below, especially in ‘informal spaces’.  The greatest deduction that 
informed most arguments is that ‘neglected spaces’ that represent informality are fertile 
spots for invention and interstices of innovation, technological flash points and nodes of 
technological divergence.  As demonstrated throughout the thesis, it is not possible to 
deduce the question of either/or in terms of dominant systems of provision, as what 
emanates is the co-existence of multiple technologies to give us a quilted ‘techno-
spatial’ topology. 
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Nairobi, like any city in the world, has its urban materialities embodying aspirations of 
various actors, but, historically, its engineer sociologists continued to define both the 
characteristics of the technical artefact and the social universe in which they were to 
function.490 As a colonial city and asan urban space, Nairobi is loaded with imprints of 
social differentiation, social control and domination and the post-colony has seen elitist 
ideals foment themselves in parallel with a rapidly expanding group of urban poor. 
However, much as infrastructure supply has for several years followed a variegated 
path, this study sought to push the boundaries beyond asymmetries of race and the 
haves versus the have-nots, or legitimate residents versus ‘vagabonds or deplorables’, 
amongst many other social characterizations.  As cities not only in the South but also in 
the North witness the emergence of unprecedented infrastructures which are not owned 
by government or large businesses, away from the centralized or controlled top-down 
by government or industry, instead they become owned and developed by individual 
citizens or small businesses.  Yet they manage to mushroom into local, regional and 
even global infrastructures.491 What then does the historicizing and particularization of 
Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructure reveal to us as we move towards global 
HOT? 
 
7.3  Key Discussion Points and Reflections 
7.3.1  Socio-Spatial Appropriation and Technological Representations 
Most technologies of water and sanitation are either interconnected to land use patterns 
or their utilization is impacted by spatial dynamics.  In the colonial context, land was 
central to the patterns of urbanity and the social security of certain urban residents. 
Nairobi, as explained in this thesis, developed from scratch, rising from a simple 
railway depot to the metropolis it is today.   However, as we grapple with questions of 
technologies of social service supply and access, the key discussion that arises is how 
spatial appropriation dynamics have not only shaped urban (Nairobi’s) history but how 
the technological scape is shaped by the same socio-spatial processes of urban 
development.  It is impossible to explore the sanitary and water-provisioning question 
in most urban areas without revisiting how land as a factor is socio-politically 
reconstituted. 
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Nairobi in its first two decades of development grew organically with the arrival of the 
railroad in 1899. 492  This ad hoc nature by which Nairobi existed was a major 
impediment to infrastructure planning, especially when based on land concessions.493 
The proponents of the ‘networked city ideal’ espouse a system of interconnected nodes 
through built infrastructures that are highly centralized in terms of how they are 
governed and managed.  This ‘modern’ ideal presupposes a spatially and socially 
ubiquitous, top-down governed infrastructure system which provides exclusive and 
homogenous services across the city.494 But it is important to note how this ‘modern 
infrastructural ideal’ casts infrastructures as public goods, whose construction, use, and 
maintenance and extension are closely connected with the land use regulationsof the 
state. 495  These infrastructures embody technical networks for the supply of urban 
services that are ‘blackboxed’ and hidden in ‘underground cities’, 496  with the 
assumption that they are ‘utterly fixed, hard technologies characterized by perfect order, 
completeness, immanence and internal homogeneity’.497 One key characteristic of most 
built infrastructures, especially of the networked ideal, is their invisibility, which many 
times derives from the fact that most are laid underground.  They only become visible 
when and where they fail.  This notwithstanding, one thing that is clear is the centrality 
of land in shaping patterns of infrastructure systems access, whether buried 
underground or laid above ground.  Land appropriation patterns that spatially represent 
and characterize the city put a mark on technological outlays, be they of a centralized 
and monolithic manner or ‘decentred’ and fragmented.  Large technical systems govern 
in a top-down way and the ‘small technologies’ of provision that thrive on individual or 
communal efforts all coalesce to make heterogeneous imprints of urbanity.  Most 
ideologies and theoretical discourses of technology studies underplay the spatial aspects 
that shape processes of invention, innovationdeployment, and adoption of technologies 
as artefacts of daily life.  In writing this thesis, I endeavoured to point out how the 
urban technological scape is uniquely variegated in tandem with specific spatial and 
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land expropriation patterns.  I pushed beyond the conventional narratives of racially 
segregated cities and the over-emphasized informality question to locate the 
autonomous nature of technologies of provisioning, especially water and sanitation. 
 
Retrospectively, much as the Global South has witnessed massive growth in 
contemporary urban studies that focus on infrastructure, the emergence of the 
‘splintering urbanism’ hypothesis needs re-questioning.  To this end, a number of works 
have emerged to challenge the attempt at positioning the urban infrastructural 
disaggregation as a recent phenomenon.  Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker use the 
Jakarta case to historically locate ‘decentred’ approaches to water access.498Meanwhile, 
Kooyand Furlong state that analyses of water supply in Southern cities that do not pay 
attention to processes beyond the network can obscure deep inequalities grounded in 
conditions of ecological vulnerability.  They argue that looking beyond the network 
lends greater complexity to discussions of water’s urbanization.  These arguments are 
illustrated through the examples of the interacting flows of piped water, groundwater, 
wastewaterand floodwater in Jakarta.   Although these cannot account for the fullness 
of water’s urbanization, they demonstrate its importance beyond the network and the 
need for research in Southern urbanisms and in Urban Political Ecology (UPE) to 
engage seriously with networks that are not only multiple and unstable, but are 
constantly remaking and being remade through the intersections of inequality, 
technologyand ecology. 499  In the same way, Elizabeth Wamuchiru challenges the 
notion of ‘the networked infrastructural ideal’ by building a narrative of co-production 
and heterogeneity of technical systems of water supply in Nairobi. 500  However, 
juxtaposed against ‘splintering urbanism’ thesis, this work confirms the massive shifts 
towards multiple small-scale modalities of provision as a postcolonial phenomenon.  It 
is with this understanding that I reverse the narrative by pointing out that the Global 
South cities and perhaps those of the North have traditionally been fragmented and 
‘splintered’ in terms of their socio-technical topologies.  Nairobi, for instance, is 
marked by a quilt of different socio-technical arrangement of water and sanitation 
provision that combine both top-down approaches that are characterized by highly 
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centralized municipal governance and bottom-linked modalities.  These include shallow 
wells, bore-holes, rain-water-harvesting, cess-pits and pushcarts.  There are also 
mediative hybridized arrangements, such as the ‘spaghetti’ pipes and standpipes cum 
water kiosks.   The centrality of some of these methods from below, as espoused in this 
study, has witnessed a process of being streamlined and acknowledged by the utility 
companies, run from above, through public-private partnerships that combine the large 
and the small to plug into the technological gaps existing, especially in the informal 
settlements that are melting pots of both technological innovation and contestation. 
Heterogeneity and ‘decentred’ or devolved small-scale modalities of provision have 
been and will remain a permanent marker of most cities as their history goes hand in 
glove with that of the cities themselves.  Nairobi’s chequered sociotechnical outlay is as 
old as the city itself. 
 
Wiebe E. Bijker, addressing the ‘principle of symmetry’ in sociotechnical explanations 
of technology in Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs (1995), states that one way of 
avoiding the twin horns of social and technical reductionism is to introduce other 
differentiations between explanandum and explanans, between dependent and 
independent variables, between foreground and background – differentiations that are 
not based on the distinction between the social and the technical.501 This he refers to as 
‘the technological frame’, which allows us to distinguish foregrounds and backdrops 
other than the technical and the social (or vice versa).502The stark topological variations 
manifest different narratives of technology and see the interfaces between the human 
and physical urban components as ‘innovation junctions’. 503  Using the dominant 
paradigm of LTS as the departure point and seeking to locate technologies of water and 
sanitation from below, especially as experienced by ordinary citizens through their day 
to day livelihoods, this thesis approached technologies as embedded in social, economic 
and political norms or meanings and drew various effects from their usage that spur 
counter-productions in the form of hybrids, contestations or the persistency of the 
indigene.  This not only leads to social reconfigurations but also reproduces techno-
political and spatial definitions.  It makes it possible to walk through different epochs of 
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Nairobi’s evolution, delineating the multiple narratives of technological obduracy and 
paucity, especially in water and sanitation, distinctly pointing out the shifts from the 
organic city of the pre- First World War period to the rational or planned city of post 
1920 and the kind of socio-technical ramifications these changes had on the urban 
residents collectively and distinctively.  Concomitantly, I analysed local developments 
by flipping the two sides of the coin, back and forth, unpacking the dominant global 
paradigms, such as the ‘high-modernist ideals’ and ‘appropriate technology’ rhetoric of 
the 1950s to the 1980s.  This unfurled narratives that offer wider lenses of 
understanding both the social and political character of sociotechnical systems. 
Nairobi’s water and sanitation scape, thus, emerges as a multilayered outlook which 
combines the visible and invisible components that emerge from an interaction of 
several actors key, being foreign ideologists and financiers as well as local decision 
makers, non-human actants and users (residents). 
 
7.3.2  A Political History of Technology 
It is common knowledge that colonialism in Africa as instituted by European powers at 
the close of the 19th century represented the worst form of racism.  However, in 
analysing the evolution of key infrastructures, one needs to hesitate and refocus so as to 
approach the subject holistically rather than taking the much trodden but limiting 
bifurcated path of reducing everything to power and race relations.  While colonialism 
thrived on notions of white supremacy that were atavistically justified by deep-seated 
Eurocentric ideals, infrastructure provision stretches further than race dictates.  A 
survey of the development of Nairobi’s water and sanitation infrastructurein a way that 
attempts to locate the race question beyond the normative interpretations, as attempted 
in this dissertation, opens more windows to critically understanding the all-roundedness 
of technology and, in this case, infrastructures of water and sanitation provision as 
artefacts functioning in socio-cultural and geopolitical milieus.  The social contexts 
within which technology arises and functions encompass a system of tensions and 
controversies due to the contested natureboth of things and society at large.  Whether 
protracted conflict rather than closure or consensus leads to sociotechnical stabilization 
is open for discussion.504 
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The theory of technological politics, as Winner states, draws attention to the momentum 
of large-scale sociotechnical systems, to the response of modern societies, to certain 
technological imperatives, and to the all too common signs of the adaptation of human 
ends to technical means.  In so doing, it offers a novel framework of interpretation and 
explanation for some of the more puzzling patterns that have taken shape in and around 
the growth of modern material culture.505 This approach proposes that we take artefacts 
seriously by paying attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning 
of those characteristics. 506  While it was not the main goal to reproduce Winner’s 
technological politics theory, in the contextual analysis of the large technical systems of 
water and sanitation for Nairobi and the bottoms-up representations of supply, this 
thesis affirms the notion of technological non-neutrality.  Technical artefacts, be they 
small or big, are embedded in politics as they occur in a socially and economically 
contested milieu.  The meanings and effects of these artefacts either point towards 
intended or unintended consequencesas they are appropriated, produced or co-
produced.  They become actants that visualize and represent socio-cultural constructs. 
 
Gabrielle Hecht states that opening the black boxes of culture and technology 
simultaneously can, for example, give us an insight into how technologies constitute a 
terrain for transforming, enactingor protesting power relations within the social fabric. 
Taking politics and culture as objects of analysis greatly deepens our understanding of 
technological change.507 This reinforces Winner’s earlier observation on the importance 
of the technological politics approach not as a substitute but as a complementary 
theoretical perspective to the earlier conventional frameworks of analysis.  In tandem 
with this approach, I undertook to retrospectively analyse the water and sanitation 
sphere for Nairobi both from above and below.  This exercise does not witness a 
momentous departure from the technological narratives of infrastructures emerging in 
particular from Global South landscapes such as Kooy’s Jakarta508 or Kjellen’s Dar es 
Salaam,509 but it represents the historical particularities of Nairobi as both a settler and 
colonial city.  The British imperialists in their colonization of Kenya were reluctant, 
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with Uganda having been their main ‘jewel’ in the East African region and, as Murunga 
notes, the first step towards the consolidation of political power was achieved through 
the establishment of centres like Nairobi with a rudimentary administrative 
system.510However, this process of consolidation proved an intractable challenge that 
was further exacerbated by controversies within the administration between settlersand 
by the fact that, unlike South Africa, Kenya ‘was appropriated whole by a metropolitan 
power which wanted to control the region but did not have any clear notion in advance 
of what to do with it.’511 This in itself led to Nairobi having a stuttered start by what its 
first colonial administrator, John Ainsworth (1864-1946), characterized as the lack of a 
definite scheme or layout and where ‘…things just moved on and were liable to 
alteration to suit some particular fad and fancy’.512 How did this shape the infrastructure 
landscape and discourse of technologies of provision? 
 
First and foremost, the adoption of a given technical system actually requires the 
creation and maintenance of a particular set of social conditions as the operating 
environment of that system.513 The sanitarians led by Edwin Chadwick in 19th century 
England and Wales did not just campaign for the adoption of technical solutions to the 
miasmas through piped systems of water supply and waste water egestion from the 
cities.  They went a notch higher in augmenting a highly centralized municipal system 
with strong policies through the adoption of the Metropolitan Sewers Act of 1848 that 
forbade the construction of houses without suitable drains and required them to be 
connected to public sewers provided there was one within 100 feet, thus echoing the 
provisions of the 1844 Metropolitan Buildings Act.  For the first time in the history of 
the city, the commissioners (administrators) were given the authority to order that 
existing properties be connected to sewers.   Lack of co-operation by the owner invited 
the commissioners executing the work themselves and passing a levy onto the owner.514 
It was this high centralization and power consolidation in management boards that 
Chadwick had envisioned in his report of 1842.  This was founded on the belief that it 
was the only effective mechanism to deal with opposition from persons and groups with 
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vested interests and local rights campaigners.  Hence, certain technologies can only 
function within certain specific politically-constituted environments as either 
authoritarian or democratic (liberal) and vice versa, where the technologies as non-
neutral entities reproduce autocracy or democracy in governance.  As for Nairobi, the 
non-defined colonial power structure meant that the city started to grow organically 
without clear guidelines and planning considerations. 
 
However, the presence of the Kenya-Uganda railway corporation, not only as a fore-
runner and founder of Nairobi in its ‘modern’ form but as a commercial entity with a 
clear internal chain of command – from Thomas Hughes’ systems analogy – meant a 
parallel system that reproduced political and administrative duality.  The corporation 
did not only exhibit stronger financial muscle necessary for supporting large technical 
urban set-ups, it almost monopolised the higher technical expertise from its pool of 
engineers and Asian (Indian) coolies attached to its regiment.  This duality has been 
indicted for the haphazard and ad hoc nature in which Nairobi developed, plunging into 
major bubonic plague outbreaks in 1901/1902, 1904 and1906, and later in 1913. 
Despite the controversy that shrouds the Williams Commission of 1907 investigating 
Nairobi and senior politicians like Winston Churchill who gave the city a clean bill of 
health on its suitability as a site, questions abound on how to provide a panacea to the 
water paucity and the sanitary ‘time bomb’ that continued to tick alarmingly.  Although 
Nairobi suffered a major fire outbreak in 1902 that razed most of the initial 
establishments, this dynamic hardly informs water infrastructure planning or atleast the 
debate around it as one would state for cities such as Hamburg in Germany, where 
planning for water coalesced around the quest not only for a sanitary city but also one 
that was secure from devastating fires. Of importance to note is how the plague 
epidemics changed the social landscape of Nairobi and introduced the initial semblance 
of racialized planning ideals. If people like Edwin Chadwick and Joseph Bazalgette left 
permanent imprints on London’s sanitary landscape, in the colonies within the first two 
decades of the 20th century, it was a person such as W. J. Simpson who created the 
socio-technical milieu that would precipitate the water and sanitation systems alongside 
other key infrastructures.  I say this on the understanding that the sweeping 
recommendations by these engineers or public health experts ended by having 
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widespread ripple effects on the socio-political and economic core of the emerging 
polities and their respective urban landscapes. 
 
For instance, the 1913 plague outbreak in Nairobi was blamed yet again on the 
conditions of the buzzing Indian bazaar.  This saw another commission headed by 
Professor W. J. Simpson being constituted by the Colonial Office to look into the 
sanitary matters bedevilling Nairobi.515 Simpson was an experienced health officer who 
had worked in many colonies, including India.  Specifically, he had been the head of 
the sanitary commission in Accra in 1909 and alsoin Lagos.  The Colonial Office hence 
saw his reputation as vital in unravelling the persistent problem of the plague that was 
threatening one of the rapidly emerging nodes for their East African interests. Going by 
what Simpson had recommended for Accra in the Gold Coast (Ghana), it came as no 
surprise when he recommended racial segregation as one of the health policies for 
Nairobi.  He had strongly argued against the indigenous water access methods that had 
thrived in Accra, racially terming them as primitive, and placed the responsibility of 
providing WSS infrastructure for ‘natives’ on the white man, categorically stating that 
this was his burden.516 It is such sentiments that reinforced the over-emphasis on large 
centralized systems of infrastructure in nascent cities such as Nairobi.Anchored on the 
principles of separated settlements and the belief in centralized systems as a panacea to 
the public health challenges in urban areas, Simpson’s Nairobi sanitary Report of 1913 
legitimised the call for the removal of the Indian bazaar.  His further recommendation 
that a system of compulsory connection of houses with sewers be effected –seemingly 
reproducing Chadwick’s 1842 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring 
Classes of Great Britain – alienated the urban underclass that could not afford such 
measures.  Political scientist John Dryzek,in what he sees as a system of ‘administrative 
rationalism’,described the process of harnessing scientific expertise by administrators to 
solve environmental problems.517 As such, it is a process that is politicised, is full of 
controversies and is one likely to be contested.  The Simpson Report advanced 
‘rationalised’ racial segregation in how Nairobi was spatially appropriated.  However, 
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does the skewed nature of infrastructure access and supply imply racialized 
provisioning or what has been characterised as ‘spatial apartheid’?518 
 
To effect Simpson’s vision for Nairobi, a certain political structure reminiscent of post-
1842 Britain had to be created.  Municipalization along Joseph Chamberlain’s ‘civic 
gospel’ ideals wasset in motion with the Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1922.519 
This sets in motion the purchase of all water supply infrastructure assets from the 
railway corporation, marking the end to its close to two decades management of water 
infrastructure alongside the colonial governments’ inadequate sanitary system. 
Furthermore, the Muthaiga water company that had operated from 1911 as the first 
private water company in Kenya was also acquired.  With the Water Act of 1952, the 
Nairobi City Council gained sweeping powers and sought to be declared as the sole 
water undertaker.  This obsession with monolithic systems of supply and centralized 
urban governance modes must be seen as having thrived within a strong-handed 
colonial regime and perpetuated in the postcolony by the powerful single-party states 
that emerge in most former colonial metropolises.  However, this attempt at attaining 
technological determinism and urban social re-engineering through technologies of 
supply, despite becoming the dominant imprint of ‘modernism’ or ‘westernization’ that 
constitutes the urban-scape, was met with either forms of protests, contestations, the 
persistency of the old as evidenced by the continued reliance on ground water modes of 
supply in the form of wells and bore-holes,or the emergence of hybridized systems that 
emerged to complement the ‘networked’ municipal mains supply systems. 
 
Secondly, going back to the question of how the colonial consolidation of power and 
how politics of domination, subjugation and subversion shape the technological 
discourse in the urban South, notions of travelling technical ideals and binaries of the 
old versus the new, the ‘modern versus indigene’ or ‘big versus small’ have to be 
delineated to provide insights into the non-seamless web of technology appropriation. 
Mikael Hård, inexploring the ideal of conflict and consensus in technology, warns that a 
functionalist methodology or approach can never succeed in being critical in a 
substantial manner and that despite managing to unravel both the unexpected and 
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unwanted aspects of a technology, we will not be in a position to suggest any 
alternative vision.520 To be able to locate agency both as technically embedded and as 
social-culturally constructed, we must borrow Edmund Husserl’s philosophical 
injunction, to the things themselves, as echoed by Langdon Winner. 521  While the 
development of uneven ‘networked infrastructure’ systems in the Global South has 
been interpreted in the context of racial subjugation, the focus needs to shift more on 
trying to question the components of the models that necessitate certain outcomes. 
Infrastructure systems have an economic and political embedding. Since systems of 
provision of services, for example, water and sanitation, were carried out following the 
designs and plans from the North almost with no tinkering, it would be interesting to 
unravel the reasons for why their implementation alienate certain members of the 
society from the network. 
 
D’Souza points out that the gravitational scheme was lifted from the landscapes of 
Britain and superimposed on the empire with great confidence and largely unmodified 
designs and procedures.522 It follows, therefore, that the varying results of the systems 
are solely to be located in the failure by the engineers to appreciate that the metropole 
and colony constituted two distinct locations.523 However, unevenness in access is not 
unique to the new frontiers of technological conquest.  For example, Noyan 
Dinçkal’sIstanbul is a variegated supply system of fountains and pipes, which 
respectively reproduce the bifurcated nature of the city along economic lines.524In the 
case of Nairobi and most other Global South polities, I argued that the cost-recovery 
component that is embedded in large technical projects due to their capital-intensive 
nature is what redrew the access map.  Service was provided on the principle of the 
customer’s payability; hence, to a large extent, the skewed nature of connectivity 
reproduces itself due to economic or class premises though operating in an environment 
of autocratic colonial subjugation, it does not become a case of either one or the other. 
By operating on shoestring budgets, the colonial authorities in Nairobi concentrated 
infrastructure development in the white-dominated areas as a way of enhancing 
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the‘European good lifestyles’.  Except for the government institutions, individuals had 
to apply for connectivity, but the cost of connection from the mains remained solely on 
the interested client.  The ‘willing seller willing buyer’ approach, though not the main 
consideration throughout, meant that the socio-economic environment was a key 
determinant in the production of spatially dichotomized cities.  Infrastructures acted as 
reinforcers of this division in an unintended manner, but in a consciously racially 
divided environment. 
 
It justified to conclude that the faltering start of the first two decades of Nairobi’s 
emergence and growth auctioned it to western ideals of urban development.  The entry 
of global institutions like the World Bank, which had an expanded mandate from its 
former IBRD, and the UNO through UNDP, WHO, and other agencies,meant the 
continuation of prescribed solutions that purported to consider local involvement yet 
perpetuated foreign ideals as conceived in Washington, New York, Brussels or London. 
The pattern of development adopted and the bracketing of indigenous systems of 
thought, survival and development as bordering on illegality militated against 
technological invention and innovation in the water and sanitation provision for Nairobi 
despite its continued existence as a water deficient city.  In retrospect, it is not that the 
high-modernist and elitist planners in Nairobi did not see the potential in small 
approaches.  Rather, the problem lies in the utopic and fantasist visualizations of the 
city.  The indigene to the city is seen as a sore spot, warranting eradication, eviction or 
relocation.  However, today most states take a more tacit approach to the question of the 
indigene in the urban space. 
 
Perhaps ‘high modernism’ failed to acknowledge the multiplicity of actors within a 
system and unilaterally bequeathed science, as understood in the West, with the 
unquestionable ability to determine the future of society along a predetermined path. 
And in the break from the old, the machine acquired almost an idolised status as a non-
human actant525 in production without paying attention to the nature of the interactive 
process that is shrouded with cultural and political underpinnings.  It is a case of either 
the machine having been humanised to disregard human agency in the making of 
history or a high modernism ideology having trusted the engineer, technocrat, shrewd 
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business person or autocratic administrator with the ultimate role of determining the 
course of history through the planning and implementation of grandiose futuristic plans. 
By seeing infrastructures and technological artefacts as apolitical, modernist 
scholarship and implementers of LTSs saw most projects either hit an outright dead end 
or precipitate the perpetual crisis that engulfed cities such as Nairobi.  The boomerang 
failure of the high-modernist thinking paved the way for the emergence of 
Schumacher’s school of thought on planning and technologies of provisioning for 
livelihood sustenance.  As revealed by most studies, the establishment of public 
services or utility companies in the North to attain some semblance of universalization 
was a process full of conflict and a long process that continued for close to a century.526 
Yet, Global South polities were expected to follow similar trajectories, but with a 
shorter time to come to fruition, perhaps with importation and implantation from the 
North being seen to anchor such optimism.  The South was expected to absorb these 
‘best practices’ and the power of the machine from the North through replication and 
adoption without adaptation, hybridization or even rejection.  The propagation of the 
West as providing technological prototypes rather than templates for theGlobal South’s 
‘leap forward’ implied failure, social differentiation and a broadening gap between the 
elitist political and business class and the urban poor.  Today, despite the vibrancy in 
small-scale approaches especially in urban informal spaces, the lack of a system of 
upscaling the technologies involved presents an almost similar narrative as that which 
befell the large projects that became ‘white elephants’. 
 
7.3.3.  Obduracy, Temporality, and the notion of ‘Home’ and ‘House’ 
Cities have traditionally been understood as socially dualized through the lenses of 
native versus immigrant settlers, age differentials, ethnicity, and education as polarized 
extremes.527 For instance, Fanon draws the binary of a settler town built in stone and 
steel, and the native or Negro village, the ‘Medina’ as a town on its knees and 
wallowing in the mire.528 Abu-Lughod stated that the major metropolis in almost every 
newly industrializing country is not a single unified city but two different cities 
                                                 
526See de Swaan (1988) 
527See Mollenkopf and Castells (1993), pp.254-5. 
528 Fanon (1961), pp. 37-39. 
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physically juxtaposed but architecturally and socially distinct.529 Freund indicates that 
the dual city in Africa is a widespread phenomenon necessitated by various historical 
and political factors in the face of European hegemonization. 530  Borrowing from 
Marcuse’s challenge of the dual city thesis, where he argues that a complex reality 
exists in the contemporary city with multiplicity (‘several different groups and 
quarters’) rather than duality, I equally paint a picture of a multifaceted heterogeneous 
city in terms of technologies of social service provisioning for Nairobi and the inertia of 
centralized networks vis-à-vis the counter-active movements from below characteristics 
of the ‘off-grid’ localities.  Rather than interpreting the urban as a case of two polarized 
extremes, as is the case in Mollenkopf and Castells’thesis, I argue that the large 
technical and centralized systems or rather the network city exists in complementarity 
with the devolved topologies that operate adjacently to the municipal networks.  The 
‘small’ technologies of provision do not compete or seek to undermine the ‘big’. 
Instead, they complement each other as modalities that define the everyday experiences 
of people in cities like Nairobi as they mediate through the quest for livelihood 
sustenance.  The technologies of provisioning are enculturalized to distinctly identify 
certain groups within certain contexts and the two co-exist side by side as they spatially 
and socially map out the urbanscape. 
 
In Nairobi, for example, the water kiosks as small or fragmented modalities of water 
provisioning are wholly dependent on the municipal authority’s network for their water 
supply,531 whether legally connected from above or illegally connected from below. 
The spaghettization and use of porters that is characteristic of the informal areas, the 
boreholes that serve exclusive and expansive former colonial and European rich urban 
ranching citadels like Karen, the motorized water bowsers, trucks and pushcarts that 
service the intermittent middle income residential settlements, and the overhead storage 
tanks that augment the high-end suburbs of Nairobi represent the collage that is the 
waterscape for Nairobi alongside the septic tanks, cesspools, soak pits, pit-latrines, 
motorized exhaustersand hand-pulled carts that constitute the various modalities of 
sewerage management for Nairobi, and which complement the conventional urban 
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municipal networked city model. It is at the interfaces between technology and people 
as users as well as co-producers that multi-directional configurations and 
reconfigurations occur to build these complementary systems of supply and access. 
 
All in all, the acknowledgement of the obdurate technologies that connote either the 
indigene or the small and the complementarity arrangement with which heterogeneous 
socio-technical artefacts co-exist alongside each other to offer Nairobi stability in water 
and sanitation in the face of distress reveal not only questions of how the city as an 
urban space was conceived by the colonialists and postcolonial elites but also how 
people visualize it through their lived experiences.  These lived experiences are not just 
socio-culturally drawn, they are also shaped by the techno-political arrangements, 
especially as defined by the bureaucratic instruments of administration that include 
urban management boards and municipal councils.  Geographer Erik Swyngedouwhas 
observed that ‘the political and the technical, the social and the natural become 
mobilized through socio-spatial arrangements that shape distinct geographies and 
landscapes; landscapes that celebrate the visions of the elite networks, reveal the scars 
suffered by the disempowered, and nurture the possibilities and dreams for alternative 
visions.’532  How do these alternative visions contrast, clash or operate at a socio-
cultural and techno-political equilibrium?  The arrangement of pipes, grids, steel and 
concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts or today’s digital and virtual signals not 
only exist to solve practical or tangible issues in society, they also constitute certain 
intended or unintended political and economic arrangements loaded with 
representations of status, ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’ or other forms of symbolism.  
They shape socio-political and economic relations and operate within certain enabling 
frameworks, for example, in the form of the colonial or neo-colonial state, the 
autocratic or democratic state, the structuralist or welfarist and liberal state. 
 
In a newspaper article of 19th January 2014, titled, Africa’s Poverty Contradictions and 
Dead Capital, Bitange Ndemo – a technocrat and former senior government official 
who became the face of one of Kenya’s most elaborate plan for a ‘fantasy city’, that is, 
Konza City – observed that, ‘…it is why we are building haphazardly to the extent that 
we may never benefit from common infrastructure like energy, water, and sewerage 
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that minimizes cost and ensures disease is kept at bay’.533 What is striking in this kind 
of thinking, more than a century since the birth of Nairobi, is not the enormous faith 
that the technocrats and political elites continue to place in the highly conceptualized 
central systems of provision and rationalized urban topologies, but the obduracy of so-
called ‘haphazard’ development.  The ‘rational’ and ‘organic’ city develop concurrently 
as long as exclusionary visions continue to be pursued. Revisiting colonialism, it is 
right to state that Nairobi was envisioned as a ‘white man’s peculiar creation’,534 one 
where ‘Africans could only be temporary residents of the town, coming in only to 
minister to the white man’s needs as labourers and eventually returning to their rural 
homes’.535 Through restrictive legal and policy instruments, Africans were prohibited 
from developing a permanent sense of settlement in urban areas.  Conversations with 
most Nairobians bring to the fore a sense of temporality that has been perpetuated over 
time whereby even those who own urban houses come to consider themselves as 
‘sojourners’ with ‘houses’ rather than ‘homes’.536 How does this notion of ‘house’ and 
‘home’ as reinforced by either local cultural values of home (upcountry or rural) or 
exclusionary urban techno-economic and political ideologies impact on the 
infrastructural techno-scape as we pursue questions of meaning and effect? 
 
Because of the exclusionary land auctions, most initial African residential areas in the 
urban areas were outside the ‘city proper’ and were largely self-construction 
efforts.537As discussed in this thesis, self-constructed sites like Kibera serve as centres 
for either bottoms-up innovative ventures of provisioning or reveal the persistency of 
the indigenous people.  The aspect of ‘self-construction’, ‘do it yourself’ or Andrew 
Hake’s characterization of Nairobi as a ‘self-help city’,538 I argue, reveals the ‘human or 
user agency’ in technology.  However, this user agency can easily be frustrated by 
overbearing the administrative organs of the state.  For instance, in the 1960s and early 
1970s, the Mathare Valley – from where Andrew Hake as a church and social developer 
directly interacted with people, leading to his aforementioned publication – witnessed 
                                                 
533NdemoSunday Nationnewspaper, 14th January 2014. 
534 See Parnell, ‘Creating Racial Privilege,’ p. 471, and Swanson, ‘Urban Origins of Separate Development,’ p. 31. 
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asurge in local bottom-linked initiatives of land appropriation through communal land-
buying companies and, at the same time,an embracing of technical ventures of 
provision through self-help schemes.  Despite the potency of such initiatives, the 
autocratic state either directly suppressed them through a system of policy standards or 
tacit ‘slum clearance’, evictions or budgetary constrictions.   One tragedy that I notedin 
the urban infrastructure management is the lack of people’s direct participation in 
technological decision-making in most of the Global South if the example of Nairobi 
can be assumed to reflect the case of most former colonies.  In City Water, City Life, 
Smith discusses what he characterizes as ‘water and the infrastructure of ideas in 
urbanizing Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago’ and what comes out clearly is the 
overwhelming role played by ordinary and powerful individuals alike in deciding on the 
ideal technologies of supplying themselves with water.539 
 
The emergence of political pluralism in Kenya from 1991 against the backdrop of the 
weaknesses of the ‘appropriate technology’ rhetoric and the augmentation of liberal 
market ideals in the management of infrastructure systems provided a new impetus for 
individual and communal agency in technologies of water and sanitation provisioning 
for Nairobi.  Areas that had, for long, operated as ‘blank and blind’ spots have 
witnessed massive grassroots mobilization, realizing their innovative potential. By 
partnering with various financial state and foreign actors, Nairobi has seen the 
emergence of remarkable technologies such as the bio-centre approach. Also, the 
standpipe and kiosk systems of supply for water are slowly being incorporated into the 
‘formal’ arrangement as indicated in this thesis through the ‘Informal Settlements 
department’ of the NCWSC. 
 
7.4 Reflecting on Further Research 
Achille Mbembe correctly notes that although innovation in urban development often 
occurs in the South, its networks are not simply North-South, but also South-East-
North-South and South-South, amongst many other flows.540 While the North-South 
paradigm dominates most technological discourses towards developing scholarship on 
technology, for example, the history of technology, which is my primary concern, it 
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will be imperative for inclusive narratives that acknowledge multidirectional flows of 
knowledge to be developed.  In the social discourses of the metropolis in the South, the 
approach is basically an asymmetrical binary of European or White (North) and 
indigenes.  However, the truth is that these localities constitute multiple groups of 
people.  For example, the history of Nairobi is interwoven into that of many local and 
immigrant groups, which include Asians (Indians), Africans of Nubian origin from 
Sudan brought in during the occupation as military porters and soldiers, Somalis and 
Arabs or Swahilis from the coast of Kenya.  It is impossible to discuss Nairobi through 
the tension between Africans and Europeans alone.  From the pioneering period, Asians 
have had a strong imprint on the economic, social and political texture of Nairobi and 
only a multi-pronged approach can be as revealing as possible.  This applies to virtually 
allofthe-Global South cities and, by extension, the Global North as humans transiting is 
as old as humanity. More inclusionary methodologies, as well as theoretical 
frameworks, need to be adopted towards writing a global HOT. 
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